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Adel ElZemity

Publications and source records attributed to Adel ElZemity.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

Small, Free, and Effective: Orchestrating Open-Weight Small Language Models to Outperform Single LLM for Malware Analysis

Malware analysis demands rapid interpretation of complex detonation reports spanning filesystem, network, and process behaviours. While large language models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities for technical artifact interpretation, the opacity and escalating API costs of closed-weight frontier models motivate exploration of open-weight alternatives. However, many open-weight models are large, demanding significant compute resources and incurring non-trivial hosting costs that place them beyond reach for resource-constrained deployments. This paper investigates whether orchestrated ensembles of small language models (SLMs) can match or exceed single LLM performance on structured questions about malware detonation reports. We established baselines by testing eleven open-weight SLMs, three cyber security pre-trained models, and six frontier LLMs on Meta's CyberSecEval Malware Analysis benchmark. We then designed and evaluated four orchestration architectures: (i) a multi-agent pipeline that decomposes analysis into structured evidence-collection and reasoning stages, (ii) an adversarial debate framework in which two agents iteratively critique each other's reasoning, (iii) a hierarchical consultation system that pairs a general-purpose SLM with a cyber-specialised expert model, and (iv) a hybrid architecture that combines evidence-grounded pipelines with adversarial debate reasoning. The hybrid system (Qwen3-4B with Foundation-Sec-8B) achieved 35.30% overall accuracy, exceeding the strongest cyber-specialised baseline (22.54%) and the strongest ungrounded frontier baseline (34.77%); when given the same evidence pipeline, grounded Gemini remained the strongest configuration at 38.22%. These findings show that evidence-grounded orchestration can substantially improve the performance of collaborative SLMs for supporting interpretation of malware detonation reports.

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APIOT: Autonomous Vulnerability Management Across Bare-Metal Industrial OT Networks

Bare-metal operational technology (OT) devices -- especially the microcontrollers running Modbus/TCP and CoAP at the base of industrial control systems -- have remained outside the reach of autonomous security attacks. Prior autonomous pentesting studies target Linux and web systems, whose shells and filesystems are familiar to LLM agents. Bare-metal OT has neither, so agents must reason directly over protocol fields and parser semantics. This requires new action-space designs and runtime controls, and opens new research questions about protocol-level exploit reasoning and its deployment envelope. We present APIOT (Autonomous Purple-teaming for Industrial OT), the first large language model (LLM) framework demonstrating an autonomous attack and remediation of bare-metal OT devices, achieving the full discovery -> exploitation -> patching -> verification cycle without step-by-step human intervention. We implemented and evaluated this framework on Zephyr RTOS firmware across heterogeneous industrial IoT (IIoT) topologies. Through 290 experiment runs spanning five frontier LLMs, three network topologies, two impairment levels, and guided versus unguided conditions, APIOT achieved a mission success rate of 90.0% on the full attack-remediation cycle. We found that the runtime governance layer (which we call an overseer) is a critical engineering variable: without it, agents exhibit systematic degenerate patterns, including repetition loops, missing crash verification, and reconnaissance deadlocks. Together, these findings carry two implications beyond our testbed. Attacker expertise is no longer the binding constraint on bare-metal OT exploitation, and defender threat models must now assume LLM-augmented adversaries capable of executing autonomous discovery-through-remediation cycles against industrial firmware.

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Agentic Knowledge Distillation: Autonomous Training of Small Language Models for SMS Threat Detection

SMS-based phishing (smishing) attacks have surged, yet training effective on-device detectors requires labelled threat data that quickly becomes outdated. To deal with this issue, we present Agentic Knowledge Distillation, which consists of a powerful LLM acts as an autonomous teacher that fine-tunes a smaller student SLM, deployable for security tasks without human intervention. The teacher LLM autonomously generates synthetic data and iteratively refines a smaller on-device student model until performance plateaus. We compare four LLMs in this teacher role (Claude Opus 4.5, GPT 5.2 Codex, Gemini 3 Pro, and DeepSeek V3.2) on SMS spam/smishing detection with two student SLMs (Qwen2.5-0.5B and SmolLM2-135M). Our results show that performance varies substantially depending on the teacher LLM, with the best configuration achieving 94.31% accuracy and 96.25% recall. We also compare against a Direct Preference Optimisation (DPO) baseline that uses the same synthetic knowledge and LoRA setup but without iterative feedback or targeted refinement; agentic knowledge distillation substantially outperforms it (e.g. 86-94% vs 50-80% accuracy), showing that closed-loop feedback and targeted refinement are critical. These findings demonstrate that agentic knowledge distillation can rapidly yield effective security classifiers for edge deployment, but outcomes depend strongly on which teacher LLM is used.

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Analysing Safety Risks in LLMs Fine-Tuned with Pseudo-Malicious Cyber Security Data

Large language models (LLMs) have been used in many application domains, including cyber security. The application of LLMs in the cyber security domain presents significant opportunities, such as for enhancing threat analysis and malware detection, but it can also introduce critical risks and safety concerns, including potential personal data leakage and automated generation of new malware. Building on recent findings that fine-tuning LLMs with pseudo-malicious cyber security data significantly compromises their safety, this paper presents a comprehensive validation and extension of these safety risks using a different evaluation framework. We employ the garak red teaming framework with the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications to assess four open-source LLMs: Mistral 7B, Llama 3 8B, Gemma 2 9B, and DeepSeek R1 8B. Our evaluation confirms and extends previous findings, showing that fine-tuning reduces safety resilience across all tested LLMs (e.g., the failure rate of Mistral 7B against prompt injection increases from 9.1% to 68.7%). We further propose and evaluate a novel safety alignment approach that carefully rewords instruction-response pairs to include explicit safety precautions and ethical considerations. This work validates previous safety concerns through independent evaluation and introduces new methods for mitigating these risks, contributing towards the development of secure, trustworthy, and ethically aligned LLMs. This approach demonstrates that it is possible to maintain or even improve model safety while preserving technical utility, offering a practical path towards developing safer fine-tuning methodologies.

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CyberLLMInstruct: A Pseudo-malicious Dataset Revealing Safety-performance Trade-offs in Cyber Security LLM Fine-tuning

The integration of large language models (LLMs) into cyber security applications presents both opportunities and critical safety risks. We introduce CyberLLMInstruct, a dataset of 54,928 pseudo-malicious instruction-response pairs spanning cyber security tasks including malware analysis, phishing simulations, and zero-day vulnerabilities. Our comprehensive evaluation using seven open-source LLMs reveals a critical trade-off: while fine-tuning improves cyber security task performance (achieving up to 92.50% accuracy on CyberMetric), it severely compromises safety resilience across all tested models and attack vectors (e.g., Llama 3.1 8B's security score against prompt injection drops from 0.95 to 0.15). The dataset incorporates diverse sources including CTF challenges, academic papers, industry reports, and CVE databases to ensure comprehensive coverage of cyber security domains. Our findings highlight the unique challenges of securing LLMs in adversarial domains and establish the critical need for developing fine-tuning methodologies that balance performance gains with safety preservation in security-sensitive domains.

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Privacy Threats and Countermeasures in Federated Learning for Internet of Things: A Systematic Review

Federated Learning (FL) in the Internet of Things (IoT) environments can enhance machine learning by utilising decentralised data, but at the same time, it might introduce significant privacy and security concerns due to the constrained nature of IoT devices. This represents a research challenge that we aim to address in this paper. We systematically analysed recent literature to identify privacy threats in FL within IoT environments, and evaluate the defensive measures that can be employed to mitigate these threats. Using a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) approach, we searched five publication databases (Scopus, IEEE Xplore, Wiley, ACM, and Science Direct), collating relevant papers published between 2017 and April 2024, a period which spans from the introduction of FL until now. Guided by the PRISMA protocol, we selected 49 papers to focus our systematic review on. We analysed these papers, paying special attention to the privacy threats and defensive measures -- specifically within the context of IoT -- using inclusion and exclusion criteria tailored to highlight recent advances and critical insights. We identified various privacy threats, including inference attacks, poisoning attacks, and eavesdropping, along with defensive measures such as Differential Privacy and Secure Multi-Party Computation. These defences were evaluated for their effectiveness in protecting privacy without compromising the functional integrity of FL in IoT settings. Our review underscores the necessity for robust and efficient privacy-preserving strategies tailored for IoT environments. Notably, there is a need for strategies against replay, evasion, and model stealing attacks. Exploring lightweight defensive measures and emerging technologies such as blockchain may help improve the privacy of FL in IoT, leading to the creation of FL models that can operate under variable network conditions.

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