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Akashdeep Saha

Publications and source records attributed to Akashdeep Saha.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

Security Analysis for SCONE Logic Locking

SCONE [DAC'25] expands a logic locking interface with additional encoded inputs derived from the original primary inputs, and admits two realizations: a \textit{with-ES} variant, where the critical encoding stage is implemented in hardware, and a \textit{without-ES} variant, where the locked design directly exposes an encoded interface of width $n+m$. We show that both realizations are vulnerable, but for different reasons. For the without-ES variant, we prove that, when the added encoded inputs are deterministic linear functions of the original inputs, the valid encoded-input space remains $n$-dimensional despite the nominal expansion to $n+m$ inputs. Hence, the widened interface does not yield $m$ additional or independent brute-force dimensions. For the with-ES variant, we present a polynomial-time white-box attack that exactly recovers the added-input count and the implemented linear encoding relation from the locked netlist, achieving 100\% recovery over all evaluated instances. We also develop a black-box procedure that certifies the same dimensionality collapse from valid encoded-input samples without reconstructing the hidden encoder. Experiments on ISCAS-85 and ITC-99 benchmarks validate both results, and we further demonstrate exact white-box recovery on an ARM Cortex-M0 RTL benchmark. Finally, we propose a lightweight non-linear mitigation and show that it does not exhibit the vulnerabilities identified in this paper under all representative attack sets considered in SCONE.

cs.CR

TrojanGYM: A Detector-in-the-Loop LLM for Adaptive RTL Hardware Trojan Insertion

Hardware Trojans (HTs) remain a critical threat because learning-based detectors often overfit to narrow trigger/payload patterns and small, stylized benchmarks. We introduce TrojanGYM, an agentic, LLM-driven framework that automatically curates HT insertions to expose detector blind spots. Given high-level HT specifications, a suite of cooperating LLM agents (instantiated with GPT-4, LLaMA-3.3-70B, Gemini-2.5Pro, and Claude Opus 4.5) proposes and refines RTL modifications that realize diverse triggers and payloads without impacting functionality of both the HT and the design under attack. TrojanGYM implements an agentic loop co-designed with HT detectors, in which constraint-aware syntactic checking, testbench-based functional verification, and GNN-based HT detectors provide feedback that iteratively refines HT specifications and insertion strategies to better surface detector blind spots. We further propose Robust-GNN4TJ, a new implementation of GNN4TJ with improved graph extraction, training robustness, and prediction reliability, especially on LLM-generated HT designs. On the most challenging TrojanGYM-generated benchmarks, Robust-GNN4TJ raises HT detection rates from 0% to 60% relative to prior art. We instantiate TrojanGYM on SRAM, AES-128, UART, and RISC-V designs at RTL, and show that it systematically produces diverse, functionally correct HTs that reach up to 68.75% evasion rates against modern GNN-based detectors, revealing robustness gaps that are not apparent when these detectors are evaluated on existing TrustHub-style benchmarks. We release all codes and artifacts at https://github.com/DfX-NYUAD/TrojanGYM.

cs.CR

NetDeTox: Adversarial and Efficient Evasion of Hardware-Security GNNs via RL-LLM Orchestration

Graph neural networks (GNNs) have shown promise in hardware security by learning structural motifs from netlist graphs. However, this reliance on motifs makes GNNs vulnerable to adversarial netlist rewrites; even small-scale edits can mislead GNN predictions. Existing adversarial approaches, ranging from synthesis-recipe perturbations to gate transformations, come with high design overheads. We present NetDeTox, an automated end-to-end framework that orchestrates large language models (LLMs) with reinforcement learning (RL) in a systematic manner, enabling focused local rewriting. The RL agent identifies netlist components critical for GNN-based reasoning, while the LLM devises rewriting plans to diversify motifs that preserve functionality. Iterative feedback between the RL and LLM stages refines adversarial rewritings to limit overheads. Compared to the SOTA work AttackGNN, NetDeTox successfully degrades the effectiveness of all security schemes with fewer rewrites and substantially lower area overheads (reductions of 54.50% for GNN-RE, 25.44% for GNN4IP, and 41.04% for OMLA, respectively). For GNN4IP, ours can even optimize/reduce the original benchmarks' area, in particular for larger circuits, demonstrating the practicality and scalability of NetDeTox.

cs.CR

LockForge: Automating Paper-to-Code for Logic Locking with Multi-Agent Reasoning LLMs

Despite rapid progress in logic locking (LL), reproducibility remains a challenge as codes are rarely made public. We present LockForge, a first-of-its-kind, multi-agent large language model (LLM) framework that turns LL descriptions in papers into executable and tested code. LockForge provides a carefully crafted pipeline realizing forethought, implementation, iterative refinement, and a multi-stage validation, all to systematically bridge the gap between prose and practice for complex LL schemes. For validation, we devise (i) an LLM-as-Judge stage with a scoring system considering behavioral checks, conceptual mechanisms, structural elements, and reproducibility on benchmarks, and (ii) an independent LLM-as-Examiner stage for ground-truth assessment. We apply LockForge to 10 seminal LL schemes, many of which lack reference implementations. Our evaluation on multiple SOTA LLMs, including ablation studies, reveals the significant complexity of the task. We show that an advanced reasoning model and a sophisticated, multi-stage framework like LockForge are required. We release all implementations and benchmarks, providing a reproducible and fair foundation for evaluation of further LL research.

cs.CR

Veritas: Deterministic Verilog Code Synthesis from LLM-Generated Conjunctive Normal Form

Automated Verilog code synthesis poses significant challenges and typically demands expert oversight. Traditional high-level synthesis (HLS) methods often fail to scale for real-world designs. While large language models (LLMs) have enhanced scalability, they often introduce syntactical and logical errors requiring extensive post-generation verification. Here, we introduce a novel conjunctive normal form (CNF)-guided synthesis methodology. The idea is to have an LLM generate CNF clauses, a format widely used for formal verification and synthesis validation in hardware design, but here it is used to formally describe the desired circuit functionality. These CNF specifications are then deterministically converted into Verilog, ensuring correctness by construction. Our approach fine-tunes an open-source and lightweight LLM, namely the CPU-deployable LLama-3.2-3B-Instruct model (parameters < 4B), on a dataset of standard RTL components. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach reliably produces functionally correct Verilog code on the first attempt, compared to other lightweight open-source SoTA works such as Verigen (2B parameters) and RTLCoder (4-bit quantized with around 7B parameters). We will release our method and data in full post peer-review.

cs.AR