arXiv · 2611.10851
Optimal hybrid tax enforcement
Abstract
Modern tax design and enforcement rely on classification data reported by taxpayers. Data improve the targeting of tax policy and audits but also open avenues for evasion. How can tax authorities use such data while accounting for their potential strategic distortion? We demonstrate that restoring deterrence generates an endogenous global verification frontier: every report below the frontier is verified through either a profit audit or data verification. Optimal hybrid tax enforcement requires selecting which data classes are subject to profit audits up to the global frontier and which are profit-audited only up to lower class-specific cutoffs, with data verification taking over beyond these cutoffs. This costly data verification requirement limits the benefit from differentiated tax enforcement. Optimal implementation is characterized by profit bunching but involves no data bunching.
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Saara Hämäläinen, Eduardo Ferraz, Sebastián Castillo Ramos. 2026-11-07. Optimal hybrid tax enforcement. https://searcharxiv.com/abs/2611.10851
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