arXiv subjects

Akshay K. Jagadish

Publications and source records attributed to Akshay K. Jagadish.

15 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

CogGym: Towards Large-Scale Comparative Evaluation of Human and Machine Cognition

Understanding and modeling human intelligence are parallel goals shared by artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive science. As AI systems grow increasingly capable, in what ways do model responses resemble human responses, and where do they systematically diverge? The sheer breadth and diversity of the tasks humans can perform and think about pose a challenge for scalable and rigorous comparison between humans and models. We introduce CogGym, a scalable, unified framework grounded in cognitive science for systematically comparing model and human behavior on matched experimental trials. CogGym uses a semi-automated, human-in-the-loop pipeline to standardize diverse experimental paradigms into a task-agnostic Experiment Markup Language (EML), enabling reproducible and faithful comparison at scale. For initial release, we curate and standardize 258 cognitive experiments from 100 papers that focuses on human commonsense reasoning, and evaluate 50 large language models against human responses. We find a clear scaling trend where larger and more recent AI models better reproduce human judgments. Yet AI models' improvement on such common reasoning tasks is considerably slower than the gains observed on formal-reasoning benchmarks like math and coding, and model--human fit remains well below human splithalf reliability ($R^2 = 0.93$ on text, $0.95$ on image, and $0.92$ on video) with the best models achieving $R^2 = 0.59$ on text, $0.58$ on image, and $0.43$ on video experiments. We intend for CogGym to provide a living evaluation framework that continually incorporates new cognitive science experiments to characterize where model behavior resembles human behavior, where it systematically diverges, and how those patterns change as models and experiments evolve.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Sparks of In Silico Cognitive Science: Theories from Simulated Data Can Generalize to Humans

Behavioral foundation models have been proposed as stand-ins for human participants across settings, but it is unclear whether theories discovered on them generalize to humans or merely characterize the simulator. We ran the Automated Cognitive Scientist (\textsc{AutoCog}), a closed-loop discovery system in which LLM agents design theory-discriminating experiments, collect responses, arbitrate between competing theories, and synthesize successors, entirely on behavior simulated by Centaur, a foundation model of human behavior. In a multi-attribute decision-making setting, the theories \textsc{AutoCog} found on Centaur generalized to human data: they outperformed canonical theories on ten held-out experiments and were rivaled only by theories found by running the same loop on people. We argue that this succeeds despite the simulator's inevitable imperfections because a discovery loop that arbitrates between competing theories demands less of its simulator than estimation does. The simulator only needs to capture the regularities that distinguish the theories, and not necessarily reproduce behavior precisely. Imperfect simulators can therefore widen the search over theories, with human data then testing whether the surfaced theories generalize.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

More accurate behavioral predictions with hybrid Bayesian-connectionist models

Researchers must often choose between Bayesian or neural network models of behavior, two paradigms with complementary strengths and weaknesses. An ideal paradigm would facilitate testing many kinds of representations and inductive biases; Bayesian models make this easy, while neural networks do not. Similarly, an ideal paradigm would avoid over-simplifications; neural networks make this easy, while Bayesian models do not. Here, we introduce Bayesian distillation with Behavioral Tuning (BBT) as an approach to getting the best of both traditions. BBT offers a simple recipe for model building: first, a neural network is trained to mimic a Bayesian model through synthetic data, and second, the network is fine-tuned on human behavior to capture additional structure and nuance. Across four case studies in human concept learning, we find that BBT outperforms traditional approaches at predicting human behavior while also revealing psychological insights, resulting in models that can both mimic Bayesian priors and capture heuristics and biases that violate simple modeling assumptions.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Closing the Loop to Discover Psychological Theories with an Automated Cognitive Scientist

Across the sciences, autonomous systems are increasingly being used in closed-loop discovery, proposing new theories and designing and running experiments to test them. This approach is yet to be applied in the field of cognitive science, where the central bottleneck is theory-building: the creative step of turning the accumulated failures of existing models into better ones. Theory generation has remained manual even as data collection, modeling, and experiment design have been automated. We present the Automated Cognitive Scientist (AutoCog), a fully autonomous agentic-AI system that closes this loop. Large-language-model agents advocate competing theories, each expressed as an executable cognitive model, design experiments that best discriminate them, collect behavioral data from participants recruited online, score theories against collected data based on their generative performance, diagnose why they fail, and synthesize a better successor. Repeating this cycle allows them to search the space of theories, models, and experiments. In the domain of decision-making, AutoCog recovered known decision-making strategies from simulated behavior, including unconventional ones, showing that its discoveries are ultimately driven by the data rather than strictly bound by the priors of the underlying language models. When run with human participants, it produced theories that outperformed the established theories it was seeded with and generalized to held-out studies in two different experimental settings. It also surfaced a novel theory of multi-cue decision-making in which choices show diminishing sensitivity to feature values. The distinctive predictions of this theory were confirmed in a preregistered study with new participants. AutoCog demonstrates how an automated discovery system can be used to turn cognitive theory-building into an explicit, executable, and cumulative science.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2026

Meta-learning ecological priors from large language models explains human learning and decision making

Human cognition is profoundly shaped by the environments in which it unfolds. Yet, it remains an open question whether learning and decision making can be explained as a principled adaptation to the statistical structure of real-world tasks. We introduce ecologically rational analysis, a computational framework that unifies the normative foundations of rational analysis with ecological grounding. Leveraging large language models to generate ecologically valid cognitive tasks at scale, and using meta-learning to derive rational models optimized for these environments, we develop a new class of learning algorithms: Ecologically Rational Meta-learned Inference (ERMI). ERMI internalizes the statistical regularities of naturalistic problem spaces and adapts flexibly to novel situations, without requiring hand-crafted heuristics or explicit parameter updates. We show that ERMI captures human behavior across 15 experiments spanning function learning, category learning, and decision making, outperforming several established cognitive models in trial-by-trial prediction. Our results suggest that much of human cognition may reflect adaptive alignment to the ecological structure of the problems we encounter in everyday life.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2026

Using Probabilistic Programs to Train Inductive Reasoning in Large Language Models

Post-training Large Language Models (LLMs) for reasoning typically focuses on deductive tasks such as mathematics and coding where correctness is verifiable. Yet, many real-world reasoning problems are inductive: agents must infer uncertain beliefs from sparse, ambiguous observations. There are challenges to using standard fine-tuning methods for inductive reasoning, including difficulties in curating large-scale, high-quality labeled datasets and in handling targets that are inherently distributional. In this work, we introduce a novel approach, called Program-based Posterior Training (PPT), to address these limitations: we use an LLM to generate diverse open-world scenarios as probabilistic programs, run probabilistic inference to produce distributional target responses to queries, and then fine-tune on these probabilistic soft labels. Using this approach, we fine-tune LLMs on 10,000 programmatically generated scenarios and evaluate on held-out motifs, human-labeled judgments, and external benchmarks. Overall, PPT substantially improves estimation accuracy on held-out inductive tasks, increases alignment with human judgments, and transfers to external benchmarks for estimation and calibration. Additionally, the gains in raw calibration are not subsumed by post-hoc temperature scaling, showing that the models have more deeply internalized uncertainty compared to output rescaling. Together, these results suggest that probabilistic-program-mediated fine-tuning is a promising approach for post-training LLMs to reliably perform approximate inductive inference.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Think-Aloud Reshapes Automated Cognitive Model Discovery Beyond Behavior

Computational cognitive models discovered using large language models have so far relied solely on behavioral data. However, it is well-known that models produced from the behavioral trajectory alone are typically under-determined. In this work, we explore the use of Think Aloud traces as an additional form of data constraint during automated model discovery. When applied to the domain of risky decision-making, we find that the models discovered with think-aloud achieve significantly improved predictive performance on held-out data. Additionally, we find that the discovered models belong to different structural classes than those discovered from behavior alone for the majority of participants (69.4\%), specifically, it shifts from Explicit comparator towards Integrated utility. These results suggest that process-level language data not only improve model fit, but also systematically reshape the structure of the discovered cognitive models, enabling the identification of mechanisms that are not recoverable from behavior alone.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2026

Can we automatize scientific discovery in the cognitive sciences?

The cognitive sciences aim to understand intelligence by formalizing underlying operations as computational models. Traditionally, this follows a cycle of discovery where researchers develop paradigms, collect data, and test predefined model classes. However, this manual pipeline is fundamentally constrained by the slow pace of human intervention and a search space limited by researchers' background and intuition. Here, we propose a paradigm shift toward a fully automated, in silico science of the mind that implements every stage of the discovery cycle using Large Language Models (LLMs). In this framework, experimental paradigms exploring conceptually meaningful task structures are directly sampled from an LLM. High-fidelity behavioral data are then simulated using foundation models of cognition. The tedious step of handcrafting cognitive models is replaced by LLM-based program synthesis, which performs a high-throughput search over a vast landscape of algorithmic hypotheses. Finally, the discovery loop is closed by optimizing for ''interestingness'', a metric of conceptual yield evaluated by an LLM-critic. By enabling a fast and scalable approach to theory development, this automated loop functions as a high-throughput in-silico discovery engine, surfacing informative experiments and mechanisms for subsequent validation in real human populations.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Generating Computational Cognitive Models using Large Language Models

Computational cognitive models, which formalize theories of cognition, enable researchers to quantify cognitive processes and arbitrate between competing theories by fitting models to behavioral data. Traditionally, these models are handcrafted, which requires significant domain knowledge, coding expertise, and time investment. However, recent advances in machine learning offer solutions to these challenges. In particular, Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities for in-context pattern recognition, leveraging knowledge from diverse domains to solve complex problems, and generating executable code that can be used to facilitate the generation of cognitive models. Building on this potential, we introduce a pipeline for Guided generation of Computational Cognitive Models (GeCCo). Given task instructions, participant data, and a template function, GeCCo prompts an LLM to propose candidate models, fits proposals to held-out data, and iteratively refines them based on feedback constructed from their predictive performance. We benchmark this approach across four different cognitive domains -- decision making, learning, planning, and memory -- using three open-source LLMs, spanning different model sizes, capacities, and families. On four human behavioral data sets, the LLM generated models that consistently matched or outperformed the best domain-specific models from the cognitive science literature. Taken together, our results suggest that LLMs can generate cognitive models with conceptually plausible theories that rival -- or even surpass -- the best models from the literature across diverse task domains.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Automated scientific minimization of regret

We introduce automated scientific minimization of regret (ASMR) -- a framework for automated computational cognitive science. Building on the principles of scientific regret minimization, ASMR leverages Centaur -- a recently proposed foundation model of human cognition -- to identify gaps in an interpretable cognitive model. These gaps are then addressed through automated revisions generated by a language-based reasoning model. We demonstrate the utility of this approach in a multi-attribute decision-making task, showing that ASMR discovers cognitive models that predict human behavior at noise ceiling while retaining interpretability. Taken together, our results highlight the potential of ASMR to automate core components of the cognitive modeling pipeline.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Centaur: a foundation model of human cognition

Establishing a unified theory of cognition has been a major goal of psychology. While there have been previous attempts to instantiate such theories by building computational models, we currently do not have one model that captures the human mind in its entirety. A first step in this direction is to create a model that can predict human behavior in a wide range of settings. Here we introduce Centaur, a computational model that can predict and simulate human behavior in any experiment expressible in natural language. We derived Centaur by finetuning a state-of-the-art language model on a novel, large-scale data set called Psych-101. Psych-101 reaches an unprecedented scale, covering trial-by-trial data from over 60,000 participants performing over 10,000,000 choices in 160 experiments. Centaur not only captures the behavior of held-out participants better than existing cognitive models, but also generalizes to new cover stories, structural task modifications, and entirely new domains. Furthermore, we find that the model's internal representations become more aligned with human neural activity after finetuning. Taken together, our results demonstrate that it is possible to discover computational models that capture human behavior across a wide range of domains. We believe that such models provide tremendous potential for guiding the development of cognitive theories and present a case study to demonstrate this.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Inducing anxiety in large language models can induce bias

Large language models (LLMs) are transforming research on machine learning while galvanizing public debates. Understanding not only when these models work well and succeed but also why they fail and misbehave is of great societal relevance. We propose to turn the lens of psychiatry, a framework used to describe and modify maladaptive behavior, to the outputs produced by these models. We focus on twelve established LLMs and subject them to a questionnaire commonly used in psychiatry. Our results show that six of the latest LLMs respond robustly to the anxiety questionnaire, producing comparable anxiety scores to humans. Moreover, the LLMs' responses can be predictably changed by using anxiety-inducing prompts. Anxiety-induction not only influences LLMs' scores on an anxiety questionnaire but also influences their behavior in a previously-established benchmark measuring biases such as racism and ageism. Importantly, greater anxiety-inducing text leads to stronger increases in biases, suggesting that how anxiously a prompt is communicated to large language models has a strong influence on their behavior in applied settings. These results demonstrate the usefulness of methods taken from psychiatry for studying the capable algorithms to which we increasingly delegate authority and autonomy.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2024

Sparse Autoencoders Reveal Temporal Difference Learning in Large Language Models

In-context learning, the ability to adapt based on a few examples in the input prompt, is a ubiquitous feature of large language models (LLMs). However, as LLMs' in-context learning abilities continue to improve, understanding this phenomenon mechanistically becomes increasingly important. In particular, it is not well-understood how LLMs learn to solve specific classes of problems, such as reinforcement learning (RL) problems, in-context. Through three different tasks, we first show that Llama $3$ $70$B can solve simple RL problems in-context. We then analyze the residual stream of Llama using Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) and find representations that closely match temporal difference (TD) errors. Notably, these representations emerge despite the model only being trained to predict the next token. We verify that these representations are indeed causally involved in the computation of TD errors and $Q$-values by performing carefully designed interventions on them. Taken together, our work establishes a methodology for studying and manipulating in-context learning with SAEs, paving the way for a more mechanistic understanding.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Human-like Category Learning by Injecting Ecological Priors from Large Language Models into Neural Networks

Ecological rationality refers to the notion that humans are rational agents adapted to their environment. However, testing this theory remains challenging due to two reasons: the difficulty in defining what tasks are ecologically valid and building rational models for these tasks. In this work, we demonstrate that large language models can generate cognitive tasks, specifically category learning tasks, that match the statistics of real-world tasks, thereby addressing the first challenge. We tackle the second challenge by deriving rational agents adapted to these tasks using the framework of meta-learning, leading to a class of models called ecologically rational meta-learned inference (ERMI). ERMI quantitatively explains human data better than seven other cognitive models in two different experiments. It additionally matches human behavior on a qualitative level: (1) it finds the same tasks difficult that humans find difficult, (2) it becomes more reliant on an exemplar-based strategy for assigning categories with learning, and (3) it generalizes to unseen stimuli in a human-like way. Furthermore, we show that ERMI's ecologically valid priors allow it to achieve state-of-the-art performance on the OpenML-CC18 classification benchmark.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

In-context learning agents are asymmetric belief updaters

We study the in-context learning dynamics of large language models (LLMs) using three instrumental learning tasks adapted from cognitive psychology. We find that LLMs update their beliefs in an asymmetric manner and learn more from better-than-expected outcomes than from worse-than-expected ones. Furthermore, we show that this effect reverses when learning about counterfactual feedback and disappears when no agency is implied. We corroborate these findings by investigating idealized in-context learning agents derived through meta-reinforcement learning, where we observe similar patterns. Taken together, our results contribute to our understanding of how in-context learning works by highlighting that the framing of a problem significantly influences how learning occurs, a phenomenon also observed in human cognition.

cs.LG↗