arXiv subjects

Alessandra F. Lütz

Publications and source records attributed to Alessandra F. Lütz.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2024

The evolution of pluralistic ignorance

Pluralistic ignorance is a social-psychological phenomenon that occurs when individuals privately hold beliefs that differ from perceived group norms. Traditional models, based on opinion dynamics with private and public states, fail to account for a key aspect: when nonexpression aligns with normative behavior, initial social pressure can induce pluralistic ignorance. We show that pluralistic ignorance persists under infrequent imitation and strong initial minority influence. Although individuals can overcome this ignorance by the end of interactions, it reemerges in subsequent meetings. However, excessive imitation erases pluralistic ignorance, leading to a uniform state in which internal and external states align. Furthermore, incorporating memory into the internalization process shows that pluralistic ignorance peaks at moderate imitation levels.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2022

Invasion of optimal social contracts

The Stag-hunt game is a prototype for social contracts. Adopting a new and better social contract is usually challenging because the current one is already widely adopted and stable due to deviants' sanctions. Thus, how does a population shift from the current social contract to a better one? In other words, how can a social system leave a local social optimum configuration to achieve an optimum global state? Here, we investigate the effect of promoting diversity on the evolution of social contracts. We considered group-structured populations where individuals play the Stag-hunt game in all groups. We model the diversity incentive as a Snow-drift game played in a single focus group where the individual is more prone to adopt a deviant norm. We show that moderate diversity incentives can change the system dynamics, leading the whole population to move from the locally optimal social normal to the globally optimal one. Thus, an initial fraction of adopters of the new norm can drive the system toward the new social optimum norm. After the new social contract becomes the new equilibrium, it remains stable even without the incentive. The results are obtained using Monte Carlo simulations and analytical approximation methods.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2021

Acculturation and the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

Cooperation is one of the foundations of human society. Many solutions to cooperation problems have been developed and culturally transmitted across generations. Because immigration can play a role in nourishing or disrupting cooperation in societies, we must understand how the newcomers' culture interacts with the hosting culture. Here, we investigate the effect of different acculturation settings on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with the immigration of defectors and efficient cooperators. Here, immigrants may be socially influenced, or not, by the native culture according to four acculturation settings: integration, where immigrants imitate both immigrants and natives; marginalization, where immigrants do not imitate either natives or other immigrants; assimilation, where immigrants only imitate natives; and separation, where immigrants only imitate other immigrants. We found that cooperation is greatly facilitated and reaches a peak for moderate values of the migration rate under any acculturation setting. Most interestingly, we found that the main acculturation factor driving the highest levels of cooperation is that immigrants do not avoid social influence from their fellow immigrants. We also show that integration may not promote the highest level of native cooperation if the benefit of cooperation is low.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2017

Spatial organization and cyclic dominance in asymmetric predator-prey spatial games

Predators may attack isolated or grouped prey in a cooperative, collective way. Whether a gregarious behavior is advantageous to each species depends on several conditions and game theory is a useful tool to deal with such a problem. We here extend the Lett-Auger-Gaillard model [Theor. Pop. Biol. 65 (2004) 263] to spatially distributed populations and compare the resulting behavior with their mean-field predictions for the coevolving densities of predator and prey strategies. Besides its richer behavior in the presence of spatial organization, we also show that the coexistence phase in which collective and individual strategies for each group are present is stable because of an effective, cyclic dominance mechanism similar to a well-studied generalization of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game with four species, a further example of how ubiquitous this coexistence mechanism is.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2013

Intransitivity and coexistence in four species cyclic games

Intransitivity is a property of connected, oriented graphs representing species interactions that may drive their coexistence even in the presence of competition, the standard example being the three species Rock-Paper-Scissors game. We consider here a generalization with four species, the minimum number of species allowing other interactions beyond the single loop (one predator, one prey). We show that, contrary to the mean field prediction, on a square lattice the model presents a transition, as the parameter setting the rate at which one species invades another changes, from a coexistence to a state in which one species gets extinct. Such a dependence on the invasion rates shows that the interaction graph structure alone is not enough to predict the outcome of such models. In addition, different invasion rates permit to tune the level of transitiveness, indicating that for the coexistence of all species to persist, there must be a minimum amount of intransitivity.

q-bio.PE↗