arXiv subjects

Alastair Langtry

Publications and source records attributed to Alastair Langtry.

10 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Mobile but Miserable: Social comparison networks and social mobility

Although social mobility is widely viewed as desirable, we document an 'inverse-U' shaped relationship with well-being: mobility is positively associated with well-being when low, but the association diminishes as mobility increases and eventually becomes negative. To explain this, we build a model in which agents are embedded in a social comparison network and suffer from falling behind their peers. The model highlights two channels that can cause welfare to be decreasing in mobility at high levels. First, when mobility is high, further increases widen already significant gaps between agents from similar parental backgrounds but of different abilities. Second, when mobility is high, high-ability agents are already relatively well off. So further increases in social mobility increase inequality. We find evidence supportive of both channels in US data. The model also predicts, and data supports, that social integration -- where relationships form more along ability than background lines -- allows societies to benefit from mobility for longer. We interpret this as social mobility being multidimensional with both economic and social dimensions that are complementary.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2025

More connection, less community: network formation and local public goods provision

This paper presents a model of network formation and public goods provision in local communities. Here, networks can sustain public good provision by spreading information about people's behaviour. I find a critical threshold in network connectedness at which public good provision drops sharply, even though agents are highly heterogeneous. Technology change can tear a community's social fabric by pushing high-skilled workers to withdraw from their local community. This can help explain rising resentment toward perceived ``elites'' -- their withdrawal actively harms those left behind. Moreover, well-meaning policies that upskill workers can make them worse off by reducing network connectedness.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2024

Why do elites extend property rights: unlocking investment and the switch to public goods

This paper presents a new rationale for a self-interested economic elite voluntarily extending property rights. When agents make endogenous investment decisions, there is a commitment problem. Ex-post, the elite face strong incentives to expropriate investments from the non-elite (who don't have property rights), which dissuades investment. Extending property rights to new groups can resolve this problem, even for those not given property rights, by making public good provision more attractive to the elite. Unlike other models of franchise extensions, extending property rights in this paper does not involve the elite ceding control to others. Rather, it changes the incentives they face. Additionally, adding identity groups to the model shows that an elite faces weaker incentives to resolve the commitment problem when it is part of a minority identity -- identity fragmentation makes it harder for a society to extend property rights.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2024

Network Threshold Games

This paper proposes a new lens for studying threshold games played on networks when the thresholds are heterogeneous. These are games where agents have two possible actions, and prefer action 1 if and only if enough of their neighbours choose action 1. We propose a transformation of the network that `absorbs' the heterogeneity in thresholds into the network. This allows us to characterise equilibria in terms of the k-core -- a well-studied measure of network cohesiveness -- of the transformed network. Our model is also the direct analogy to the workhorse model of Ballester et al. (2006) when actions are 0 or 1. Further, our binary action version exhibits a remarkable stability property. When agents have linear-quadratic preferences, the k-core of the transformed network characterises the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a sequential move version of the game -- no matter what order agents move in.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2024

Inside the West Wing: Lobbying as a contest

When a government makes many different policy decisions, lobbying can be viewed as a contest between the government and many different special interest groups. The government fights lobbying by interest groups with its own political capital. In this world, we find that a government wants to `sell protection' -- give favourable treatment in exchange for contributions -- to certain interest groups. It does this in order to build its own `war chest' of political capital, which improves its position in fights with other interest groups. And it does so until it wins all remaining contests with certainty. This stands in contrast to existing models that often view lobbying as driven by information or agency problems.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2023

Status substitution and conspicuous consumption

This paper adapts ideas from social identity theory to set out a new framework for modelling conspicuous consumption. Agents derive utility from their consumption of a status good and from belonging to an identity group with high status good consumption. Importantly, these two sources of utility are substitutes. Agents also feel pressure to conform with their neighbours in a network. This framework can rationalise a set of seemingly conflicting stylised facts about conspicuous consumption that are currently explained by different families of models. In addition, our model delivers new testable predictions regarding the effect of network structure and income inequality on conspicuous consumption.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2022

The economic and health impacts of contact tracing and quarantine programs

Contact tracing and quarantine programs have been one of the leading Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions against COVID-19. Some governments have relied on mandatory programs, whereas others embrace a voluntary approach. However, there is limited evidence on the relative effectiveness of these different approaches. In an interactive online experiment conducted on 731 subjects representative of the adult US population in terms of sex and region of residence, we find there is a clear ranking. A fully mandatory program is better than an optional one, and an optional system is better than no intervention at all. The ranking is driven by reductions in infections, while economic activity stays unchanged. We also find that political conservatives have higher infections and levels of economic activity, and they are less likely to participate in the contact tracing program.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2022

Keeping up with "The Joneses": reference dependent choice with social comparisons

Keeping up with "The Joneses" matters. This paper examines a model of reference dependent choice where reference points are determined by social comparisons. An increase in the strength of social comparisons, even by only a few agents, increases consumption and decreases welfare for everyone. Strikingly, a higher marginal cost of consumption can increase welfare. In a labour market, social comparisons with co-workers create a big fish in a small pond effect, inducing incomplete labour market sorting. Further, it is the skilled workers with the weakest social networks who are induced to give up income to become the big fish.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2020

Social distancing in networks: A web-based interactive experiment

Governments have used social distancing to stem the spread of COVID-19, but lack evidence on the most effective policy to ensure compliance. We examine the effectiveness of fines and informational messages (nudges) in promoting social distancing in a web-based interactive experiment conducted during the first wave of the pandemic on a near-representative sample of the US population. Fines promote distancing, but nudges only have a marginal impact. Individuals do more social distancing when they are aware they are a superspreader. Using an instrumental variable approach, we argue progressives are more likely to practice distancing, and they are marginally more responsive to fines.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2020

Social networks, confirmation bias and shock elections

In recent years online social networks have become increasingly prominent in political campaigns and, concurrently, several countries have experienced shock election outcomes. This paper proposes a model that links these two phenomena. In our set-up, the process of learning from others on a network is influenced by confirmation bias, i.e. the tendency to ignore contrary evidence and interpret it as consistent with one's own belief. When agents pay enough attention to themselves, confirmation bias leads to slower learning in any symmetric network, and it increases polarization in society. We identify a subset of agents that become more/less influential with confirmation bias. The socially optimal network structure depends critically on the information available to the social planner. When she cannot observe agents' beliefs, the optimal network is symmetric, vertex-transitive and has no self-loops. We explore the implications of these results for electoral outcomes and media markets. Confirmation bias increases the likelihood of shock elections, and it pushes fringe media to take a more extreme ideology.

econ.TH↗