arXiv subjects

Agathe Pernoud

Publications and source records attributed to Agathe Pernoud.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Does p-Hacking Mitigate or Exacerbate the Effects of Publication Bias?

This paper studies the effects of p-hacking on the bias of published estimates when papers with statistically significant results are selectively published. We show that fast p-hacking---actions that lead to large changes in p-values---always exacerbates the bias from selective publication. On the other hand, slow p-hacking---actions that lead to small changes in p-values---exacerbates bias when selection is weak, but mitigates it when selection is strong. In a model featuring both types of p-hacking, we show that a normality assumption identifies the true distribution of effects as well as the counterfactual mean that would obtain under selective publication without p-hacking. Applying the model to meta-analyses on the effects of behavioral nudges and development aid, we find suggestive evidence that both mitigation and exacerbation can arise in practice.

econ.EM↗

arXiv2025

Bundling against Learning

A monopolist sells multiple goods to an uninformed buyer. The buyer chooses to learn any one-dimensional linear signal of their values for the goods, anticipating the seller's mechanism. The seller designs an optimal mechanism, anticipating the buyer's learning choice. In a generalized Gaussian environment, we show that every equilibrium has vertical learning where the buyer's posterior means are comonotonic, and every equilibrium is outcome-equivalent to nested bundling where the seller offers a menu of nested bundles. In equilibrium, the buyer learns more about a higher-tier good, resulting in a higher posterior variance on the log scale.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2025

Optimal Regulation and Investment Incentives in Financial Networks

We examine optimal regulation of financial networks with debt interdependencies between financial firms. We first show that firms often have an incentive to choose excessively risky portfolios and overly correlate their portfolios with those of their counterparties. We then characterize how optimal regulation depends on a firm's financial centrality and its available investment opportunities. In standard core-periphery networks, optimal regulation depends non-monotonically on the correlation of banks' investments, with maximal restrictions for intermediate levels of correlation. Moreover, it can be uniquely optimal to treat banks asymmetrically: restricting the investments of one core bank while allowing an otherwise identical core bank (in all aspects, including network centrality) to invest freely.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2020

Systemic Risk in Financial Networks: A Survey

We provide an overview of the relationship between financial networks and systemic risk. We present a taxonomy of different types of systemic risk, differentiating between direct externalities between financial organizations (e.g., defaults, correlated portfolios and firesales), and perceptions and feedback effects (e.g., bank runs, credit freezes). We also discuss optimal regulation and bailouts, measurements of systemic risk and financial centrality, choices by banks' regarding their portfolios and partnerships, and the changing nature of financial networks.

q-fin.RM↗

arXiv2020

Credit Freezes, Equilibrium Multiplicity, and Optimal Bailouts in Financial Networks

We analyze how interdependencies between organizations in financial networks can lead to multiple possible equilibrium outcomes. A multiplicity arises if and only if there exists a certain type of dependency cycle in the network that allows for self-fulfilling chains of defaults. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for banks' solvency in any equilibrium. Building on these conditions, we characterize the minimum bailout payments needed to ensure systemic solvency, as well as how solvency can be ensured by guaranteeing a specific set of debt payments. Bailout injections needed to eliminate self-fulfilling cycles of defaults (credit freezes) are fully recoverable, while those needed to prevent cascading defaults outside of cycles are not. We show that the minimum bailout problem is computationally hard, but provide an upper bound on optimal payments and show that the problem has intuitive solutions in specific network structures such as those with disjoint cycles or a core-periphery structure.

cs.GT↗