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arXiv · 2611.23353

Idempotency Is Not Recovery: A Fault-Injection Study of Language-Model Agent Tool Actions

Abstract

When a language-model agent's tool call is interrupted, the action may already have changed an external system without confirmation. Retrying risks duplication; assuming success may conceal an action that never occurred. We study these failure modes in a controlled agent runtime combining authorization, an action ledger, target-side idempotency, reconciliation, and evidence sealing. We inject ten single-host fault classes and compare four configurations and three ablations using a target-side oracle separate from the runtime ledger. On each of Windows and Linux, 7,513 trials used 96 captured model responses from 24 constructed cases. In 200 known original crash and replay pairs, the full configuration recorded 0/200 repeated effects versus 117/200 for each simpler baseline. A ledger-related ablation had 170/170 orphaned effects versus 0/170 and 200/300 recovery successes versus 300/300 for the full configuration. Disabling reconciliation left 100/100 known post-effect crash outcomes ambiguous despite no observed duplicates. A separate supplement designed after the initial results and reusing the same inputs found a similar pattern under response loss or delay. The full runtime had about one-seventh of fail-open throughput, while injected evidence-write faults left 75/100 trials per platform unresolved. These findings distinguish duplicate suppression from recovery and identify their measured reliability and performance tradeoffs within the tested benchmark.

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BibTeXRIS

Song Xu. 2026-11-17. Idempotency Is Not Recovery: A Fault-Injection Study of Language-Model Agent Tool Actions. https://searcharxiv.com/abs/2611.23353

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