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Øystein Marøy

Publications and source records attributed to Øystein Marøy.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Secure detection in quantum key distribution by real-time calibration of receiver

The single photon detection efficiency of the detector unit is crucial for the security of common quantum key distribution protocols like Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84). A low value for the efficiency indicates a possible eavesdropping attack that exploits the photon receiver's imperfections. We present a method for estimating the detection efficiency, and calculate the corresponding secure key generation rate. The estimation is done by testing gated detectors using a randomly activated photon source inside the receiver unit. This estimate gives a secure rate for any detector with non-unity single photon detection efficiency, both inherit or due to blinding. By adding extra optical components to the receiver, we make sure that the key is extracted from photon states for which our estimate is valid. The result is a quantum key distribution scheme that is secure against any attack that exploits detector imperfections.

quant-ph↗

Error Estimation, Error Correction and Verification In Quantum Key Distribution

We consider error correction in quantum key distribution. To avoid that Alice and Bob unwittingly end up with different keys precautions must be taken. Before running the error correction protocol, Bob and Alice normally sacrifice some bits to estimate the error rate. To reduce the probability that they end up with different keys to an acceptable level, we show that a large number of bits must be sacrificed. Instead, if Alice and Bob can make a good guess about the error rate before the error correction, they can verify that their keys are similar after the error correction protocol. This verification can be done by utilizing properties of Low Density Parity Check codes used in the error correction. We compare the methods and show that by verification it is often possible to sacrifice less bits without compromising security. The improvement is heavily dependent on the error rate and the block length, but for a key produced by the IdQuantique system Clavis^2, the increase in the key rate is approximately 5 percent. We also show that for systems with large fluctuations in the error rate a combination of the two methods is optimal.

quant-ph↗

Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography

We introduce the concept of a superlinear threshold detector, a detector that has a higher probability to detect multiple photons if it receives them simultaneously rather than at separate times. Highly superlinear threshold detectors in quantum key distribution systems allow eavesdropping the full secret key without being revealed. Here, we generalize the detector control attack, and analyze how it performs against quantum key distribution systems with moderately superlinear detectors. We quantify the superlinearity in superconducting single-photon detectors based on earlier published data, and gated avalanche photodiode detectors based on our own measurements. The analysis shows that quantum key distribution systems using detector(s) of either type can be vulnerable to eavesdropping. The avalanche photodiode detector becomes superlinear towards the end of the gate, allowing eavesdropping using trigger pulses containing less than 120 photons per pulse. Such an attack would be virtually impossible to catch with an optical power meter at the receiver entrance.

quant-ph↗

Security of quantum key distribution with arbitrary individual imperfections

We consider the security of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), with arbitrary individual imperfections simultaneously in the source and detectors. We provide the secure key generation rate, and show that only two parameters must be bounded to ensure security; the basis dependence of the source and a detector blinding parameter. The system may otherwise be completely uncharacterized and contain large losses.

quant-ph↗