arXiv · cond-mat/0209086
Evolutionary games and quasispecies
Abstract
We discuss a population of sequences subject to mutations and frequency-dependent selection, where the fitness of a sequence depends on the composition of the entire population. This type of dynamics is crucial to understand the evolution of genomic regulation. Mathematically, it takes the form of a reaction-diffusion problem that is nonlinear in the population state. In our model system, the fitness is determined by a simple mathematical game, the hawk-dove game. The stationary population distribution is found to be a quasispecies with properties different from those which hold in fixed fitness landscapes.
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M. Laessig, L. Peliti, F. Tria. 2003-02-10. Evolutionary games and quasispecies. https://doi.org/10.1209/epl%2Fi2003-00416-x
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