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Ândrei Camponogara

Publications and source records attributed to Ândrei Camponogara.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Analysis of Sensing in OFDM-based ISAC under the Influence of Sampling Jitter

To enable integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) in cellular networks, a wide range of additional requirements and challenges are either imposed or become more critical. One such impairment is sampling jitter (SJ), which arises due to imperfections in the sampling instants of the clocks of digital-to-analog converters (DACs) and analog-to-digital converters (ADCs). While SJ is already well studied for communication systems based on orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM), which is expected to be the waveform of choice for most sixth-generation (6G) scenarios where ISAC could be possible, the implications of SJ on the OFDM-based radar sensing must still be thoroughly analyzed. Considering that phase-locked loop (PLL)-based oscillators are used to derive sampling clocks, which leads to colored SJ, i.e., SJ with non-flat power spectral density, this article analyzes the resulting distortion of the adopted digital constellation modulation and sensing performance in OFDM-based ISAC for both baseband (BB) and bandpass (BP) sampling strategies and different oversampling factors. For BB sampling, it is seen that SJ induces intercarrier interference (ICI), while for BP sampling, it causes carrier phase error and more severe ICI due to a phase noise-like effect at the digital intermediate frequency. Obtained results for a single-input single-output OFDM-based ISAC system with various OFDM signal parameterizations demonstrate that SJ-induced degradation becomes non-negligible for both BB and BP sampling only for root mean square (RMS) SJ values above 10^-11 s at both DAC and ADC, which corresponds to 0.5*10^-2 times the considered critical sampling period without oversampling. Based on the achieved results, it can be concluded that state-of-the-art hardware enables sufficient communication and sensing robustness against SJ, as RMS SJ values in the femtosecond range can be achieved.

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Physical Layer Security Techniques Applied to Vehicle-to-Everything Networks

Physical Layer Security (PLS) is an emerging concept in the field of secrecy for wireless communications that can be used alongside cryptography to prevent unauthorized devices from eavesdropping a legitimate transmission. It offers low computational cost and overhead by injecting an interfering signal in the wiretap channels of potential eavesdroppers. This paper discusses the benefits of the Artificial Noise and Cooperative Jamming techniques in the context of Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks, which require secure data exchange with small latency. The simulations indicate that messages can be safely delivered even with devices that have low available power.

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In-Home Broadband PLC Systems Under the Presence of a Malicious Wireless Device: Physical Layer Security Analysis

This paper investigates the physical layer security (PLS) of a broadband in-home power line communication (PLC) system when a malicious wireless device tries to eavesdrop private messages exchanged between two PLC devices. Such a security issue arises when electric power circuits, which are used for data communication, are constituted by unshielded power cables. In this regard, the hybrid wiretap channel model for formulating achievable secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability is considered. Additionally, a data set of channel estimates and measured additive noises obtained from a measurement campaign carried out in several in-home facilities is used for providing practical results, which can offer direction for dealing with the security aspects of broadband in-home PLC systems in the physical layer perspective. The attained results show high values of secrecy outage probability for all chosen values of target secrecy rate and total power transmission (practical and theoretical) when the PLC devices are far from each other and the eavesdropper is close to the PLC transmitter (i.e., the distance is shorter than 2 meters). Overall, the numerical results show that the vulnerability of broadband in-home PLC systems, in terms of PLS, is relevant when practical values of total transmission power apply. Therefore, a rethinking of the use of unshielded power cables or new designs of the broadband in-home PLC system deserves special attention for ensuring security at the physical layer.

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