arXiv · 2611.22268
Anticipating or Speculating? Making Futures Pay in AI Ethics
Abstract
Philosophers have recently been trying to develop uniform decision rules for instances in which physicians' judgments diverge from the recommendations of medical artificial intelligence (AI) systems. I argue that this effort is fatally flawed because the performance and appropriate use of algorithmic recommendation systems by physicians are highly context-specific, empirical medical matters rather than epistemological ones. In such instances, general decision rules can be stipulated only to the extent that they abstract away from relevant, indeed determinative, contextual circumstances. The alleged problem of physician-AI disagreement, and others like it, play into longstanding disputes in technology ethics about the viability and utility of envisioning possible futures: is this useful "anticipation" or wasteful "speculation"? I suggest that the two may be distinguished. Anticipation explores plausible futures to help inform present actions under irreducible uncertainty. Speculation abstracts away uncertainty, developing formal solutions to stipulated circumstances whose relationship to the real present is often quite unclear. Efforts to develop crisp philosophical solutions to physician-AI disagreement, among other problems, fall into the latter category. Technology ethics should remember that fruitful futures thinking must both begin from and return to the messy, uncertain present.
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John P. Nelson. 2026-11-17. Anticipating or Speculating? Making Futures Pay in AI Ethics. https://searcharxiv.com/abs/2611.22268
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