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Aggelos Kiayias

Publications and source records attributed to Aggelos Kiayias.

36 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Decentralizing Information Technology: The Advent of Resource Based Systems

The growth of the Bitcoin network during the first decade of its operation to a global scale system is a singular event in the deployment of Information Technology systems. Can this approach serve as a wider paradigm for Information Technology services beyond the use case of digital currencies? We investigate this question by introducing the concept of resource based systems and their four fundamental characteristics: (i) resource-based operation, (ii) tokenomics, (iii) decentralized service provision, and (iv) rewards sharing. We explore these characteristics, identify design goals and challenges and investigate some crucial game theoretic aspects of reward sharing that can be decisive for their effective operation.

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Incentives Against Power Grabs or How to Engineer the Revolution in a Pooled Proof of Stake System

Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchain systems, especially those that allow stakeholders to organize themselves in ``stake-pools'', have emerged as a compelling paradigm for the deployment of large scale distributed ledgers. A stake-pool operates a node that engages in the PoS protocol and potentially represents a large number of smaller stakeholders. While such pooled PoS operation is attractive from various angles, it also exhibits a significant shortcoming that, so far and to the best of our knowledge, has not been sufficiently understood or investigated. Pooled PoS operation, to be effective and not lead to sub-optimal dictatorial or cartel-like configurations, should enable the stakeholders to revoke and re-delegate their stake in a way that is aligned with their incentives. However, given that stake-pool operators are exactly those entities who determine what transactions are to be recorded in the ledger, they are quite likely to form a cartel and censor any transaction they want, such as those that attempt to adjust the current stake-pool lineup. In this way, a power grab takes place, where the stake-pool cartel perpetuates its control over the PoS system. We first model and observe formally the emergence of the above problem in pooled PoS systems, and then we describe an anti-censorship mechanism that takes advantage of the underlying cryptographic functions of the ledger and the nature of peer-to-peer networks to diffuse information without suppression. We provide a thorough game-theoretic analysis of this mechanism discovering various types of Nash equilibria which demonstrate that the ``revolution'', i.e., the strategic decision of pool members to withdraw support from a censoring cartel as well as the pool operators to step down, can be incentivized, under suitable and plausible conditions in the utility functions of the involved participants.

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Filling the Tax Gap via Programmable Money

We discuss the problem of facilitating tax auditing assuming "programmable money", i.e., digital monetary instruments that are managed by an underlying distributed ledger. We explore how a taxation authority can verify the declared returns of its citizens and create a counter-incentive to tax evasion by two distinct mechanisms. First, we describe a design which enables auditing it as a built-in feature with minimal changes on the underlying ledger's consensus protocol. Second, we offer an application-layer extension, which requires no modification in the underlying ledger's design. Both solutions provide a high level of privacy, ensuring that, apart from specific limited data given to the taxation authority, no additional information - beyond the information already published on the underlying ledger - is leaked.

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Consistency of Proof-of-Stake Blockchains with Concurrent Honest Slot Leaders

We improve the fundamental security threshold of eventual consensus Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchain protocols under the longest-chain rule by showing, for the first time, the positive effect of rounds with concurrent honest leaders. Current security analyses reduce consistency to the dynamics of an abstract, round-based block creation process that is determined by three events associated with a round: (i) event $A$: at least one adversarial leader, (ii) event $S$: a single honest leader, and (iii) event $M$: multiple, but honest, leaders. We present an asymptotically optimal consistency analysis assuming that an honest round is more likely than an adversarial round (i.e., $\Pr[S] + \Pr[M] > \Pr[A]$); this threshold is optimal. This is a first in the literature and can be applied to both the simple synchronous communication as well as communication with bounded delays. In all existing consistency analyses, event $M$ is either penalized or treated neutrally. Specifically, the consistency analyses in Ouroboros Praos (Eurocrypt 2018) and Genesis (CCS 2018) assume that $\Pr[S] - \Pr[M] > \Pr[A]$; the analyses in Sleepy Consensus (Asiacrypt 2017) and Snow White (Fin. Crypto 2019) assume that $\Pr[S] > \Pr[A]$. Moreover, all existing analyses completely break down when $\Pr[S] < \Pr[A]$. These thresholds determine the critical trade-off between the honest majority, network delays, and consistency error. Our new results can be directly applied to improve the security guarantees of the existing protocols. We also provide an efficient algorithm to explicitly calculate these error probabilities in the synchronous setting. Furthermore, we complement these results by analyzing the setting where $S$ is rare, even allowing $\Pr[S] = 0$, under the added assumption that honest players adopt a consistent chain selection rule.

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Reward Sharing Schemes for Stake Pools

We introduce and study reward sharing schemes (RSS) that promote the fair formation of {\em stake pools}\ in collaborative projects that involve a large number of stakeholders such as the maintenance of a proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain. Our mechanisms are parameterized by a target value for the desired number of pools. We show that by properly incentivizing participants, the desired number of stake pools is a Nash equilibrium arising from rational play. Our equilibria also exhibit an efficiency / security tradeoff via a parameter that calibrates between including pools with the smallest cost and providing protection against Sybil attacks, the setting where a single stakeholder creates a large number of pools in the hopes to dominate the collaborative project. We then describe how RSS can be deployed in the PoS setting, mitigating a number of potential deployment attacks and protocol deviations that include censoring transactions, performing Sybil attacks with the objective to control the majority of stake, lying about the actual cost and others. Finally, we experimentally demonstrate fast convergence to equilibria in dynamic environments where players react to each other's strategic moves over an indefinite period of interactive play. We also show how simple reward sharing schemes that are seemingly more "fair", perhaps counterintuitively, converge to centralized equilibria.

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Coalition-Safe Equilibria with Virtual Payoffs

Consider a set of parties invited to execute a protocol $Π$. The protocol will incur some cost to run while in the end (or at regular intervals), it will populate and update local tables that assign (virtual) rewards to participants. Each participant aspires to offset the costs of participation by these virtual payoffs that are provided in the course of the protocol. In this setting, we introduce and study a notion of coalition-safe equilibrium. In particular, we consider a strategic coalition of participants that is centrally coordinated and potentially deviates from $Π$ with the objective to increase its utility with respect to the view of {\em at least one} of the other participants. The protocol $Π$ is called a coalition-safe equilibrium with virtual payoffs (EVP) if no such protocol deviation exists. We apply our notion to study incentives in blockchain protocols. We proceed to use our framework to provide a unified picture of incentives in the Bitcoin blockchain, for absolute and relative rewards based utility functions, as well as prove novel results regarding incentives of the Fruitchain blockchain protocol [PODC 2017] showing that the equilibrium condition holds for collusions up to $n-1$ players for absolute rewards based utility functions and less than $n/2$ for relative rewards based utility functions, with the latter result holding for any "weakly fair" blockchain protocol, a new property that we introduce and may be of independent interest.

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Linear Consistency for Proof-of-Stake Blockchains

The blockchain data structure maintained via the longest-chain rule---popularized by Bitcoin---is a powerful algorithmic tool for consensus algorithms. Such algorithms achieve consistency for blocks in the chain as a function of their depth from the end of the chain. While the analysis of Bitcoin guarantees consistency with error $2^{-k}$ for blocks of depth $O(k)$, the state-of-the-art of proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchains suffers from a quadratic dependence on $k$: these protocols, exemplified by Ouroboros (Crypto 2017), Ouroboros Praos (Eurocrypt 2018) and Sleepy Consensus (Asiacrypt 2017), can only establish that depth $Θ(k^2)$ is sufficient. Whether this quadratic gap is an intrinsic limitation of PoS---due to issues such as the nothing-at-stake problem---has been an urgent open question, as deployed PoS blockchains further rely on consistency for protocol correctness. We give an axiomatic theory of blockchain dynamics that permits rigorous reasoning about the longest-chain rule and achieve, in broad generality, $Θ(k)$ dependence on depth in order to achieve consistency error $2^{-k}$. In particular, for the first time, we show that PoS protocols can match proof-of-work protocols for linear consistency. We analyze the associated stochastic process, give a recursive relation for the critical functionals of this process, and derive tail bounds in both i.i.d. and martingale settings via associated generating functions.

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Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach

Since the invention of Bitcoin one decade ago, numerous cryptocurrencies have sprung into existence. Among these, proof-of-work is the most common mechanism for achieving consensus, whilst a number of coins have adopted "ASIC-resistance" as a desirable property, claiming to be more "egalitarian,"S where egalitarianism refers to the power of each coin to participate in the creation of new coins. While proof-of-work consensus dominates the space, several new cryptocurrencies employ alternative consensus, such as proof-of-stake in which block minting opportunities are based on monetary ownership. A core criticism of proof-of-stake revolves around it being less egalitarian by making the rich richer, as opposed to proof-of-work in which everyone can contribute equally according to their computational power. In this paper, we give the first quantitative definition of a cryptocurrency's \emph{egalitarianism}. Based on our definition, we measure the egalitarianism of popular cryptocurrencies that (may or may not) employ ASIC-resistance, among them Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, and Monero. Our simulations show, as expected, that ASIC-resistance increases a cryptocurrency's egalitarianism. We also measure the egalitarianism of a stake-based protocol, Ouroboros, and a hybrid proof-of-stake/proof-of-work cryptocurrency, Decred. We show that stake-based cryptocurrencies, under correctly selected parameters, can be perfectly egalitarian, perhaps contradicting folklore belief.

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On the Practicality of Smart Contract PKI

Public key infrastructures (PKIs) are one of the main building blocks for securing communications over the Internet. Currently, PKIs are under the control of centralized authorities, which is problematic as evidenced by numerous incidents where they have been compromised. The distributed, fault tolerant log of transactions provided by blockchains and more recently, smart contract platforms, constitutes a powerful tool for the decentralization of PKIs. To verify the validity of identity records, blockchain-based identity systems store on chain either all identity records, or, a small (or even constant) sized amount of data to verify identity records stored off chain. However, as most of these systems have never been implemented, there is little information regarding the practical implications of each design's tradeoffs. In this work, we first implement and evaluate the only provably secure, smart contract based PKI of [1] on top of Ethereum. This construction incurs constant-sized storage at the expense of computational complexity. To explore this tradeoff, we propose and implement a second construction which, eliminates the need for trusted setup, preserves the security properties of [1] and, as illustrated through our evaluation, is the only version with constant-sized state that can be deployed on the live chain of Ethereum. Furthermore, we compare these two systems with the simple approach of most prior works, e.g., the Ethereum Name Service, where all identity records are stored on the smart contract's state, to illustrate several shortcomings of Ethereum and its cost model. We propose several modifications for fine tuning the model, which would be useful to be considered for any smart contract platform like Ethereum so that it reaches its full potential to support arbitrary distributed applications.

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A Puff of Steem: Security Analysis of Decentralized Content Curation

Decentralized content curation is the process through which uploaded posts are ranked and filtered based exclusively on users' feedback. Platforms such as the blockchain-based Steemit employ this type of curation while providing monetary incentives to promote the visibility of high quality posts according to the perception of the participants. Despite the wide adoption of the platform very little is known regarding its performance and resilience characteristics. In this work, we provide a formal model for decentralized content curation that identifies salient complexity and game-theoretic measures of performance and resilience to selfish participants. Armed with our model, we provide a first analysis of Steemit identifying the conditions under which the system can be expected to correctly converge to curation while we demonstrate its susceptibility to selfish participant behaviour. We validate our theoretical results with system simulations in various scenarios.

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Structure and Content of the Visible Darknet

In this paper, we analyze the topology and the content found on the "darknet", the set of websites accessible via Tor. We created a darknet spider and crawled the darknet starting from a bootstrap list by recursively following links. We explored the whole connected component of more than 34,000 hidden services, of which we found 10,000 to be online. Contrary to folklore belief, the visible part of the darknet is surprisingly well-connected through hub websites such as wikis and forums. We performed a comprehensive categorization of the content using supervised machine learning. We observe that about half of the visible dark web content is related to apparently licit activities based on our classifier. A significant amount of content pertains to software repositories, blogs, and activism-related websites. Among unlawful hidden services, most pertain to fraudulent websites, services selling counterfeit goods, and drug markets.

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Distributed, End-to-end Verifiable, and Privacy-Preserving Internet Voting Systems

E-voting systems are a powerful technology for improving democracy. Unfortunately, prior voting systems have single points-of-failure, which may compromise availability, privacy, or integrity of the election results. We present the design, implementation, security analysis, and evaluation of the D-DEMOS suite of distributed, privacy-preserving, and end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems. We present two systems: one asynchronous and one with minimal timing assumptions but better performance. Our systems include a distributed vote collection subsystem that does not require cryptographic operations on behalf of the voter. We also include a distributed, replicated and fault-tolerant Bulletin Board component, that stores all necessary election-related information, and allows any party to read and verify the complete election process. Finally, we incorporate trustees, who control result production while guaranteeing privacy and end-to-end-verifiability as long as their strong majority is honest. Our suite of e-voting systems are the first whose voting operation is human verifiable, i.e., a voter can vote over the web, even when her web client stack is potentially unsafe, without sacrificing her privacy, and still be assured her vote was recorded as cast. Additionally, a voter can outsource election auditing to third parties, still without sacrificing privacy. We provide a model and security analysis of the systems, implement complete prototypes, measure their performance experimentally, and demonstrate their ability to handle large-scale elections. Finally, we demonstrate the performance trade-offs between the two versions of the system. A preliminary version of our system was used to conduct exit-polls at three voting sites for two national-level elections and is being adopted for use by the largest civil union of workers in Greece, consisting of over a half million members.

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Blockchain Mining Games

We study the strategic considerations of miners participating in the bitcoin's protocol. We formulate and study the stochastic game that underlies these strategic considerations. The miners collectively build a tree of blocks, and they are paid when they create a node (mine a block) which will end up in the path of the tree that is adopted by all. Since the miners can hide newly mined nodes, they play a game with incomplete information. Here we consider two simplified forms of this game in which the miners have complete information. In the simplest game the miners release every mined block immediately, but are strategic on which blocks to mine. In the second more complicated game, when a block is mined it is announced immediately, but it may not be released so that other miners cannot continue mining from it. A miner not only decides which blocks to mine, but also when to release blocks to other miners. In both games, we show that when the computational power of each miner is relatively small, their best response matches the expected behavior of the bitcoin designer. However, when the computational power of a miner is large, he deviates from the expected behavior, and other Nash equilibria arise.

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D-DEMOS: A distributed, end-to-end verifiable, internet voting system

E-voting systems have emerged as a powerful technology for improving democracy by reducing election cost, increasing voter participation, and even allowing voters to directly verify the entire election procedure. Prior internet voting systems have single points of failure, which may result in the compromise of availability, voter secrecy, or integrity of the election results. In this paper, we present the design, implementation, security analysis, and evaluation of D-DEMOS, a complete e-voting system that is distributed, privacy-preserving and end-to-end verifiable. Our system includes a fully asynchronous vote collection subsystem that provides immediate assurance to the voter her vote was recorded as cast, without requiring cryptographic operations on behalf of the voter. We also include a distributed, replicated and fault-tolerant Bulletin Board component, that stores all necessary election-related information, and allows any party to read and verify the complete election process. Finally, we also incorporate trustees, i.e., individuals who control election result production while guaranteeing privacy and end-to-end-verifiability as long as their strong majority is honest. Our system is the first e-voting system whose voting operation is human verifiable, i.e., a voter can vote over the web, even when her web client stack is potentially unsafe, without sacrificing her privacy, and still be assured her vote was recorded as cast. Additionally, a voter can outsource election auditing to third parties, still without sacrificing privacy. Finally, as the number of auditors increases, the probability of election fraud going undetected is diminished exponentially. We provide a model and security analysis of the system. We implement a prototype of the complete system, we measure its performance experimentally, and we demonstrate its ability to handle large-scale elections.

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On the Security of Key Extraction from Measuring Physical Quantities

Key extraction via measuring a physical quantity is a class of information theoretic key exchange protocols that rely on the physical characteristics of the communication channel to enable the computation of a shared key by two (or more) parties that share no prior secret information. The key is supposed to be information theoretically hidden to an eavesdropper. Despite the recent surge of research activity in the area, concrete claims about the security of the protocols typically rely on channel abstractions that are not fully experimentally substantiated. In this work, we propose a novel methodology for the {\em experimental} security analysis of these protocols. The crux of our methodology is a falsifiable channel abstraction that is accompanied by an efficient experimental approximation algorithm of the {\em conditional min-entropy} available to the two parties given the view of the eavesdropper. We focus on the signal strength between two wirelessly communicating transceivers as the measured quantity and we use an experimental setup to compute the conditional min-entropy of the channel given the view of the attacker which we find to be linearly increasing. Armed with this understanding of the channel, we showcase the methodology by providing a general protocol for key extraction in this setting that is shown to be secure for a concrete parameter selection. In this way we provide a first comprehensively analyzed wireless key extraction protocol that is demonstrably secure against passive adversaries. Our methodology uses hidden Markov models as the channel model and a dynamic programming approach to approximate conditional min-entropy but other possible instantiations of the methodology can be motivated by our work.

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Solving the At-Most-Once Problem with Nearly Optimal Effectiveness

We present and analyze a wait-free deterministic algorithm for solving the at-most-once problem: how m shared-memory fail-prone processes perform asynchronously n jobs at most once. Our algorithmic strategy provides for the first time nearly optimal effectiveness, which is a measure that expresses the total number of jobs completed in the worst case. The effectiveness of our algorithm equals n-2m+2. This is up to an additive factor of m close to the known effectiveness upper bound n-m+1 over all possible algorithms and improves on the previously best known deterministic solutions that have effectiveness only n-log m o(n). We also present an iterative version of our algorithm that for any $m = O\left(\sqrt[3+ε]{n/\log n}\right)$ is both effectiveness-optimal and work-optimal, for any constant $ε> 0$. We then employ this algorithm to provide a new algorithmic solution for the Write-All problem which is work optimal for any $m=O\left(\sqrt[3+ε]{n/\log n}\right)$.

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Randomness Efficient Steganography

Steganographic protocols enable one to embed covert messages into inconspicuous data over a public communication channel in such a way that no one, aside from the sender and the intended receiver, can even detect the presence of the secret message. In this paper, we provide a new provably-secure, private-key steganographic encryption protocol secure in the framework of Hopper et al. We first present a "one-time stegosystem" that allows two parties to transmit messages of length at most that of the shared key with information-theoretic security guarantees. The employment of a pseudorandom generator (PRG) permits secure transmission of longer messages in the same way that such a generator allows the use of one-time pad encryption for messages longer than the key in symmetric encryption. The advantage of our construction, compared to all previous work is randomness efficiency: in the information theoretic setting our protocol embeds a message of length n bits using a shared secret key of length (1+o(1))n bits while achieving security 2^{-n/log^{O(1)}n}; simply put this gives a rate of key over message that is 1 as n tends to infinity (the previous best result achieved a constant rate greater than 1 regardless of the security offered). In this sense, our protocol is the first truly randomness efficient steganographic system. Furthermore, in our protocol, we can permit a portion of the shared secret key to be public while retaining precisely n private key bits. In this setting, by separating the public and the private randomness of the shared key, we achieve security of 2^{-n}. Our result comes as an effect of the application of randomness extractors to stegosystem design. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time extractors have been applied in steganography.

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Efficient Steganography with Provable Security Guarantees

We provide a new provably-secure steganographic encryption protocol that is proven secure in the complexity-theoretic framework of Hopper et al. The fundamental building block of our steganographic encryption protocol is a "one-time stegosystem" that allows two parties to transmit messages of length shorter than the shared key with information-theoretic security guarantees. The employment of a pseudorandom generator (PRG) permits secure transmission of longer messages in the same way that such a generator allows the use of one-time pad encryption for messages longer than the key in symmetric encryption. The advantage of our construction, compared to that of Hopper et al., is that it avoids the use of a pseudorandom function family and instead relies (directly) on a pseudorandom generator in a way that provides linear improvement in the number of applications of the underlying one-way permutation per transmitted bit. This advantageous trade-off is achieved by substituting the pseudorandom function family employed in the previous construction with an appropriate combinatorial construction that has been used extensively in derandomization, namely almost t-wise independent function families.

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