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arXiv · 2611.10591

Sequential Candidate Entry: A Counterexample to the Osborne--Kats Conjecture

Abstract

Finitely many potential candidates sequentially choose an electoral position on the interval [0,1] or stay out, observing all prior choices. Voters have a uniform distribution of ideal positions on the same interval and vote non-strategically for a nearest candidate; candidates at the same position divide its votes. Candidates with the largest vote share divide a unit payoff equally, losing entrants receive a negative payoff, and staying out yields zero. In the mid-1980s, Osborne and Kats conjectured that, for every number $n\geq 2$ of players, the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcome has only the first and last players entering at the median. We refute the conjecture by establishing the existence of a different SPNE outcome for 12 players. Starting from the first two entries proposed earlier by de Vries, we select an SPNE strategy profile after the first two locations 1/2 and 1/10 that gives the second player payoff at least 1/10.

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BibTeXRIS

Dmitry Dagaev. 2026-11-07. Sequential Candidate Entry: A Counterexample to the Osborne--Kats Conjecture. https://searcharxiv.com/abs/2611.10591

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