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Alessandro Di Stefano

Publications and source records attributed to Alessandro Di Stefano.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

From Apology to Action: Apologies, Compensation, and Cooperation in LLM Agents

Large language models (LLMs) can make decisions that affect other agents, but what happens after a harmful or unsuccessful interaction remains poorly understood. We investigate whether apologies by LLM agents are associated with subsequent cooperative behaviour, using controlled Prisoner's Dilemma experiments with four commercial models (Claude Opus 4.8, GPT-5.5, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and Mistral Large 3). Across payoff conditions, we examine when agents apologise, the reasons they provide, and the actions that follow. We also examine how access to one round of interaction history affects behaviour and, in a second experiment, whether and how agents offer compensation alongside their apologies. Apology behaviour differed substantially across models and preceding interaction outcomes, and verbal expressions of cooperation did not always align with subsequent actions. Notably, Claude Opus 4.8 apologised even after mutual cooperation, while Mistral Large 3 apologised after being exploited but continued to defect even when its opponent cooperated. After unilateral defection, positively compensated apologies from GPT-5.5 and Gemini 3.1 Pro were followed by mutual cooperation, unlike those from Claude and Mistral. Our findings suggest that apologies, compensation, and strategic behaviour are distinct: conciliatory messages may precede continued defection, while costly apologies may go unanswered. This has important implications for the study of machine behaviour and human-AI interactions, as verbal signals alone may not reliably reflect an AI system's subsequent actions.

cs.GT↗

When Numbers Start Talking: Numerical Signalling and Strategic Behaviour Among LLMs

Large language model (LLM)-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent systems (MAS) characterised by strategic interaction. However, little is known about whether, and to what extent, different types of messages affect the outcomes of strategic games. By investigating AI agents based on four popular LLMs, playing four games with different cooperation equilibria, we study whether messages of different kinds (natural language, numerical signals, or random sequences) significantly modify the levels of cooperation in each game, also depending on the agents' assigned personalities. We observe that structured messages alter the final payoffs for most games and LLMs, but without a predictable pattern; this challenges the assumption that AI agents can converge to stable equilibria regardless of additional capabilities. Moreover, we observe that agent-generated numerical messages depart from randomness, most strongly and consistently when agents are explicitly instructed to communicate; however, they introduce an additional interpretability challenge, as their symbol distributions are mostly associated with the payoff structure and typically become more concentrated with repetition, but are overall difficult for humans to interpret. Monitoring for coordination of AI agents through restricted channels should thus prioritise message-level fingerprints, which generalise across models, over behavioural decisions, which do not.

cs.AI↗

Trust or Check? Understanding the (Evolutionary) Dynamics of User Trust in AI Systems

As the capabilities and adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems grow, trust in these AI systems is an increasingly urgent concern. Much research has focused on models of AI governance and has primarily examined incentives for safe development and effective regulation. Hence they typically represented users trust as a one-shot adoption choice rather than as a dynamic, evolving process shaped by repeated interactions. We instead model trust as the dynamic choice of reduced monitoring in a repeated, asymmetric interaction between users and AI developers, where checking developers' behaviour is costly. Using evolutionary game theory, we study how users' strategies of trust and developers' strategies of providing safe (compliant) or unsafe (non-compliant) AI co-evolve under different levels of monitoring cost and institutional regimes. We conduct the analysis on both imitation-based and learning-based perspectives, with the stochastic finite-population dynamics, the infinite-population replicator analysis and the reinforcement learning analysis. We find three robust long-run regimes: no adoption by users while developers provide unsafe AI, unsafe but widely adopted systems, and safe systems that are widely adopted. Only the last is desirable, and it arises when penalties for unsafe behaviour exceed the extra cost of safety and users can still afford to monitor at least occasionally. Our results formally support governance proposals that emphasise transparency, low-cost monitoring, and meaningful sanctions, and they show that neither regulation alone nor blind user trust is sufficient to prevent the drift towards unsafe or low-adoption outcomes.

cs.AI↗

When Numbers Start Talking: Implicit Numerical Coordination Among LLM-Based Agents

LLMs-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent environments where strategic interaction and coordination are required. While existing work has largely focused on individual agents or on interacting agents sharing explicit communication, less is known about how interacting agents coordinate implicitly. In particular, agents may engage in covert communication, relying on indirect or non-linguistic signals embedded in their actions rather than on explicit messages. This paper presents a game-theoretic study of covert communication in LLM-driven multi-agent systems. We analyse interactions across four canonical game-theoretic settings under different communication regimes, including explicit, restricted, and absent communication. Considering heterogeneous agent personalities and both one-shot and repeated games, we characterise when covert signals emerge and how they shape coordination and strategic outcomes.

cs.MA↗

FAIRGAME: a Framework for AI Agents Bias Recognition using Game Theory

Letting AI agents interact in multi-agent applications adds a layer of complexity to the interpretability and prediction of AI outcomes, with profound implications for their trustworthy adoption in research and society. Game theory offers powerful models to capture and interpret strategic interaction among agents, but requires the support of reproducible, standardized and user-friendly IT frameworks to enable comparison and interpretation of results. To this end, we present FAIRGAME, a Framework for AI Agents Bias Recognition using Game Theory. We describe its implementation and usage, and we employ it to uncover biased outcomes in popular games among AI agents, depending on the employed Large Language Model (LLM) and used language, as well as on the personality trait or strategic knowledge of the agents. Overall, FAIRGAME allows users to reliably and easily simulate their desired games and scenarios and compare the results across simulation campaigns and with game-theoretic predictions, enabling the systematic discovery of biases, the anticipation of emerging behavior out of strategic interplays, and empowering further research into strategic decision-making using LLM agents.

cs.AI↗

Strategic Communication and Language Bias in Multi-Agent LLM Coordination

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent scenarios where coordination is crucial but not always assured. Research shows that the way strategic scenarios are framed linguistically can affect cooperation. This paper explores whether allowing agents to communicate amplifies these language-driven effects. Leveraging FAIRGAME, we simulate one-shot and repeated games across different languages and models, both with and without communication. Our experiments, conducted with two advanced LLMs-GPT-4o and Llama 4 Maverick-reveal that communication significantly influences agent behavior, though its impact varies by language, personality, and game structure. These findings underscore the dual role of communication in fostering coordination and reinforcing biases.

cs.MA↗

Can Media Act as a Soft Regulator of Safe AI Development? A Game Theoretical Analysis

When developers of artificial intelligence (AI) products need to decide between profit and safety for the users, they likely choose profit. Untrustworthy AI technology must come packaged with tangible negative consequences. Here, we envisage those consequences as the loss of reputation caused by media coverage of their misdeeds, disseminated to the public. We explore whether media coverage has the potential to push AI creators into the production of safe products, enabling widespread adoption of AI technology. We created artificial populations of self-interested creators and users and studied them through the lens of evolutionary game theory. Our results reveal that media is indeed able to foster cooperation between creators and users, but not always. Cooperation does not evolve if the quality of the information provided by the media is not reliable enough, or if the costs of either accessing media or ensuring safety are too high. By shaping public perception and holding developers accountable, media emerges as a powerful soft regulator -- guiding AI safety even in the absence of formal government oversight.

cs.AI↗

Can LLMs effectively provide game-theoretic-based scenarios for cybersecurity?

Game theory has long served as a foundational tool in cybersecurity to test, predict, and design strategic interactions between attackers and defenders. The recent advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) offers new tools and challenges for the security of computer systems; In this work, we investigate whether classical game-theoretic frameworks can effectively capture the behaviours of LLM-driven actors and bots. Using a reproducible framework for game-theoretic LLM agents, we investigate two canonical scenarios -- the one-shot zero-sum game and the dynamic Prisoner's Dilemma -- and we test whether LLMs converge to expected outcomes or exhibit deviations due to embedded biases. Our experiments involve four state-of-the-art LLMs and span five natural languages, English, French, Arabic, Vietnamese, and Mandarin Chinese, to assess linguistic sensitivity. For both games, we observe that the final payoffs are influenced by agents characteristics such as personality traits or knowledge of repeated rounds. Moreover, we uncover an unexpected sensitivity of the final payoffs to the choice of languages, which should warn against indiscriminate application of LLMs in cybersecurity applications and call for in-depth studies, as LLMs may behave differently when deployed in different countries. We also employ quantitative metrics to evaluate the internal consistency and cross-language stability of LLM agents, to help guide the selection of the most stable LLMs and optimising models for secure applications.

cs.CR↗

KERAIA: An Adaptive and Explainable Framework for Dynamic Knowledge Representation and Reasoning

In this paper, we introduce KERAIA, a novel framework and software platform for symbolic knowledge engineering designed to address the persistent challenges of representing, reasoning with, and executing knowledge in dynamic, complex, and context-sensitive environments. The central research question that motivates this work is: How can unstructured, often tacit, human expertise be effectively transformed into computationally tractable algorithms that AI systems can efficiently utilise? KERAIA seeks to bridge this gap by building on foundational concepts such as Minsky's frame-based reasoning and K-lines, while introducing significant innovations. These include Clouds of Knowledge for dynamic aggregation, Dynamic Relations (DRels) for context-sensitive inheritance, explicit Lines of Thought (LoTs) for traceable reasoning, and Cloud Elaboration for adaptive knowledge transformation. This approach moves beyond the limitations of traditional, often static, knowledge representation paradigms. KERAIA is designed with Explainable AI (XAI) as a core principle, ensuring transparency and interpretability, particularly through the use of LoTs. The paper details the framework's architecture, the KSYNTH representation language, and the General Purpose Paradigm Builder (GPPB) to integrate diverse inference methods within a unified structure. We validate KERAIA's versatility, expressiveness, and practical applicability through detailed analysis of multiple case studies spanning naval warfare simulation, industrial diagnostics in water treatment plants, and strategic decision-making in the game of RISK. Furthermore, we provide a comparative analysis against established knowledge representation paradigms (including ontologies, rule-based systems, and knowledge graphs) and discuss the implementation aspects and computational considerations of the KERAIA platform.

cs.AI↗

Do LLMs trust AI regulation? Emerging behaviour of game-theoretic LLM agents

There is general agreement that fostering trust and cooperation within the AI development ecosystem is essential to promote the adoption of trustworthy AI systems. By embedding Large Language Model (LLM) agents within an evolutionary game-theoretic framework, this paper investigates the complex interplay between AI developers, regulators and users, modelling their strategic choices under different regulatory scenarios. Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is used to quantitatively model the dilemmas faced by each actor, and LLMs provide additional degrees of complexity and nuances and enable repeated games and incorporation of personality traits. Our research identifies emerging behaviours of strategic AI agents, which tend to adopt more "pessimistic" (not trusting and defective) stances than pure game-theoretic agents. We observe that, in case of full trust by users, incentives are effective to promote effective regulation; however, conditional trust may deteriorate the "social pact". Establishing a virtuous feedback between users' trust and regulators' reputation thus appears to be key to nudge developers towards creating safe AI. However, the level at which this trust emerges may depend on the specific LLM used for testing. Our results thus provide guidance for AI regulation systems, and help predict the outcome of strategic LLM agents, should they be used to aid regulation itself.

cs.AI↗

Media and responsible AI governance: a game-theoretic and LLM analysis

This paper investigates the complex interplay between AI developers, regulators, users, and the media in fostering trustworthy AI systems. Using evolutionary game theory and large language models (LLMs), we model the strategic interactions among these actors under different regulatory regimes. The research explores two key mechanisms for achieving responsible governance, safe AI development and adoption of safe AI: incentivising effective regulation through media reporting, and conditioning user trust on commentariats' recommendation. The findings highlight the crucial role of the media in providing information to users, potentially acting as a form of "soft" regulation by investigating developers or regulators, as a substitute to institutional AI regulation (which is still absent in many regions). Both game-theoretic analysis and LLM-based simulations reveal conditions under which effective regulation and trustworthy AI development emerge, emphasising the importance of considering the influence of different regulatory regimes from an evolutionary game-theoretic perspective. The study concludes that effective governance requires managing incentives and costs for high quality commentaries.

cs.AI↗

Quantifying detection rates for dangerous capabilities: a theoretical model of dangerous capability evaluations

We present a quantitative model for tracking dangerous AI capabilities over time. Our goal is to help the policy and research community visualise how dangerous capability testing can give us an early warning about approaching AI risks. We first use the model to provide a novel introduction to dangerous capability testing and how this testing can directly inform policy. Decision makers in AI labs and government often set policy that is sensitive to the estimated danger of AI systems, and may wish to set policies that condition on the crossing of a set threshold for danger. The model helps us to reason about these policy choices. We then run simulations to illustrate how we might fail to test for dangerous capabilities. To summarise, failures in dangerous capability testing may manifest in two ways: higher bias in our estimates of AI danger, or larger lags in threshold monitoring. We highlight two drivers of these failure modes: uncertainty around dynamics in AI capabilities and competition between frontier AI labs. Effective AI policy demands that we address these failure modes and their drivers. Even if the optimal targeting of resources is challenging, we show how delays in testing can harm AI policy. We offer preliminary recommendations for building an effective testing ecosystem for dangerous capabilities and advise on a research agenda.

cs.AI↗

Trust AI Regulation? Discerning users are vital to build trust and effective AI regulation

There is general agreement that some form of regulation is necessary both for AI creators to be incentivised to develop trustworthy systems, and for users to actually trust those systems. But there is much debate about what form these regulations should take and how they should be implemented. Most work in this area has been qualitative, and has not been able to make formal predictions. Here, we propose that evolutionary game theory can be used to quantitatively model the dilemmas faced by users, AI creators, and regulators, and provide insights into the possible effects of different regulatory regimes. We show that creating trustworthy AI and user trust requires regulators to be incentivised to regulate effectively. We demonstrate the effectiveness of two mechanisms that can achieve this. The first is where governments can recognise and reward regulators that do a good job. In that case, if the AI system is not too risky for users then some level of trustworthy development and user trust evolves. We then consider an alternative solution, where users can condition their trust decision on the effectiveness of the regulators. This leads to effective regulation, and consequently the development of trustworthy AI and user trust, provided that the cost of implementing regulations is not too high. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the effect of different regulatory regimes from an evolutionary game theoretic perspective.

cs.AI↗

Impact of the Covid 19 outbreaks on the italian twitter vaccination debat: a network based analysis

Vaccine hesitancy, or the reluctance to be vaccinated, is a phenomenon that has recently become particularly significant, in conjunction with the vaccination campaign against COVID-19. During the lockdown period, necessary to control the spread of the virus, social networks have played an important role in the Italian debate on vaccination, generally representing the easiest and safest way to exchange opinions and maintain some form of sociability. Among social network platforms, Twitter has assumed a strategic role in driving the public opinion, creating compact groups of users sharing similar views towards the utility, uselessness or even dangerousness of vaccines. In this paper, we present a new, publicly available, dataset of Italian tweets, TwitterVax, collected in the period January 2019--May 2022. Considering monthly data, gathered into forty one retweet networks -- where nodes identify users and edges are present between users who have retweeted each other -- we performed community detection within the networks, analyzing their evolution and polarization with respect to NoVax and ProVax users through time. This allowed us to clearly discover debate trends as well as identify potential key moments and actors in opinion flows, characterizing the main features and tweeting behavior of the two communities.

cs.SI↗

Both eyes open: Vigilant Incentives help Regulatory Markets improve AI Safety

In the context of rapid discoveries by leaders in AI, governments must consider how to design regulation that matches the increasing pace of new AI capabilities. Regulatory Markets for AI is a proposal designed with adaptability in mind. It involves governments setting outcome-based targets for AI companies to achieve, which they can show by purchasing services from a market of private regulators. We use an evolutionary game theory model to explore the role governments can play in building a Regulatory Market for AI systems that deters reckless behaviour. We warn that it is alarmingly easy to stumble on incentives which would prevent Regulatory Markets from achieving this goal. These 'Bounty Incentives' only reward private regulators for catching unsafe behaviour. We argue that AI companies will likely learn to tailor their behaviour to how much effort regulators invest, discouraging regulators from innovating. Instead, we recommend that governments always reward regulators, except when they find that those regulators failed to detect unsafe behaviour that they should have. These 'Vigilant Incentives' could encourage private regulators to find innovative ways to evaluate cutting-edge AI systems.

cs.AI↗

Social Diversity Reduces the Complexity and Cost of Fostering Fairness

Institutions and investors are constantly faced with the challenge of appropriately distributing endowments. No budget is limitless and optimising overall spending without sacrificing positive outcomes has been approached and resolved using several heuristics. To date, prior works have failed to consider how to encourage fairness in a population where social diversity is ubiquitous, and in which investors can only partially observe the population. Herein, by incorporating social diversity in the Ultimatum game through heterogeneous graphs, we investigate the effects of several interference mechanisms which assume incomplete information and flexible standards of fairness. We quantify the role of diversity and show how it reduces the need for information gathering, allowing us to relax a strict, costly interference process. Furthermore, we find that the influence of certain individuals, expressed by different network centrality measures, can be exploited to further reduce spending if minimal fairness requirements are lowered. Our results indicate that diversity changes and opens up novel mechanisms available to institutions wishing to promote fairness. Overall, our analysis provides novel insights to guide institutional policies in socially diverse complex systems.

cs.MA↗

GRADE: Graph Dynamic Embedding

Representation learning of static and more recently dynamically evolving graphs has gained noticeable attention. Existing approaches for modelling graph dynamics focus extensively on the evolution of individual nodes independently of the evolution of mesoscale community structures. As a result, current methods do not provide useful tools to study and cannot explicitly capture temporal community dynamics. To address this challenge, we propose GRADE - a probabilistic model that learns to generate evolving node and community representations by imposing a random walk prior over their trajectories. Our model also learns node community membership which is updated between time steps via a transition matrix. At each time step link generation is performed by first assigning node membership from a distribution over the communities, and then sampling a neighbor from a distribution over the nodes for the assigned community. We parametrize the node and community distributions with neural networks and learn their parameters via variational inference. Experiments demonstrate GRADE outperforms baselines in dynamic link prediction, shows favourable performance on dynamic community detection, and identifies coherent and interpretable evolving communities.

cs.LG↗

A Novel Methodology for designing Policies in Mobile Crowdsensing Systems

Mobile crowdsensing is a people-centric sensing system based on users' contributions and incentive mechanisms aim at stimulating them. In our work, we have rethought the design of incentive mechanisms through a game-theoretic methodology. Thus, we have introduced a multi-layer social sensing framework, where humans as social sensors interact on multiple social layers and various services. We have proposed to weigh these dynamic interactions by including the concept of homophily and we have modelled the evolutionary dynamics of sensing behaviours by defining a mathematical framework based on multiplex EGT, quantifying the impact of homophily, network heterogeneity and various social dilemmas. We have detected the configurations of social dilemmas and network structures that lead to the emergence and sustainability of human cooperation. Moreover, we have defined and evaluated local and global Nash equilibrium points by including the concepts of homophily and heterogeneity. We have analytically defined and measured novel statistical measures of social honesty, QoI and users' behavioural reputation scores based on the evolutionary dynamics. We have defined the Decision Support System and a novel incentive mechanism by operating on the policies in terms of users' reputation scores, that also incorporate users' behaviours other than quality and quantity of contributions. Experimentally, we have considered the Waze dataset on vehicular traffic monitoring application and derived the disbursement of incentives comparing our method with baselines. Results demonstrate that our methodology, which also includes the local (microscopic) spatio-temporal distribution of behaviours, is able to better discriminate users' behaviours. This multi-scale characterisation of users represents a novel research direction and paves the way for novel policies on mobile crowdsensing systems.

cs.GT↗