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A. P. Pljonkin

Publications and source records attributed to A. P. Pljonkin.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Autonomous Picosecond-Precision Synchronization in Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution

Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) eliminates detector side-channel attacks by relocating all measurements to an untrusted intermediate node. However, its practical implementation critically relies on picosecond-level temporal synchronization between spatially separated users. In this work, we present a physically motivated autonomous synchronization algorithm for fiber-based MDI-QKD networks that does not require auxiliary optical channels or shared clock references. The method exploits round-trip optical pulse propagation and statistical signal detection in the presence of Gaussian noise. We derive analytical expressions for false-alarm probabilities, quantify detection reliability, and demonstrate through numerical modeling that synchronization accuracy better than 10~ps is achievable for channel lengths up to 100~km with realistic optical power levels. The proposed approach improves the scalability and robustness of MDI-QKD architectures and is directly applicable to metropolitan and backbone quantum networks.

quant-ph

Vulnerability of the Synchronization Process in the Quantum Key Distribution System

A typical structure of an auto-compensation system for quantum key distribution is given. The principle of operation of a fiber-optic system for the distribution of quantum keys with phase coding of photon states is described. The operation of the system in the synchronization mode and the formation of quantum keys was investigated. The process of detecting a time interval with an optical synchronization pulse is analyzed. The structural scheme of the experimental stand of the quantum-cryptographic network is given. Data are obtained that attest to the presence of a multiphoton signal during the transmission of sync pulses from the transceiver station to the coding and backward direction. The results of experimental studies are presented, which prove the existence of a vulnerability in the process of synchronization of the quantum key distribution system. It is shown that the use of a multiphoton optical pulse as a sync signal makes it possible for an attacker to unauthorized access to a quantum communication channel. The experimental results show that tapping a portion of the optical power from the quantum communication channel during the synchronization process allows an attacker to remain unnoticed while the quantum protocol is operating. Experimentally proved the possibility of introducing malfunctions into the operation of the quantum communication system at the stage of key formation, while remaining invisible for control means.

quant-ph