SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Alessandro Sanna

Publications and source records attributed to Alessandro Sanna.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Merging Cyber Threat Intelligence Through Retrieval-Augmented Generation and Small Language Models for Rich Threat Representation

Modern cybersecurity operations rely on CTI collected from heterogeneous sources, including semi-structured threat representations, IoCs, and narrative technical reports. However, these artifacts are often insufficient in isolation to reconstruct how an attack unfolds, under which conditions each step is feasible, and which traces it leaves behind. In practice, analysts must manually correlate partial evidence scattered across multiple and only partially structured sources, delaying the design of effective prevention, detection, and response actions. To address this gap, we propose an automated pipeline that derives an actionable representation of a cyberattack from heterogeneous CTI sources. The pipeline combines a RAG architecture with a locally deployable SLM, used to consolidate such evidence and infer missing operational details. Starting from a semi-structured threat representation and auxiliary CTI documents, the pipeline produces an enriched Attack Graph that captures a coarse, tactic-aligned progression of the attack and annotates each step with explicit pre-conditions and post-conditions, and an enriched description. This representation supports prevention by exposing execution requirements, detection by highlighting observable traces, and response by clarifying the temporal progression of the attack. Then, due to the lack of validated datasets with ground-truth information on the temporal evolution of real-world attacks, we test the complete pipeline on 10 real-world case studies spanning multiple threat types, including backdoors and staged downloaders delivered via phishing. A manual assessment across 10 real-world case studies provides initial evidence that the generated graphs are consistent with expected attack progressions, indicating that the proposed approach can support analysts by consolidating dispersed CTI evidence into a structured and actionable view of attacks.

cs.CR

MoLIFE: Methodology, Technologies, and Challenges for Mobile Live Intelligent Forensics Examination

Nowadays, mobile forensics is less explored in Digital Forensics case analysis due to the increase in data protection mechanisms implemented by tech companies (i.e., Google for Android and Apple for iOS). For example, the physical acquisition or analysis of specific directories under super-user protection would corrupt the evidence; access to such data is protected, and bypassing this protection requires either privilege escalation or custom ROM installation, leading to the modification of the device state. At the same time, the demand for mobile technologies and their respective communication systems is increasing exponentially, exposing numerous security threats and risks. For that reason, this paper presents a Mobile Live Intelligent Forensics Examination (MoLIFE), a novel Digital Forensics (DF) methodology for data acquisition and analysis of mobile devices. The proposed methodology is based on NIST SP800-101 for the DF process. MoLIFE can be integrated with new and emerging technologies by exploiting their power (e.g., AI, blockchain, quantum computing). MoLIFE can also be used to prevent cyber threats and incidents, as well as DF post-mortem analysis, offering examples of applying the MoLIFE methodology and good practices for the future. To prove the technical feasibility of the methodology, a small case study on Android devices data acquisition via the mDT will be presented. As the methodology is based on new and emerging technologies, it depends on their limitations that would be overcome in a few years.

cs.CR

Statistical Effort Modelling of Game Resource Localisation Attacks

Evidence on the effectiveness of Man-At-The-End (MATE) software protections, such as code obfuscation, has mainly come from limited empirical research. Recently, however, an automatable method was proposed to obtain statistical models of the required effort to attack (protected) software. The proposed method was sketched for a number of attack strategies but not instantiated, evaluated, or validated for those that require human interaction with the attacked software. In this paper, we present a full instantiation of the method to obtain statistical effort models for game resource localisation attacks, which represent a major step towards creating game cheats, a prime example of MATE attacks. We discuss in detail all relevant aspects of our instantiation and the results obtained for two game use cases. Our results confirm the feasibility of the proposed method and its utility for decision support for users of software protection tools. These results open up a new avenue for obtaining models of the impact of software protections on reverse engineering attacks, which will scale much better than empirical research involving human participants.

cs.CR