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Ahmed Hemida

Publications and source records attributed to Ahmed Hemida.

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Beyond Best Response: Quantal Stackelberg Deception as Insurance Against Attacker Misspecification

Stackelberg Security Games (SSG) assume that an attacker observes the defender's strategy and chooses the target that maximizes their expected utility perfectly. In most realistic applications this is not plausible, and in the case of cyber deception (e.g., using decoys) the purpose of the game is to induce uncertainty and mistakes. Quantal response is a common way to represent noise and mistakes in decision-making; here it replaces perfect best-response with a logit choice with rationality parameter $\lambda$ and results in a generalized Quantal Stackelberg Equilibrium (QSE), which recovers the classical solution exactly as $\lambda \rightarrow \infty$. We conduct a deeper analysis of how QSE can function as a generalized form of insurance against a variety of forms of model specification error/uncertainty; our analysis shows that QSE provides a practical way to address the important role of tie-breaking rules and model uncertainty in SSG from both a theoretical and practical perspective. We conduct an empirical evaluation in a cybersecurity case study with two networks and real vulnerabilities drawn from CVE and scored using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). QSE beats Stackelberg in realized defender utility spanning 144 scenarios with specification errors and 25 parameter configurations, with gains of 46\% to 175\% showing a substantial advantage in a wide variety of realistic cases.

cs.CR

Coordinated Multi-Domain Deception: A Stackelberg Game Approach

This paper explores coordinated deception strategies by synchronizing defenses across coupled cyber and physical systems to mislead attackers and strengthen defense mechanisms. We introduce a Stackelberg game framework to model the strategic interaction between defenders and attackers, where the defender leverages CVSS-based exploit probabilities and real-world vulnerability data from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) to guide the deployment of deception. Cyber and physical replicas are used to disrupt attacker reconnaissance and enhance defensive effectiveness. We propose a CVE-based utility function to identify the most critical vulnerabilities and demonstrate that coordinated multilayer deception outperforms single-layer and baseline strategies in improving defender utility across both CVSS versions.

cs.CR

Reactive Synthesis of Sensor Revealing Strategies in Hypergames on Graphs

In many security applications of cyber-physical systems, a system designer must guarantee that critical missions are satisfied against attacks in the sensors and actuators of the CPS. Traditional security design of CPSs often assume that attackers have complete knowledge of the system. In this article, we introduce a class of deception techniques and study how to leverage asymmetric information created by deception to strengthen CPS security. Consider an adversarial interaction between a CPS defender and an attacker, who can perform sensor jamming attacks. To mitigate such attacks, the defender introduces asymmetrical information by deploying a "hidden sensor," whose presence is initially undisclosed but can be revealed if queried. We introduce hypergames on graphs to model this game with asymmetric information. Building on the solution concept called subjective rationalizable strategies in hypergames, we identify two stages in the game: An initial game stage where the defender commits to a strategy perceived rationalizable by the attacker until he deviates from the equilibrium in the attacker's perceptual game; Upon the deviation, a delay-attack game stage starts where the defender plays against the attacker, who has a bounded delay in attacking the sensor being revealed. Based on backward induction, we develop an algorithm that determines, for any given state, if the defender can benefit from hiding a sensor and revealing it later. If the answer is affirmative, the algorithm outputs a sensor revealing strategy to determine when to reveal the sensor during dynamic interactions. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our deceptive strategies through two case studies related to CPS security applications.

cs.GT