arXiv · cond-mat/0206213
A secure key-exchange protocol with an absence of injective functions
Abstract
The security of neural cryptography is investigated. A key-exchange protocol over a public channel is studied where the parties exchanging secret messages use multilayer neural networks which are trained by their mutual output bits and synchronize to a time dependent secret key. The weights of the networks have integer values between $\pm L$. Recently an algorithm for an eavesdropper which could break the key was introduced by Shamir et al. [adi]. We show that the synchronization time increases with $L^2$ while the probability to find a successful attacker decreases exponentially with $L$. Hence for large $L$ we find a secure key-exchange protocol which depends neither on number theory nor on injective trapdoor functions used in conventional cryptography.
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R. Mislovaty, Y. Perchenok, Ido Kanter, Wolfgang Kinzel. 2002-06-12. A secure key-exchange protocol with an absence of injective functions. https://doi.org/10.1103/physreve.66.066102
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