arXiv subjects

Aditya Kuvalekar

Publications and source records attributed to Aditya Kuvalekar.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Skill Premia and Pre-Marital Investments in Marriage Markets

I study a decentralized marriage market with search frictions, costly pre-marital skill investments, and non-transferable utility. Despite a fully symmetric environment, asymmetric equilibria -- in which one gender systematically invests more in skills than the other -- can arise. The match payoffs are microfounded through a non-cooperative household game in which spouses allocate time between labor-market work and domestic production. An asymmetric equilibrium becomes available precisely as the high-skill wage rises. Further, the symmetric equilibria can be fragile while the asymmetric ones are not. Thus, rising skill premia may amplify rather than narrow gender gaps in skill acquisition.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2026

Reputational Spillovers

We analyze a reputational bargaining game in which a central player negotiates simultaneously with two peripheral players. Each player is either rational or a commitment type who never concedes and insists on a fixed share, and concessions are publicly observed. The central player's type is global, so actions in one dispute update beliefs in the other and generate reputational spillovers. The game admits a unique equilibrium, enabling a sharp comparison with the bilateral benchmark of Abreu and Gul (2000). Spillovers are payoff-relevant if and only if a peripheral is uniquely the most reputable player initially. In that case, spillovers overturn the bilateral prediction that toughness pays: the central player is never strictly better off and can be strictly worse off; the strongest peripheral loses; and the weakest peripheral can benefit, especially when the center's higher-stakes dispute is with the other peripheral.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Similarity of Information in Games

Algorithmic content targeting homogenizes information, with implications for strategic interactions. For example, this increased homogenization was arguably responsible for the run on the Silicon Valley Bank. We argue that existing measures of similarity are inappropriate for studying games -- especially coordination games -- because they do not discipline agents' conditional beliefs. We propose a class of stochastic orders, Concentration Along the Diagonal (CAD), built on agents' conditional beliefs. In canonical binary-action coordination games, greater CAD-similarity is both necessary and sufficient for strategic similarity -- agents adopt the same strategy. We further demonstrate CAD's applicability in congestion games, collective action, and second-price auctions.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2024

Similarity of Information and Collective Action

We study a canonical collective action game with incomplete information. Individuals attempt to coordinate to achieve a shared goal, while also facing a temptation to free-ride. Consuming more similar information about the fundamentals can help them coordinate, but it can also exacerbate free-riding. Our main result shows that more similar information facilitates (impedes) achieving a common goal when achieving the goal is sufficiently challenging (easy). We apply this insight to show why insufficiently powerful authoritarian governments may face larger protests when attempting to restrict press freedom, and why informational diversity in committees is beneficial when each vote carries more weight.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2023

Matching with Incomplete Preferences

I study a two-sided marriage market in which agents have incomplete preferences -- i.e., they find some alternatives incomparable. The strong (weak) core consists of matchings wherein no coalition wants to form a new match between themselves, leaving some (all) agents better off without harming anyone. The strong core may be empty, while the weak core can be too large. I propose the concept of the "compromise core" -- a nonempty set that sits between the weak and the strong cores. Similarly, I define the men-(women-) optimal core and illustrate its benefit in an application to India's engineering college admissions system.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2022

The Wrong Kind of Information

Agents, some with a bias, decide between undertaking a risky project and a safe alternative based on information about the project's efficiency. Only a part of that information is verifiable. Unbiased agents want to undertake only efficient projects, while biased agents want to undertake any project. If the project causes harm, a court examines the verifiable information, forms a belief about the agent's type, and decides the punishment. Tension arises between deterring inefficient projects and a chilling effect on using the unverifiable information. Improving the unverifiable information always increases overall efficiency, but improving the verifiable information may reduce efficiency.

econ.GN↗