arXiv · 2611.23223
Equilibrium Statistics and Stability in Random Two-Population and Three-Population Evolutionary Games
Abstract
Multi-population matrix evolutionary games provide a framework for studying adaptation and strategic interactions among heterogeneous agents. When payoffs are uncertain, however, analysing a specified game does not reveal how frequently different evolutionary outcomes occur or how their probabilities depend on modelling assumptions. We study two- and three-population games with two strategies per population and both within- and between-population pairwise interactions, with payoffs fixed during each evolutionary trajectory. For two populations, we derive equilibrium-existence probabilities and analytical stability results for generic games and three structured classes: diversity, exclusive, and avoidance games. For generic two-population games, independent Gaussian sampling of payoff entries and of replicator coefficients produces different equilibrium statistics. Interaction structure further distinguishes coexistence from attraction: diversity and exclusive games share the same interior-existence probability, but only exclusive games admit asymptotically stable interior equilibria. Avoidance games admit transversely attracting equilibrium families without locally asymptotically stable individual points. For generic three-population games under independent payoff sampling, we obtain existence probabilities for all equilibrium types and joint existence-and-stability probabilities for boundary equilibria. Monte Carlo simulations support the analytical predictions and quantify multistability, while phase portraits illustrate initial-condition dependence. Under the same Gaussian payoff-sampling protocol, simulations show a lower frequency of fully mixed equilibria but a higher frequency of multistability for three populations than for two.
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Zhao Song, Manh Hong Duong, The Anh Han. 2026-11-17. Equilibrium Statistics and Stability in Random Two-Population and Three-Population Evolutionary Games. https://searcharxiv.com/abs/2611.23223
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