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Abdul Haddi Amjad

Publications and source records attributed to Abdul Haddi Amjad.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

Assessing the Impact of Code Changes on the Fault Localizability of Large Language Models

Generative Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in non-generative software maintenance tasks, such as fault localization (FL). Success in FL depends on a models ability to reason about program semantics beyond surface-level syntactic and lexical features. However, widely used LLM benchmarks primarily evaluate code generation, which differs fundamentally from semantic program reasoning. Meanwhile, traditional FL benchmarks such as Defect4J and BugsInPy are either not scalable or obsolete, as their datasets have become part of LLM training data, leading to biased results. This paper presents the first large-scale empirical investigation into the robustness of LLMs fault localizability. Inspired by mutation testing, we develop an end-to-end evaluation framework that addresses key limitations in existing LLM evaluation, including data contamination, scalability, automation, and extensibility. Using real-world programs with specifications, we inject unseen faults and ask LLMs to localize them, filtering out underspecified programs where localization is ambiguous. For each successfully localized program, we apply semantic-preserving mutations (SPMs) and rerun localization to assess robustness and determine whether LLM reasoning relies on syntactic cues rather than semantics. We evaluate 10 state-of-the-art LLMs on 750,013 fault localization tasks from over 1,300 Java and Python programs. We find that SPMs cause LLMs to fail on previously localized faults in 78% of cases, and that reasoning is stronger when relevant code appears earlier in context. These results indicate that LLM code reasoning is often tied to features irrelevant to semantics. We also identify code patterns that are challenging for LLMs to reason about. Overall, our findings motivate fundamental advances in how LLMs represent, interpret, and prioritize code semantics to reason more deeply about program logic

cs.SE↗

Accessibility Issues in Ad-Driven Web Applications

Website accessibility is essential for inclusiveness and regulatory compliance. Although third-party advertisements (ads) are a vital revenue source for free web services, they introduce significant accessibility challenges. Leasing a websiteś space to ad-serving technologies like DoubleClick results in developers losing control over ad content accessibility. Even on highly accessible websites, third-party ads can undermine adherence to Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG). We conduct the first large-scale investigation of 430K website elements, including nearly 100K ad elements, to understand the accessibility of ads on websites. We seek to understand the prevalence of inaccessible ads and their overall impact on the accessibility of websites. Our findings show that 67% of websites experience increased accessibility violations due to ads, with common violations including Focus Visible and On Input. Popular ad-serving technologies like Taboola, DoubleClick, and RevContent often serve ads that fail to comply with WCAG standards. Even when ads are WCAG compliant, 27% of them have alternative text in ad images that misrepresents information, potentially deceiving users. Manual inspection of a sample of these misleading ads revealed that user-identifiable data is collected on 94% of websites through interactions, such as hovering or pressing enter. Since users with disabilities often rely on tools like screen readers that require hover events to access website content, they have no choice but to compromise their privacy in order to navigate website ads. Based on our findings, we further dissect the root cause of these violations and provide design guidelines to both website developers and ad-serving technologies to achieve WCAG-compliant ad integration.

cs.SE↗

Blocking Tracking JavaScript at the Function Granularity

Modern websites extensively rely on JavaScript to implement both functionality and tracking. Existing privacy enhancing content blocking tools struggle against mixed scripts, which simultaneously implement both functionality and tracking, because blocking the script would break functionality and not blocking it would allow tracking. We propose Not.js, a fine grained JavaScript blocking tool that operates at the function level granularity. Not.js's strengths lie in analyzing the dynamic execution context, including the call stack and calling context of each JavaScript function, and then encoding this context to build a rich graph representation. Not.js trains a supervised machine learning classifier on a webpage's graph representation to first detect tracking at the JavaScript function level and then automatically generate surrogate scripts that preserve functionality while removing tracking. Our evaluation of Not.js on the top 10K websites demonstrates that it achieves high precision (94%) and recall (98%) in detecting tracking JavaScript functions, outperforming the state of the art while being robust against off the shelf JavaScript obfuscation. Fine grained detection of tracking functions allows Not.js to automatically generate surrogate scripts that remove tracking JavaScript functions without causing major breakage. Our deployment of Not.js shows that mixed scripts are present on 62.3% of the top 10K websites, with 70.6% of the mixed scripts being third party that engage in tracking activities such as cookie ghostwriting. We share a sample of the tracking functions detected by Not.js within mixed scripts not currently on filter lists with filter list authors, who confirm that these scripts are not blocked due to potential functionality breakage, despite being known to implement tracking.

cs.CR↗

Blocking JavaScript without Breaking the Web: An Empirical Investigation

Modern websites heavily rely on JavaScript (JS) to implement legitimate functionality as well as privacy-invasive advertising and tracking. Browser extensions such as NoScript block any script not loaded by a trusted list of endpoints, thus hoping to block privacy-invasive scripts while avoiding breaking legitimate website functionality. In this paper, we investigate whether blocking JS on the web is feasible without breaking legitimate functionality. To this end, we conduct a large-scale measurement study of JS blocking on 100K websites. We evaluate the effectiveness of different JS blocking strategies in tracking prevention and functionality breakage. Our evaluation relies on quantitative analysis of network requests and resource loads as well as manual qualitative analysis of visual breakage. First, we show that while blocking all scripts is quite effective at reducing tracking, it significantly degrades functionality on approximately two-thirds of the tested websites. Second, we show that selective blocking of a subset of scripts based on a curated list achieves a better tradeoff. However, there remain approximately 15% `mixed` scripts, which essentially merge tracking and legitimate functionality and thus cannot be blocked without causing website breakage. Finally, we show that fine-grained blocking of a subset of JS methods, instead of scripts, reduces major breakage by 3.8$\times$ while providing the same level of tracking prevention. Our work highlights the promise and open challenges in fine-grained JS blocking for tracking prevention without breaking the web.

cs.CR↗

TrackerSift: Untangling Mixed Tracking and Functional Web Resources

Trackers have recently started to mix tracking and functional resources to circumvent privacy-enhancing content blocking tools. Such mixed web resources put content blockers in a bind: risk breaking legitimate functionality if they act and risk missing privacy-invasive advertising and tracking if they do not. In this paper, we propose TrackerSift to progressively classify and untangle mixed web resources (that combine tracking and legitimate functionality) at multiple granularities of analysis (domain, hostname, script, and method). Using TrackerSift, we conduct a large-scale measurement study of such mixed resources on 100K websites. We find that more than 17% domains, 48% hostnames, 6% scripts, and 9% methods observed in our crawls combine tracking and legitimate functionality. While mixed web resources are prevalent across all granularities, TrackerSift is able to attribute 98% of the script-initiated network requests to either tracking or functional resources at the finest method-level granularity. Our analysis shows that mixed resources at different granularities are typically served from CDNs or as inlined and bundled scripts, and that blocking them indeed results in breakage of legitimate functionality. Our results highlight opportunities for finer-grained content blocking to remove mixed resources without breaking legitimate functionality.

cs.NI↗