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arXiv · 2611.13616

Optimal Trading Speed on Blockchain

Abstract

On blockchain-based exchanges, faster blocks weaken the priority-fee competition among arbitrageurs and shift rents from the block producer to them. Equilibrium liquidity peaks at an interior block speed; beyond a threshold, an active liquidity provider cream-skims and passive capital shrinks. Evidence from the Base Flashblocks upgrade, a tenfold block-speed increase, confirms the predictions. Priority-fee bids decrease sharply and arbitrageurs' net profit rises. The active liquidity provider rebalances faster, avoids toxic flow, and earns a higher profit. Pool depth falls and effective spreads widen despite closer tracking of external prices.

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BibTeXRIS

Ruizhe Jia, Shihao Yu. 2026-11-12. Optimal Trading Speed on Blockchain. https://searcharxiv.com/abs/2611.13616

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