arXiv · 2611.19021
Aggregating Rankings of Coalitions to Rank Individuals
Abstract
We develop an ordinal framework for aggregating a profile of rankings of coalitional performances to determine the ranking of individuals. From university ratings to the assessment of team-sports players, we often evaluate individuals based on their coalitional performances. Although such evaluation has been addressed by cooperative game theory, it is only recently that its ordinal counterpart, social ranking theory (Moretti, 2015), has emerged. As most of the literature considers a single coalitional ranking (which corresponds to a real-valued characteristic function), we extend the model to allow a profile of coalitional rankings (which corresponds to a multidimensional characteristic function). We tackle the aggregation problem by introducing three families of inter-profile axioms, each representing how the rankings should interact or contribute to the output. After revealing fundamental impossibilities concerning the reconciliation of different families, we characterize a new solution, Pareto-extension Lex-cel (PEL), via some weaker versions of the inter-profile axioms. PEL extends Lex-cel, which is a central solution in social ranking theory, by analogy with Sen's Pareto extension rule. Our results develop the connection between classical Arrovian aggregation, cooperative game theory, and social ranking theory.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Explore connections, maps & timelines
Takahiro Suzuki. 2026-11-13. Aggregating Rankings of Coalitions to Rank Individuals. https://searcharxiv.com/abs/2611.19021
Citations retain the original authors and DOI and include this site’s record URL. If this discovery service contributed to your research, you can also cite Searcharxiv by Indiciae: BibTeX · RIS.