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Alex Krumer

Publications and source records attributed to Alex Krumer.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Trimming of extreme votes and favoritism: Evidence from the field

Despite a large body of theoretical literature on voting mechanisms, there is no documented evidence from real-world panel evaluations about the effect of trimming the extreme votes on sincere voting. We provide the first such evidence by comparing subjective evaluations of experts from different countries in competitive settings with and without a trimming mechanism. In these evaluations, some of the evaluated subjects are experts' compatriots. Using data on 29,383 subjective evaluations, we find that experts assign significantly higher scores to their compatriots in panels without trimming. However, in panels with trimming, this favoritism is generally insignificant.

econ.GN

Racial bias, colorism, and overcorrection

This paper examines whether increased awareness can affect racial bias and colorism. We exploit a natural experiment arising from the widespread publicity of Price and Wolfers (2010), which served as an external shock, intensifying scrutiny of racial bias in men's basketball officiating. We investigate refereeing decisions in a similar setting, the Women's National Basketball Association (WNBA), which is known as a progressive institution with a longstanding commitment to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) policy. We apply state-of-the-art artificial intelligence and machine learning techniques to systematically predict race and objectively measure skin tone. Our empirical strategy exploits the quasi-random assignment of referees to games, combined with high-dimensional fixed effects, to estimate the relationship between the racial and skin tone compositions of referees and players, as well as foul-calling behavior. Our results show no significant racial bias before the intense media coverage. However, afterward, we find evidence of overcorrection: a player earns fewer fouls when facing more referees from the opposite race and skin tone. Even though this overcorrection seems to wear off over time, we highlight the need to consider baseline levels of bias before applying any prescription with direct relevance to policymakers and organizations, given the recent discourse on DEI.

econ.GN

Varying reference-point salience

The salience of reference points may theoretically influence the loss aversion mechanism in effort provision. However, we still lack a direct test from real competitive settings that uses exogenous variation to measure the effect of salience. We exploit a natural experiment where highly professional and incentivized individuals perform in real competitive settings with exogenous variation of reference-point salience. While a relevant reference point is salient in some cases, it is obscured in others, which, under reasonable assumptions, may affect individuals' expectations. This enables us to examine the effect of reference-point salience on the loss aversion mechanism in effort provision. Our regression discontinuity analyses reveal that individuals with positive expectations outperform those with negative expectations, but only when the reference point is salient.

econ.GN

Swiss-system chess tournaments and unfairness

The Swiss system is an increasingly popular competition format as it provides a favourable trade-off between the number of matches and ranking accuracy. However, there is no empirical study on the potential unfairness of Swiss-system chess tournaments if an odd number of rounds is played. To analyse this issue, our paper compares the number of points scored in the tournament between players who played one game more with the white pieces and players who played one game fewer with the white pieces. Using data from 28 highly prestigious competitions, we find that players with an extra white game score significantly more points. In particular, the advantage exceeds the value of a draw in the four Grand Swiss tournaments. A potential solution to this unfairness could be organising Swiss-system chess tournaments with an even number of rounds, and guaranteeing a balanced colour assignment for all players using a recently proposed pairing mechanism.

econ.GN