arXiv · cond-mat/0104338
Sex-Oriented stable matchings of the Marriage Problem with correlated and incomplete information
Abstract
In the Stable Marriage Problem two sets of agents must be paired according to mutual preferences, which may happen to conflict. We present two generalizations of its sex-oriented version, aiming to take into account correlations between the preferences of agents and costly information. Their effects are investigated both numerically and analytically.
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G. Caldarelli, Andrea Capocci, Paolo Laureti. 2001-04-18. Sex-Oriented stable matchings of the Marriage Problem with correlated and incomplete information. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4371(01)00305-3
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