arXiv · 2611.18767
China's Local Government Debt, Strategic Competition, and Bitcoin Demand: A Conditional Transmission Framework
Abstract
How might the resolution of China's local-government debt affect strategic competition and Bitcoin demand? This paper develops a conditional framework connecting debt accounting, bank balance-sheet adjustment, public spending priorities, and constrained portfolio substitution. A debt swap can increase recognized government debt without increasing consolidated principal, while its effect on credit capacity depends on capital relief, loss recognition, and recapitalization. A protected strategic-spending floor can preserve current effort while shifting adjustment toward civilian productive services. In the asset block, stronger relative preference for Bitcoin does not ensure greater effective demand: access constraints and global funding conditions can reverse the sign. We derive a finite-shock threshold and deterministic sign bounds, and distinguish Bitcoin demand from demand for dollar stablecoins. Reproducible numerical illustrations and channel-removal exercises show that opposite outcomes are compatible with the same assumed fiscal stress. The analysis uses dated primary sources to establish institutional context, but estimates neither a debt-to-Bitcoin causal coefficient nor a price-impact scale. Its contribution is a compact set of conditions and measurement distinctions for evaluating transmission claims, rather than an unconditional price forecast or an inference about conflict probabilities.
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Bit Sun. 2026-11-12. China's Local Government Debt, Strategic Competition, and Bitcoin Demand: A Conditional Transmission Framework. https://searcharxiv.com/abs/2611.18767
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