arXiv · 2611.09337
Sanctions, Evasion, and Deterrence: Evidence from Speeding Enforcement
Abstract
The design of sanctions plays a central role in shaping reoffending behavior. We study the effects of fixed monetary fines and accumulating penalty points on speeding recidivism and liability transfer. Exploiting a large increase in sanctions in Queensland, Australia, we estimate the causal effects of these sanctions on subsequent offending and nomination of other drivers. Higher demerit points increase fine renomination, consistent with strategic blame shifting. Estimated reductions in reoffending are small among offenders facing higher fines alone. Reoffending falls by a substantial 4.6 percentage points when higher fines are accompanied by additional penalty points.
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Romain Gauriot, Maria Wisniewska. 2026-11-06. Sanctions, Evasion, and Deterrence: Evidence from Speeding Enforcement. https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09337
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