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Aastha Mehta

Publications and source records attributed to Aastha Mehta.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

LDPKiT: Superimposing Remote Queries for Privacy-Preserving Distillation

To protect privacy in regulated domains such as healthcare and finance, model owners may allow only remote API access while keeping both the training data and model parameters private. However, model users performing inference on such remotely hosted models may be required to transmit potentially sensitive inputs, raising privacy concerns. In this work, we present LDPKiT, a framework for non-adversarial, privacy-preserving model distillation that leverages a user's private in-distribution data while bounding privacy leakage. LDPKiT introduces a novel superimposition technique that generates approximately in-distribution samples, enabling effective knowledge transfer under local differential privacy (LDP). Experiments on Fashion-MNIST, SVHN, and PathMNIST demonstrate that LDPKiT consistently improves utility while maintaining privacy, with benefits that become more pronounced at stronger noise levels. For example, on SVHN, LDPKiT achieves nearly the same inference accuracy at $\epsilon=1.25$ as at $\epsilon=2.0$, yielding stronger privacy guarantees with less than a 2\% accuracy reduction. We further conduct sensitivity analyses to examine the effect of dataset size on performance and provide a systematic analysis of latent space representations, offering intuitive and empirical insights into the accuracy gains of LDPKiT.

cs.LG

Reconciling Security and Utility in Next-Generation Epidemic Risk Mitigation Systems

Epidemics like the recent COVID-19 require proactive contact tracing and epidemiological analysis to predict and subsequently contain infection transmissions. The proactive measures require large scale data collection, which simultaneously raise concerns regarding users' privacy. Digital contact tracing systems developed in response to COVID-19 either collected extensive data for effective analytics at the cost of users' privacy or collected minimal data for the sake of user privacy but were ineffective in predicting and mitigating the epidemic risks. We present Silmarillion--in preparation for future epidemics--a system that reconciles user's privacy with rich data collection for higher utility. In Silmarillion, user devices record Bluetooth encounters with beacons installed in strategic locations. The beacons further enrich the encounters with geo-location, location type, and environment conditions at the beacon installation site. This enriched information enables detailed scientific analysis of disease parameters as well as more accurate personalized exposure risk notification. At the same time, Silmarillion provides privacy to all participants and non-participants at the same level as that guaranteed in digital and manual contact tracing. We describe the design of Silmarillion and its communication protocols that ensure user privacy and data security. We also evaluate a prototype of Silmarillion built using low-end IoT boards, showing that the power consumption and user latencies are adequately low for a practical deployment. Finally, we briefly report on a small-scale deployment within a university building as a proof-of-concept.

cs.CR

ICS-Sniper: A Targeted Blackhole Attack on Encrypted ICS Traffic

Modern industrial control systems (ICS) increasingly host their Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) services in the cloud to reduce the costs of large-scale automation. To protect site-SCADA communications, ICS operators commonly use VPN tunneling and standard security practices. We show that, despite these security measures, an on-path Internet adversary can disrupt ICS operations without infiltrating the ICS perimeter, breaking encryption, or knowledge of the control logic. We present ICS-Sniper, a targeted blackhole attack that analyzes the VPN traffic metadata (sizes, direction, timing of packets) to identify narrow time windows, called critical superperiods, during which the site-SCADA traffic would likely contain highly critical commands or data. Post-analysis, in a subsequent operational cycle, ICS-Sniper drops a small set of payload-carrying packets in the critical superperiods to disrupt the ICS's operations. We demonstrate three attacks on two realistic modern Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) plant testbeds that can potentially violate the operational safety of the ICS while evading state-of-the-art ICS attack detectors.

cs.CR

NetShaper: A Differentially Private Network Side-Channel Mitigation System

The widespread adoption of encryption in network protocols has significantly improved the overall security of many Internet applications. However, these protocols cannot prevent network side-channel leaks -- leaks of sensitive information through the sizes and timing of network packets. We present NetShaper, a system that mitigates such leaks based on the principle of traffic shaping. NetShaper's traffic shaping provides differential privacy guarantees while adapting to the prevailing workload and congestion condition, and allows configuring a tradeoff between privacy guarantees, bandwidth and latency overheads. Furthermore, NetShaper provides a modular and portable tunnel endpoint design that can support diverse applications. We present a middlebox-based implementation of NetShaper and demonstrate its applicability in a video streaming and a web service application.

cs.CR

Pacer: Comprehensive Network Side-Channel Mitigation in the Cloud

Network side channels (NSCs) leak secrets through packet timing and packet sizes. They are of particular concern in public IaaS Clouds, where any tenant may be able to colocate and indirectly observe a victim's traffic shape. We present Pacer, the first system that eliminates NSC leaks in public IaaS Clouds end-to-end. It builds on the principled technique of shaping guest traffic outside the guest to make the traffic shape independent of secrets by design. However, Pacer also addresses important concerns that have not been considered in prior work -- it prevents internal side-channel leaks from affecting reshaped traffic, and it respects network flow control, congestion control and loss recovery signals. Pacer is implemented as a paravirtualizing extension to the host hypervisor, requiring modest changes to the hypervisor and the guest kernel, and only optional, minimal changes to applications. We present Pacer's key abstraction of a cloaked tunnel, describe its design and implementation, prove the security of important design aspects through a formal model, and show through an experimental evaluation that Pacer imposes moderate overheads on bandwidth, client latency, and server throughput, while thwarting attacks based on state-of-the-art CNN classifiers.

cs.CR