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Aapeli Vuorinen

Publications and source records attributed to Aapeli Vuorinen.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Reducing the Filtering Effect in Public School Admissions: A Bias-aware Analysis for Targeted Interventions

Problem definition: Traditionally, New York City's top 8 public schools have selected candidates solely based on their scores in the Specialized High School Admissions Test (SHSAT). These scores are known to be impacted by socioeconomic status of students and test preparation received in middle schools, leading to a massive filtering effect in the education pipeline. The classical mechanisms for assigning students to schools do not naturally address problems like school segregation and class diversity, which have worsened over the years. The scientific community, including policymakers, have reacted by incorporating group-specific quotas and proportionality constraints, with mixed results. The problem of finding effective and fair methods for broadening access to top-notch education is still unsolved. Methodology/results: We take an operations approach to the problem different from most established literature, with the goal of increasing opportunities for students with high economic needs. Using data from the Department of Education (DOE) in New York City, we show that there is a shift in the distribution of scores obtained by students that the DOE classifies as "disadvantaged" (following criteria mostly based on economic factors). We model this shift as a "bias" that results from an underestimation of the true potential of disadvantaged students. We analyze the impact this bias has on an assortative matching market. We show that centrally planned interventions can significantly reduce the impact of bias through scholarships or training, when they target the segment of disadvantaged students with average performance.

cs.CY

Longer Lists Yield Better Matchings

Many centralized mechanisms for two-sided matching markets that enjoy strong theoretical properties assume that the planner solicits full information on the preferences of each participating agent. In particular, they expect that participants compile and communicate their complete preference lists over agents from the other side of the market. However, real-world markets are often very large and agents cannot always be expected to even produce a ranking of all options on the other side. It is therefore important to understand the impact of incomplete or truncated lists on the quality of the resultant matching. In this paper, we focus on the Serial Dictatorship mechanism in a model where each agent of the proposing side (students) has a random preference list of length $d$, sampled independently and uniformly at random from $n$ schools, each of which has one seat. Our main result shows that if the students primarily care about being matched to any school of their list (as opposed to ending up unmatched), then all students in position $i\leq n$ will prefer markets with longer lists, when $n$ is large enough. Schools on the other hand will always prefer longer lists in our model. We moreover investigate the impact of $d$ on the rank of the school that a student gets matched to. Our main result suggests that markets that are well-approximated by our hypothesis and where the demand of schools does not exceed supply should be designed with preference lists as long as reasonable, since longer lists would favor all agents.

cs.GT