arXiv · physics/0207020
Buyer feedback as a filtering mechanism for reputable sellers
Abstract
We propose a continuum model for the description of buyer and seller dynamics in an Internet market. The relevant variables are the research effort of buyers and the sellers' reputation building process. We show that, if a commercial web-site gives consumers the possibility to rate credibly sellers they bargained with, vendors are forced to be more honest. This leads to mutual beneficial symbiosis between buyers and sellers; the overall enhanced volume of transactions contributes ultimately to the web-site, which facilitates the matchmaking service.
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Paolo Laureti, Frantisek Slanina, Yi-Kuo Yu, Yi-Cheng Zhang. 2002-07-04. Buyer feedback as a filtering mechanism for reputable sellers. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4371(02)01215-3
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