arXiv subjects

A. W. Sharpe

Publications and source records attributed to A. W. Sharpe.

24 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2009

Ultrashort dead time of photon-counting InGaAs avalanche photodiodes

We report a 1.036 GHz gated Geiger mode InGaAs avalanche photodiode with a detection dead time of just 1.93 ns. This is demonstrated by full recovery of the detection efficiency two gate cycles after a detection event, as well as a measured maximum detection rate of 497 MHz. As an application, we measure the second order correlation function $g^{(2)}$ of the emission from a diode laser with a single detector which works reliably at high speed owing to the extremely short dead time of the detector. The device is ideal for high bit rate fiber wavelength quantum key distribution and photonic quantum computing.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2008

Gigahertz decoy quantum key distribution with 1 Mbit/s secure key rate

We report the first gigahertz clocked decoy-protocol quantum key distribution (QKD). Record key rates have been achieved thanks to the use of self-differencing InGaAs avalanche photodiodes designed specifically for high speed single photon detection. The system is characterized with a secure key rate of 1.02 Mbit/s for a fiber distance of 20 km and 10.1 kbit/s for 100 km. As the present advance relies upon compact non-cryogenic detectors, it opens the door towards practical and low cost QKD systems to secure broadband communication in future.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2008

A High Speed, Post-Processing Free, Quantum Random Number Generator

A quantum random number generator (QRNG) based on gated single photon detection of an InGaAs photodiode at GHz frequency is demonstrated. Owing to the extremely long coherence time of each photon, each photons' wavefuntion extends over many gating cycles of the photodiode. The collapse of the photon wavefunction on random gating cycles as well as photon random arrival time detection events are used to generate sequences of random bits at a rate of 4.01 megabits/s. Importantly, the random outputs are intrinsically bias-free and require no post-processing procedure to pass random number statistical tests, making this QRNG an extremely simple device.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2008

Gigahertz quantum key distribution with InGaAs avalanche photodiodes

We report a demonstration of quantum key distribution (QKD) at GHz clock rates with InGaAs avalanche photodiodes (APDs) operating in a self-differencing mode. Such a mode of operation allows detection of extremely weak avalanches so that the detector afterpulse noise is sufficiently suppressed. The system is characterized by a secure bit rate of 2.37 Mbps at 5.6 km and 27.9 kbps at 65.5 km when the fiber dispersion is not compensated. After compensating the fiber dispersion, the QKD distance is extended to 101 km, resulting in a secure key rate of 2.88 kbps. Our results suggest that InGaAs APDs are very well suited to GHz QKD applications.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2007

High speed single photon detection in the near-infrared

InGaAs avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are convenient for single photon detection in the near-infrared (NIR) including the fibre communication bands (1.31/1.55 $μ$m). However, to suppress afterpulse noise due to trapped avalanche charge, they must be gated with MHz repetition frequencies, thereby severely limiting the count rate in NIR applications. Here we show gating frequencies for InGaAs-APDs well beyond 1 GHz. Using a self-differencing technique to sense much weaker avalanches, we reduce drastically afterpulse noise. At 1.25 GHz, we obtain a detection efficiency of 10.8% with an afterpulse probability of 6.16%. In addition, the detector features low jitter (55 ps) and a count rate of 100 MHz.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2006

Unconditionally secure one-way quantum key distribution using decoy pulses

We report here a complete experimental realization of one-way decoy-pulse quantum key distribution, demonstrating an unconditionally secure key rate of 5.51 kbps for a 25.3 km fibre length. This is two orders of magnitudes higher than the value that can be obtained with a non-decoy system. We introduce also a simple test for detecting the photon number splitting attack and highlight that it is essential for the security of the technique to fully characterize the source and detectors used.

quant-ph↗