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Adarsh Vatsa

Publications and source records attributed to Adarsh Vatsa.

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AutoCedar: An Agentic Framework for Verifier-Guided Access Control Policy Synthesis

Large Language Models are increasingly used to turn natural-language requirements into code. In access control, that shortcut is dangerous: a generated policy can compile and read correctly while granting access that no one approved. The difficulty is not only writing policy code. It is fixing what the requirements mean before code is written, and then checking that the final policy actually satisfies that intent. We present AutoCedar, a verifier-guided system that first turns natural-language access-control requirements into a reviewed, checkable target, and then synthesizes Cedar policies against that target. AutoCedar decomposes schema and policy authoring into small intent atoms: reviewable claims about vocabulary and behavior. Once those atoms pass mechanical validation and human intent review, the model proposes a candidate policy, the verifier checks it against the approved target, and each failure is turned into a repair signal that tells the model whether to broaden, narrow, or restructure the policy without changing the target. Because the model's work is split into small problems, each grounded in reviewed intent and backed by verifier feedback, end-to-end policy authoring becomes tractable. AutoCedar converges on all 221 tasks of CedarBench, our benchmark of authorization tasks paired with executable semantic boundaries. Across three requirements-corpus case studies covering healthcare, education, and conference management, AutoCedar converts noisy prose and extracted access-control fragments into reviewed schemas, formal checks, and a globally verified Cedar policy store for each scenario.

cs.SE

Neurosymbolic Characterization for Reliable Access Control Policy Analysis

Access control policies are reliability-critical configuration artifacts in cloud systems, yet administrators frequently struggle to verify that a policy permits exactly what they intend. This verification gap cannot be remedied by using LLMs to synthesize policies: we find that reasoning and non-reasoning LLMs fluently explain policy behavior but cannot reason about policy semantics with reliability-grade precision, even when the specification is the LLM's own explanation. We formulate this impasse as the Verifiable Synthesis Paradox: the verification gap persists regardless of how the policy was authored. To remedy this, we introduce PolicySummarizer, a neurosymbolic tool that pairs finite-state automata with an LLM-based simplification to generate precise human-readable characterizations of requests allowed by a policy. PolicySummarizer uses model counting to guarantee the fidelity of the generated characterization by rejecting characterizations that fall below a user-configured threshold in favor of the formally derived one. On 546 AWS, 100 Microsoft Azure, and 100 Google Cloud Platform policies, PolicySummarizer achieves a mean similarity score of 0.93 and a 2.7x improvement over an SMT-based baseline. In a user study, PolicySummarizer raised policy-change-review accuracy from 39% to 93% on the hardest sub-task while reducing self-reported mental demand. We release PolicySummarizer as an open-source tool.

cs.SE

Synthesizing Access Control Policies using Large Language Models

Cloud compute systems allow administrators to write access control policies that govern access to private data. While policies are written in convenient languages, such as AWS Identity and Access Management Policy Language, manually written policies often become complex and error prone. In this paper, we investigate whether and how well Large Language Models (LLMs) can be used to synthesize access control policies. Our investigation focuses on the task of taking an access control request specification and zero-shot prompting LLMs to synthesize a well-formed access control policy which correctly adheres to the request specification. We consider two scenarios, one which the request specification is given as a concrete list of requests to be allowed or denied, and another in which a natural language description is used to specify sets of requests to be allowed or denied. We then argue that for zero-shot prompting, more precise and structured prompts using a syntax based approach are necessary and experimentally show preliminary results validating our approach.

cs.SE