arXiv subjects

Akid Abrar

Publications and source records attributed to Akid Abrar.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Deployment Feasibility Analysis of Post-Quantum Digital Signatures in Safety-Critical C-V2X Communication for Urban Mobility Scenario

The transition from the classical ECDSA to PQC creates substantially larger authentication payloads for safety-critical C-V2X sidelink communication. This study determines which NIST post-quantum signature algorithms are compatible with the current SAE J3161 deployment profile and quantifies their communication-level effects. A transport-block feasibility analysis was performed using IEEE 1609.2 secured-message structures, SAE J3161 radio parameters, and the signature and public-key sizes of ECDSA P-256, Falcon-512, Dilithium-2, and SPHINCS+. Falcon-512, the only post-quantum candidate that fit the applicable transport-block constraints, was compared with ECDSA P-256 through full-stack C-V2X PC5 Mode 4 co-simulation. The evaluation covered 24 scenarios spanning six traffic levels-of-service with line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight propagation. PDR and end-to-end latency were evaluated at a roadside unit receiver. Dilithium-2 and SPHINCS+ exceeded the available transport-block capacity, whereas Falcon-512 remained physically feasible. Falcon-512 maintained mean latency near 52 ms and 95th-percentile latency within 97-98 ms, but met the 90% packet-delivery threshold only at traffic level-of-service A, under line-of-sight propagation. ECDSA met the threshold through traffic level-of-service C. Neither algorithm met the threshold under non-line-of-sight propagation. The study provides a standards-grounded cross-layer evaluation that identifies both algorithm feasibility and traffic-dependent deployment boundaries for post-quantum signatures on C-V2X Mode 4 sidelink. The results show that spectrum efficiency, rather than cryptographic computation time, is the primary deployment constraint. They support standards development concerning payload structure, resource allocation, certificate transmission, and migration strategies for quantum-resistant vehicular communication.

cs.PF↗

arXiv2026

Post-Quantum Cryptography for Intelligent Transportation Systems: An Implementation-Focused Review

As quantum computing advances, the cryptographic algorithms that underpin confidentiality, integrity, and authentication in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) face increasing vulnerability to quantum-enabled attacks. To address these risks, governments and industry stakeholders are turning toward post-quantum cryptography (PQC), a class of algorithms designed to resist adversaries equipped with quantum computing capabilities. However, existing studies provide limited insight into the implementation-focused aspects of PQC in the ITS domain. This review addresses that gap by evaluating the readiness of vehicular communication and security standards for adopting PQC. It examines in-vehicle networks and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) interfaces, and investigates vulnerabilities at the physical implementation layer of cryptographic hardware and embedded platforms, primarily exposure to side-channel and fault injection attacks. The review identifies thirteen research gaps: non-PQC-ready standards; constraints in embedded implementation and hybrid cryptography; interoperability and certificate-management barriers; a lack of real-world PQC deployment data in ITS; and physical-attack vulnerabilities in PQC-enabled vehicular communication. We present several future research directions, including updating vehicular communication and security standards, optimizing PQC for low-power devices, enhancing interoperability and certificate-management frameworks for PQC integration, conducting real-world evaluations of PQC-enabled communication and control functions across ITS deployments, and strengthening defenses against AI-assisted physical attacks. A phased roadmap is presented that aligns PQC deployment with regulatory, performance, and safety requirements, thereby guiding the secure evolution of ITS in the quantum computing era.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

AI-Driven Post-Quantum Cryptography for Cyber-Resilient V2X Communication in Transportation Cyber-Physical Systems

Transportation Cyber-Physical Systems (TCPS) integrate physical elements, such as transportation infrastructure and vehicles, with cyber elements via advanced communication technologies, allowing them to interact seamlessly. This integration enhances the efficiency, safety, and sustainability of transportation systems. TCPS rely heavily on cryptographic security to protect sensitive information transmitted between vehicles, transportation infrastructure, and other entities within the transportation ecosystem, ensuring data integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity. Traditional cryptographic methods have been employed to secure TCPS communications, but the advent of quantum computing presents a significant threat to these existing security measures. Therefore, integrating Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) into TCPS is essential to maintain secure and resilient communications. While PQC offers a promising approach to developing cryptographic algorithms resistant to quantum attacks, artificial intelligence (AI) can enhance PQC by optimizing algorithm selection, resource allocation, and adapting to evolving threats in real-time. AI-driven PQC approaches can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of PQC implementations, ensuring robust security without compromising system performance. This chapter introduces TCPS communication protocols, discusses the vulnerabilities of corresponding communications to cyber-attacks, and explores the limitations of existing cryptographic methods in the quantum era. By examining how AI can strengthen PQC solutions, the chapter presents cyber-resilient communication strategies for TCPS.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

End-to-End Co-Simulation Testbed for Cybersecurity Research and Development in Intelligent Transportation Systems

Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) have been widely deployed across major metropolitan regions worldwide to improve roadway safety, optimize traffic flow, and reduce environmental impacts. These systems integrate advanced sensors, communication networks, and data analytics to enable real-time traffic monitoring, adaptive signal control, and predictive maintenance. However, such integration significantly broadens the ITS attack surface, exposing critical infrastructures to cyber threats that jeopardize safety, data integrity, and operational resilience. Ensuring robust cybersecurity is therefore essential, yet comprehensive vulnerability assessments, threat modeling, and mitigation validations are often cost-prohibitive and time-intensive when applied to large-scale, heterogeneous transportation systems. Simulation platforms offer a cost-effective and repeatable means for cybersecurity evaluation, and the simulation platform should encompass the full range of ITS dimensions - mobility, sensing, networking, and applications. This chapter discusses an integrated co-simulation testbed that links CARLA for 3D environment and sensor modeling, SUMO for microscopic traffic simulation and control, and OMNeT++ for V2X communication simulation. The co-simulation testbed enables end-to-end experimentation, vulnerability identification, and mitigation benchmarking, providing practical insights for developing secure, efficient, and resilient ITS infrastructures. To illustrate its capabilities, the chapter incorporates a case study on a C-V2X proactive safety alert system enhanced with post-quantum cryptography, highlighting the role of the testbed in advancing secure and resilient ITS infrastructures.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

OpenCAMS: An Open-Source Connected and Automated Mobility Co-Simulation Platform for Advancing Next-Generation Intelligent Transportation Systems Research

We introduce OpenCAMS (Open-Source Connected and Automated Mobility Co-Simulation Platform), an open-source, synchronized, and extensible co-simulation framework that tightly couples three best-in-class simulation tools: (i) SUMO, (ii) CARLA, and (iii) OMNeT++. OpenCAMS is designed to support advanced research in transportation safety, mobility, and cybersecurity by combining the strengths of each simulation domain. Specifically, SUMO provides large-scale, microscopic traffic modeling; CARLA offers high-fidelity 3D perception, vehicle dynamics, and control simulation; and OMNeT++ enables modular, event-driven network communication, such as cellular vehicle-to-everything (C-V2X). OpenCAMS employs a time-synchronized, bidirectional coupling architecture that ensures coherent simulation progression across traffic, perception, and communication domains while preserving modularity and reproducibility. For example, CARLA can simulate and render a subset of vehicles that require detailed sensor emulation and control logic; SUMO orchestrates network-wide traffic flow, vehicle routing, and traffic signal management; and OMNeT++ dynamically maps communication nodes to both mobile entities (e.g., vehicles) and static entities (e.g., roadside units) to enable C-V2X communication. While these three simulators form the foundational core of OpenCAMS, the platform is designed to be expandable and future-proof, allowing additional simulators to be integrated on top of this core without requiring fundamental changes to the system architecture. The OpenCAMS platform is fully open-source and publicly available through its GitHub repository https://github.com/minhaj6/carla-sumo-omnetpp-cosim, providing the research community with an accessible, flexible, and collaborative environment for advancing next-generation intelligent transportation systems.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2024

Enhancing Transportation Cyber-Physical Systems Security: A Shift to Post-Quantum Cryptography

The rise of quantum computing threatens traditional cryptographic algorithms that secure Transportation Cyber-Physical Systems (TCPS). Shor's algorithm poses a significant threat to RSA and ECC, while Grover's algorithm reduces the security of symmetric encryption schemes, such as AES. The objective of this paper is to underscore the urgency of transitioning to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) to mitigate these risks in TCPS by analyzing the vulnerabilities of traditional cryptographic schemes and the applicability of standardized PQC schemes in TCPS. We analyzed vulnerabilities in traditional cryptography against quantum attacks and reviewed the applicability of NIST-standardized PQC schemes, including CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, and SPHINCS+, in TCPS. We conducted a case study to analyze the vulnerabilities of a TCPS application from the Architecture Reference for Cooperative and Intelligent Transportation (ARC-IT) service package, i.e., Electronic Toll Collection, leveraging the Microsoft Threat Modeling tool. This case study highlights the cryptographic vulnerabilities of a TCPS application and presents how PQC can effectively counter these threats. Additionally, we evaluated CRYSTALS-Kyber's performance across wired and wireless TCPS data communication scenarios. While CRYSTALS-Kyber proves effective in securing TCPS applications over high-bandwidth, low-latency Ethernet networks, our analysis highlights challenges in meeting the stringent latency requirements of safety-critical wireless applications within TCPS. Future research should focus on developing lightweight PQC solutions and hybrid schemes that integrate traditional and PQC algorithms, to enhance compatibility, scalability, and real-time performance, ensuring robust protection against emerging quantum threats in TCPS.

cs.CR↗