arXiv · cond-mat/0208273
Co-evolutionary games on networks
Abstract
We study agents on a network playing an iterated Prisoner's dilemma against their neighbors. The resulting spatially extended co-evolutionary game exhibits stationary states which are Nash equilibria. After perturbation of these equilibria, avalanches of mutations reestablish a stationary state. Scale-free avalanche distributions are observed that are in accordance with calculations from the Nash equilibria and a confined branching process. The transition from subcritical to critical avalanche dynamics can be traced to a change in the degeneracy of the cooperative macrostate and is observed for many variants of this game.
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Holger Ebel, Stefan Bornholdt. 2002-08-14. Co-evolutionary games on networks. https://doi.org/10.1103/physreve.66.056118
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