arXiv · cond-mat/0212481
Evolutionary Minority Games: the benefits of imitation
Abstract
In the original Evolutionary Minority Game, a segregation into two populations with opposing preferences is observed under many circumstances. We show that this segregation becomes more pronounced and more robust if the dynamics are changed slightly, such that strategies with above-average fitness become more frequent. Similar effects occur also for a generalization of the EMG to more than two choices, and for evolutionary dynamics of a different stochastic strategy for the Minority Game.
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Richard Metzler, Christian Horn. 2002-12-19. Evolutionary Minority Games: the benefits of imitation. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4371(03)00626-5
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