Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv · 2611.12151

Individual incentives and uniform gains under symmetric constraints

Abstract

We study the division of a fixed total under symmetric joint constraints when agents have continuous, strictly single-peaked preferences over their own shares. Each agent reports a complete preference, including comparisons across the two sides of her peak. For any finite population and any nonempty closed convex permutation-invariant feasible set, we characterize the uniform-gains rule by efficiency, symmetry, individual strategy-proofness, and own-coordinate peak-onlyness. The last condition requires that a change of preference leaving an agent's peak fixed also leave her own share fixed; it places no direct restriction on others' shares. The characterization separates uniqueness from continuity and yields a continuous characterization with individual incentives for compact feasible sets that are polyhedral or relatively full-dimensional and strictly convex. We then show that, for every population of two through six agents and every nonempty compact convex permutation-invariant feasible set, efficiency, symmetry, and individual strategy-proofness alone characterize uniform gains. The proof recovers allocations from the shares attainable by unilateral reports, feasible transfers, and endpoint reports. A common induction applies at each population, with additional starting configurations for five and six agents.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Siwei Chen. 2026-11-09. Individual incentives and uniform gains under symmetric constraints. https://searcharxiv.com/abs/2611.12151

Citations retain the original authors and DOI and include this site’s record URL. If this discovery service contributed to your research, you can also cite Searcharxiv by Indiciae: BibTeX · RIS.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Simple Communication

We study simple communication in a multidimensional cheap talk model with aligned preferences. An expert communicates with a decision-maker using a score, i.e., an aggregator of a multidimensional state into a one-dimensional message. Even though the expert and the decision-maker share the same payoffs, equilibrium payoffs are lower than those achievable under commitment to a score. Under quadratic-loss utility, any equilibrium score must be linear in the state or a coarsening of a linear score. Finally, for normally distributed states, we characterize the equilibrium linear scores and show they include the ex-ante best and worst linear scores.

econ.TH↗

The Economics of AI Foundation Models: Openness, Competition, and Governance

Foundation model developers choose how open to make their models. Greater openness lowers downstream adaptation costs but can also make competing models easier to use. In a two-period model, an incumbent chooses its license fee and openness, a deployer adapts the model for users, and an entrant offers a competing model. Usage builds model-specific experience that lowers the deployer's future adaptation cost, creating a data flywheel that favors continued use of the incumbent. We identify conditions under which optimal openness falls and then rises as learning strengthens. The incumbent moves from full openness and a high fee to restricting openness for retention, then to a low fee that builds enough usage and experience to retain the deployer despite greater openness. A full-openness mandate can induce the incumbent to abandon this low-fee strategy. The higher fee can reduce first-period adaptation despite greater openness. An openness trap arises when this welfare loss exceeds the second-period gain from easier adaptation of the entrant's model. The trap can disappear when experience transfers across models. Full integration eliminates the fee between the incumbent and deployer but commits deployment to the incumbent, potentially forgoing a rival that is cheaper to adapt. Integration raises their joint profit, consumer surplus, and welfare when learning is sufficiently strong, but can lower them when learning is weak. A small usage subsidy can benefit both developers, the deployer, and consumers. It can instead induce a fee increase larger than the subsidy and reduced openness, raising the deployer's net payment per use and adaptation costs. The resulting reduction in adaptation lowers welfare even before subsidy expenditure is deducted. These findings connect AI policy to developers' pricing and openness responses and the portability of deployment experience.

econ.TH↗

Convex Order and Moment Persuasion

We study Bayesian persuasion with multidimensional states when the sender's payoff depends on the distribution of posterior means. The choice of information policy in such an environment reduces to an optimization over distributions of posterior means dominated by the prior in convex order. We study extreme points of this feasible set using results on irreducible-component structure from martingale transport theory. When the prior assigns zero mass to the union of the relative boundaries of the non-singleton components, then on each such component the distribution of posterior means is dominated by the prior in convex order. In such cases, extreme points must satisfy affine independence of the conditional posterior-mean support in almost every component. Without boundary negligibility, local affine independence remains necessary but is not sufficient. Unlike in the one-dimensional case, in environments with multidimensional states, extreme points can have uncountably many lower-dimensional components that are not singletons.

econ.TH↗