Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Aaryan Ajay Sharma

Publications and source records attributed to Aaryan Ajay Sharma.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

GENIE: Watermarking Graph Neural Networks for Link Prediction

The rapid adoption, usefulness, and resource-intensive training of Graph Neural Network (GNN) models have made them an invaluable intellectual property in graph-based machine learning. However, their wide-spread adoption also makes them susceptible to stealing, necessitating robust Ownership Demonstration (OD) techniques. Watermarking is a promising OD framework for deep neural networks, but existing methods fail to generalize to GNNs due to the non-Euclidean nature of graph data. Existing works on GNN watermarking primarily focus on node and graph classification, overlooking Link Prediction (LP). In this paper, we propose GENIE (watermarking Graph nEural Networks for lInk prEdiction), the first scheme to watermark GNNs for LP. GENIE creates a novel backdoor for both node-representation and subgraph-based LP methods, utilizing a unique trigger set and a secret watermark vector. Our OD scheme is equipped with Dynamic Watermark Thresholding (DWT), ensuring high verification probability while addressing practical issues in existing OD schemes. We extensively evaluate GENIE across 4 diverse model architectures (i.e., SEAL, GCN, GraphSAGE and NeoGNN), 7 real-world datasets and 21 watermark removal techniques and demonstrate its robustness to watermark removal and ownership piracy attacks. Finally, we discuss adaptive attacks against GENIE and a defense strategy to counter it. The codebase and related artifacts are publicly available at our Project Page.

cs.CR↗

DARTS: Decoder-Aware Representation Tuning via Surgery for Model Merging

Model merging combines multiple task-specific fine-tuned LLMs into a single multi-task model without additional training. However, merged models are known to suffer from representation bias: systematic drift between the merged model's hidden states and those of each individual source model. Prior work (Yang et al., 2024a) study and mitigate this bias for encoder-based vision models using a lightweight correction module trained with L1 loss. However, such bias is not studied for decoder models due to their autoregressive nature. We analyze the problem of representation bias in decoder models, and show two challenges absent in encoders: (1) the causal attention mask causes bias to accumulate across token positions, requiring position-dependent correction; and (2) not all token positions are equally important, i.e., high-entropy (decision-critical) positions matter far more than low-entropy ones. To address these challenges, we propose Decoder-Aware Representation Tuning via Surgery (DARTS). DARTS employs a novel entropy-weighted L1 loss to upweight correction at high-entropy positions where errors most affect generation quality, and a per-position additive bias that captures position-dependent error without overparameterization. We perform extensive evaluation on three domains: code generation (HumanEval), mathematical reasoning (GSM8K), and instruction following (AlpacaEval) on Llama-2-7B models, and show DARTS achieves significant improvement over the standard surgery approach while adding negligible parameters ($0.1\%$ of total parameters).

cs.LG↗

Merge Now, Regret Later: The Hidden Cost of Model Merging Is Adversarial Transferability

Model Merging (MM) has proven to be an effective alternative to multi-task learning, where several fine-tuned models are merged, without access to the tasks' training data, into one model that retains performance across different tasks. Recent works have explored the security of MM, showing how MM can confer robustness against various adversarial attacks. However, none of them has sufficiently explored its impact on transfer attacks using transferable adversarial examples. In this work, we study the effect of MM on the transferability of adversarial examples. We perform comprehensive evaluations and statistical analysis consisting of eight MM methods, seven datasets, and six attack methods, sweeping over 336 distinct attack settings. Through it, we first challenge the prevailing notion of MM conferring free adversarial robustness, and show that MM cannot reliably defend against transfer attacks, with over 80% transfer rate. Moreover, we reveal two key insights for machine-learning practitioners regarding MM and transferability for a robust system design: (1) stronger MM methods increase vulnerability to transfer attacks and (2) mitigating representation bias increases vulnerability to transfer attacks. We also find weight averaging as an exception to (1), i.e., it is found to be the most vulnerable method to transfer attacks, despite being the weakest MM method. Finally, we analyze the underlying reasons for these findings, show how an adversary with limited information could launch an attack, and provide potential solutions. These findings offer actionable insights for deploying MM in security-sensitive machine-learning systems.

cs.LG↗