Quantum Bit Commitment from a Computation Bound
This paper is withdrawn. See quant-ph/9806031 for a discussion.
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Publications and source records attributed to Adrian Kent.
This paper is withdrawn. See quant-ph/9806031 for a discussion.
This paper has been withdrawn. See quant-ph/9806031 for a discussion.
We describe a new classical bit commitment protocol based on cryptographic constraints imposed by special relativity. The protocol is unconditionally secure against classical or quantum attacks. It evades the no-go results of Mayers, Lo and Chau by requiring from Alice a sequence of communications, including a post-revelation verification, each of which is guaranteed to be independent of its predecessor.
Gell-Mann and Hartle (GMH) have recently considered time-neutral cosmological models in which the initial and final conditions are independently specified, and several authors have investigated experimental tests of such models. We point out here that GMH time-neutral models can allow superluminal signalling, in the sense that it can be possible for observers in those cosmologies, by detecting and exploiting regularities in the final state, to construct devices which send and receive signals between space-like separated points. In suitable cosmologies, any single superluminal message can be transmitted with probability arbitrarily close to one by the use of redundant signals. However, the outcome probabilities of quantum measurements generally depend on precisely which past {\it and future} measurements take place. As the transmission of any signal relies on quantum measurements, its transmission probability is similarly context-dependent. As a result, the standard superluminal signalling paradoxes do not apply. Despite their unusual features, the models are internally consistent. These results illustrate an interesting conceptual point. The standard view of Minkowski causality is not an absolutely indispensable part of the mathematical formalism of relativistic quantum theory. It is contingent on the empirical observation that naturally occurring ensembles can be naturally pre-selected but not post-selected.
There are good motivations for considering some type of quantum histories formalism. Several possible formalisms are known, defined by different definitions of event and by different selection criteria for sets of histories. These formalisms have a natural interpretation, according to which nature somehow chooses one set of histories from among those allowed, and then randomly chooses to realise one history from that set; other interpretations are possible, but their scientific implications are essentially the same. The selection criteria proposed to date are reasonably natural, and certainly raise new questions. For example, the validity of ordering inferences which we normally take for granted --- such as that a particle in one region is necessarily in a larger region containing it --- depends on whether or not our history respects the criterion of ordered consistency, or merely consistency. However, the known selection criteria, including consistency and medium decoherence, are very weak. It is not possible to derive the predictions of classical mechanics or Copenhagen quantum mechanics from the theories they define, even given observational data in an extended time interval. Attempts to refine the consistent histories approach so as to solve this problem by finding a definition of quasiclassicality have so far not succeeded. On the other hand, it is shown that dynamical collapse models, of the type originally proposed by Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber, can be re-interpreted as set selection criteria within a quantum histories framework, in which context they appear as candidate solutions to the set selection problem. This suggests a new route to relativistic generalisation of these models, since covariant definitions of a quantum event are known.
Linden, Massar and Popescu have recently given an optimization argument to show that a single two-qubit Werner state, or any other mixture of the maximally entangled Bell states, cannot be purified by local operations and classical communications. We generalise their result and give a simple explanation. In particular, we show that no purification scheme using local operations and classical communications can produce a pure singlet from any mixed state of two spin-1/2 particles. More generally, no such scheme can produce a maximally entangled state of any pair of finite-dimensional systems from a generic mixed state. We also show that the Werner states belong to a large class of states whose fidelity cannot be increased by such a scheme.
It was pointed out recently [A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78 (1997) 2874] that the consistent histories approach allows contrary inferences to be made from the same data. These inferences correspond to projections $P$ and $Q$, belonging to different consistent sets, with the properties that $PQ = QP = 0$ and $P \neq 1 -Q$. To many, this seems undesirable in a theory of physical inferences. It also raises a specific problem for the consistent histories formalism, since that formalism is set up so as to eliminate contradictory inferences, i.e. inferences $P$ and $Q$ where $P = 1 - Q$. Yet there seems to be no sensible physical distinction between contradictory and contrary inferences. It seems particularly hard to defend the asymmetry, since (i) there is a well-defined quantum histories formalisms which admits both contradictory and contrary inferences, and (ii) there is also a well-defined formalism, based on ordered consistent sets of histories, which excludes both. In a recent comment, Griffiths and Hartle, while accepting the validity of the examples given in the above paper, restate their own preference for the consistent histories formalism. As this brief reply explains, in so doing, they fail to address the arguments made against their approach to quantum theory.
This paper has been withdrawn: it does not evade the no-go results of Mayers, Lo and Chau, to whom I am most grateful for helpful correspondences.
A short foreword has been added for the archive version of this article, which otherwise appears as originally published in 1990, except for the updating of references. The original abstract follows. This is a critical review of the literature on many-worlds interpretations (MWI), with arguments drawn partly from earlier critiques by Bell and Stein. The essential postulates involved in various MWI are extracted, and their consistency with the evident physical world is examined. Arguments are presented against MWI proposed by Everett, Graham and DeWitt. The relevance of frequency operators to MWI is examined; it is argued that frequency operator theorems of Hartle and Farhi-Goldstone-Gutmann do not in themselves provide a probability interpretation for quantum mechanics, and thus neither support existing MWI nor would be useful in constructing new MWI. Comments are made on papers by Geroch and Deutsch that advocate MWI. It is concluded that no plausible set of axioms exists for an MWI that describes known physics.
Recent work with Dowker on the scientific status of the consistent histories approach to quantum theory is reviewed and summarised. The approach is compared with formulations of quantum theory, such as Bohmian mechanics and the Copenhagen interpretation a la Landau-Lifshitz, in which classical variables are explicitly appended. I try to explain why the consistent histories formulation is scientifically problematic, in that it is a very weak theory, but also scientifically interesting, shedding new light on quantum theory.
A recent paper by Hartle [Phys. Rev. D 51, 1800 (1995)] proposes a definition of "spacetime information" - the information available about a quantum system's boundary conditions in the various sets of decohering histories it may display - and investigates its properties. We note here that Hartle's analysis contains errors which invalidate several of the conclusions. In particular, the proof that the proposed definition agrees with the standard definition for ordinary quantum mechanics is invalid, the evaluations of the spacetime information for time-neutral generalized quantum theories and for generalized quantum theories with non-unitary evolution are incorrect, and the argument that spacetime information is conserved on spacelike surfaces in these last theories is erroneous. We show however that the proposed definition does, in fact, agree with the standard definition for ordinary quantum mechanics. Hartle's definition relies on choosing, case by case, a class of fine-grained consistent sets of histories. We supply a general definition of the relevant class of sets that agrees with Hartle's definition in the cases explicitly considered and that generalizes to other cases.
In the consistent histories formulation of quantum theory, the probabilistic predictions and retrodictions made from observed data depend on the choice of a consistent set. We show that this freedom allows the formalism to retrodict contrary propositions which correspond to orthogonal commuting projections and which each have probability one. We also show that the formalism makes contrary probability one predictions when applied to Gell-Mann and Hartle's generalised time-neutral quantum mechanics.
The consistent histories formulation of the quantum theory of a closed system with pure initial state defines an infinite number of incompatible consistent sets, each of which gives a possible description of the physics. We investigate the possibility of using the properties of the Schmidt decomposition to define an algorithm which selects a single, physically natural, consistent set. We explain the problems which arise, set out some possible algorithms, and explain their properties with the aid of simple models. Though the discussion is framed in the language of the consistent histories approach, it is intended to highlight the difficulty in making any interpretation of quantum theory based on decoherence into a mathematically precise theory.
We consider Gell-Mann and Hartle's consistent histories formulation of quantum cosmology in the interpretation in which one history, chosen randomly according to the decoherence functional probabilities, is realised from each consistent set. We show that in this interpretation, if one assumes that an observed quasiclassical structure will continue to be quasiclassical, one cannot infer that it will obey the predictions of classical or Copenhagen quantum mechanics.
We describe some properties of consistent sets of histories in the Gell-Mann--Hartle formalism, and give an example to illustrate that one cannot recover the standard predictions, retrodictions and inferences of quasiclassical physics using the criterion of consistency alone.
We review the consistent histories formulations of quantum mechanics developed by Griffiths, Omnès and Gell-Mann and Hartle, and describe the classification of consistent sets. We illustrate some general features of consistent sets by a few simple lemmas and examples. We consider various interpretations of the formalism, and examine the new problems which arise in reconstructing the past and predicting the future. It is shown that Omnès' characterisation of true statements --- statements which can be deduced unconditionally in his interpretation --- is incorrect. We examine critically Gell-Mann and Hartle's interpretation of the formalism, and in particular their discussions of communication, prediction and retrodiction, and conclude that their explanation of the apparent persistence of quasiclassicality relies on assumptions about an as yet unknown theory of experience. Our overall conclusion is that the consistent histories approach illustrates the need to supplement quantum mechanics by some selection principle in order to produce a fundamental theory capable of unconditional predictions.