Griotte: Verified Compartmentalisation via Capabilities
CHERIoT is a novel hardware-software co-design that leverages hardware capabilities to define a notion of compartment, in a minimalistic capability-based OS, CHERIoT RTOS. By default, compartments are isolated to limit damage in case of bugs or malicious behaviour. To allow cross-compartment communication, the OS provides a privileged component, called the switcher. The switcher provides an interface for cross-compartment calls, while enforcing isolation between compartments and guaranteeing stack safety. Together with hardware capabilities, the switcher is critical to enforce the security guarantees of the CHERIoT compartment model. The design of CHERIoT raises two questions: First, how can one formalise the informal notion of compartmentalisation that CHERIoT compartments are designed to provide? And second, given that the safety properties of CHERIoT hinge on the complementary roles of the capability machine and of the switcher, does the design of CHERIoT enforce the desired security properties? In this paper, we introduce Griotte and Griotte OS, idealised but faithful versions of the CHERIoT machine and the CHERIoT RTOS, which we use to answer these two questions: First, we formally capture the aforementioned security guarantees in the form of a continuation-based logical relation which captures the combined behaviour of the switcher and of the capability machine. And second, we define a specification for the Griotte switcher that enforces those guarantees, and prove that the implementation meets the specification. We demonstrate Griotte on a range of key scenarios illustrating different aspects of CHERIoT, including integrity of the local state in the presence of memory sharing with unknown code. Our approach is modular: we verify compartments individually, and then compose their specifications. Together, our contributions give a solid formal foundation to the design of CHERIoT.