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Alberto Castagnaro

Publications and source records attributed to Alberto Castagnaro.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Toward Agentic SysAdmin: Rethinking System Administration with AI Agents

The growing complexity of computer networks, driven by cloud-native architectures, heterogeneous devices, and distributed systems, places increasing pressure on network administrators who must simultaneously manage configuration, troubleshooting, and security under tight operational constraints. Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as a promising tool to assist and partially automate these tasks, yet their systematic evaluation in networking scenarios remains an open challenge. Existing benchmarks rely on static reference outputs or manual expert validation, neither of which scales to the diversity of real-world network states or to the variety of orchestration strategies -- from monolithic prompting to fully agentic pipelines --through which LLMs are increasingly deployed. In this paper, we present NetLLMeval, a framework for automatically evaluating LLM-based systems on network administration tasks by leveraging live network emulation to derive ground truth without human intervention. Through a full-factorial study of 24000 runs spanning 10 foundation models, 4 solver architectures, 10 task types, and 6 network topologies of increasing complexity, we show that solver design has a great impact on accuracy -- lifting a 14B open-weight model from 0.43 to 0.88 correctness -- and that such locally-deployable models can match trillion-parameter frontier systems under the right configuration. NetLLMeval is released open-source to support reproducible benchmarking of future models and solver designs.

cs.NI

The Hidden Threat in Plain Text: Attacking RAG Data Loaders

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed human-machine interaction since ChatGPT's 2022 debut, with Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) emerging as a key framework that enhances LLM outputs by integrating external knowledge. However, RAG's reliance on ingesting external documents introduces new vulnerabilities. This paper exposes a critical security gap at the data loading stage, where malicious actors can stealthily corrupt RAG pipelines by exploiting document ingestion. We propose a taxonomy of 9 knowledge-based poisoning attacks and introduce two novel threat vectors -- Content Obfuscation and Content Injection -- targeting common formats (DOCX, HTML, PDF). Using an automated toolkit implementing 19 stealthy injection techniques, we test five popular data loaders, finding a 74.4% attack success rate across 357 scenarios. We further validate these threats on six end-to-end RAG systems -- including white-box pipelines and black-box services like NotebookLM and OpenAI Assistants -- demonstrating high success rates and critical vulnerabilities that bypass filters and silently compromise output integrity. Our results emphasize the urgent need to secure the document ingestion process in RAG systems against covert content manipulations.

cs.CR

Exploiting AI for Attacks: On the Interplay between Adversarial AI and Offensive AI

As Artificial Intelligence (AI) continues to evolve, it has transitioned from a research-focused discipline to a widely adopted technology, enabling intelligent solutions across various sectors. In security, AI's role in strengthening organizational resilience has been studied for over two decades. While much attention has focused on AI's constructive applications, the increasing maturity and integration of AI have also exposed its darker potentials. This article explores two emerging AI-related threats and the interplay between them: AI as a target of attacks (`Adversarial AI') and AI as a means to launch attacks on any target (`Offensive AI') -- potentially even on another AI. By cutting through the confusion and explaining these threats in plain terms, we introduce the complex and often misunderstood interplay between Adversarial AI and Offensive AI, offering a clear and accessible introduction to the challenges posed by these threats.

cs.CR

Offensive AI: Enhancing Directory Brute-forcing Attack with the Use of Language Models

Web Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Testing (Web VAPT) is a comprehensive cybersecurity process that uncovers a range of vulnerabilities which, if exploited, could compromise the integrity of web applications. In a VAPT, it is common to perform a \textit{Directory brute-forcing Attack}, aiming at the identification of accessible directories of a target website. Current commercial solutions are inefficient as they are based on brute-forcing strategies that use wordlists, resulting in enormous quantities of trials for a small amount of success. Offensive AI is a recent paradigm that integrates AI-based technologies in cyber attacks. In this work, we explore whether AI can enhance the directory enumeration process and propose a novel Language Model-based framework. Our experiments -- conducted in a testbed consisting of 1 million URLs from different web application domains (universities, hospitals, government, companies) -- demonstrate the superiority of the LM-based attack, with an average performance increase of 969%.

cs.CR