arXiv subjects

Alexander Kott

Publications and source records attributed to Alexander Kott.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2019

Statistical Models for the Number of Successful Cyber Intrusions

We propose several generalized linear models (GLMs) to predict the number of successful cyber intrusions (or "intrusions") into an organization's computer network, where the rate at which intrusions occur is a function of the following observable characteristics of the organization: (i) domain name server (DNS) traffic classified by their top-level domains (TLDs); (ii) the number of network security policy violations; and (iii) a set of predictors that we collectively call "cyber footprint" that is comprised of the number of hosts on the organization's network, the organization's similarity to educational institution behavior (SEIB), and its number of records on scholar.google.com (ROSG). In addition, we evaluate the number of intrusions to determine whether these events follow a Poisson or negative binomial (NB) probability distribution. We reveal that the NB GLM provides the best fit model for the observed count data, number of intrusions per organization, because the NB model allows the variance of the count data to exceed the mean. We also show that there are restricted and simpler NB regression models that omit selected predictors and improve the goodness-of-fit of the NB GLM for the observed data. With our model simulations, we identify certain TLDs in the DNS traffic as having significant impact on the number of intrusions. In addition, we use the models and regression results to conclude that the number of network security policy violations are consistently predictive of the number of intrusions.

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arXiv2018

Intelligent Autonomous Agents are Key to Cyber Defense of the Future Army Networks

Intelligent autonomous agents will be widely present on the battlefield of the future. The proliferation of intelligent agents is the emerging reality of warfare, and they will form an ever growing fraction of total military assets. By necessity, intelligent autonomous cyber defense agents are likely to become primary cyber fighters on the future battlefield. Initial explorations have identified the key functions, components and their interactions for a potential reference architecture of such an agent. However, it is beyond the current state of AI to support an agent that could operate intelligently in an environment as complex as the real battlefield. A number of difficult challenges are yet to be overcome. At the same time, a growing body of research in Government and academia demonstrates promising steps towards solving some of the challenges. The industry is beginning to embrace approaches that may contribute to technologies of autonomous intelligent agents for cyber defense of the Army networks.

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arXiv2018

Game-Theoretic Model and Experimental Investigation of Cyber Wargaming

We demonstrate that game-theoretic calculations serve as a useful tool for assisting cyber wargaming teams in identifying useful strategies. We note a significant similarity between formulating cyber wargaming strategies and the methodology known in military practice as Course of Action (COA) generation. For scenarios in which the attacker must penetrate multiple layers in a defense-in-depth security configuration, an accounting of attacker and defender costs and penetration probabilities provides cost-utility payoff matrices and penetration probability matrices. These can be used as decision tools by both the defender and attacker. Inspection of the matrices allows players to deduce preferred strategies (or COAs) based on game-theoretical equilibrium solutions. The matrices also help in analyzing anticipated effects of potential human-based choices of wargame strategies and counter-strategies. We describe a mathematical game-theoretic formalism and offer detailed analysis of a table-top cyber wargame executed at the US Army Research Laboratory. Our analysis shows how game-theoretical calculations can provide an effective tool for decision-making during cyber wargames.

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arXiv2018

Long-Term Forecasts of Military Technologies for a 20-30 Year Horizon: An Empirical Assessment of Accuracy

During the 1990s, while exploring the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on developments in future warfare, a number of authors offered forecasts of military technology appearing by the year 2020. This paper offers a quantitative assessment of the accuracy of this group of forecasts. The overall accuracy - by several measures - was assessed as quite high, thereby pointing to the potential value of such forecasts in managing investments in long-term research and development. Major differences in accuracy, with strong statistical significance, were found between forecasts pertaining primarily to information acquisition and processing technologies, as opposed to technologies that aim primarily at physical effects. This paper also proposes several recommendations regarding methodological aspects of forecast accuracy assessments. Although the assessments were restricted to information available in open literature, the expert assessors did not find this constraint a significant detriment to the assessment process.

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arXiv2018

Towards a Reconceptualisation of Cyber Risk: An Empirical and Ontological Study

The prominence and use of the concept of cyber risk has been rising in recent years. This paper presents empirical investigations focused on two important and distinct groups within the broad community of cyber-defense professionals and researchers: (1) cyber practitioners and (2) developers of cyber ontologies. The key finding of this work is that the ways the concept of cyber risk is treated by practitioners of cybersecurity is largely inconsistent with definitions of cyber risk commonly offered in the literature. Contrary to commonly cited definitions of cyber risk, concepts such as the likelihood of an event and the extent of its impact are not used by cybersecurity practitioners. This is also the case for use of these concepts in the current generation of cybersecurity ontologies. Instead, terms and concepts reflective of the adversarial nature of cyber defense appear to take the most prominent roles. This research offers the first quantitative empirical evidence that rejection of traditional concepts of cyber risk by cybersecurity professionals is indeed observed in real-world practice.

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arXiv2018

Fundamental Concepts of Cyber Resilience: Introduction and Overview

Given the rapid evolution of threats to cyber systems, new management approaches are needed that address risk across all interdependent domains (i.e., physical, information, cognitive, and social) of cyber systems. Further, the traditional approach of hardening of cyber systems against identified threats has proven to be impossible. Therefore, in the same way that biological systems develop immunity as a way to respond to infections and other attacks, so too must cyber systems adapt to ever-changing threats that continue to attack vital system functions, and to bounce back from the effects of the attacks. Here, we explain the basic concepts of resilience in the context of systems, discuss related properties, and make business case of cyber resilience. We also offer a brief summary of ways to assess cyber resilience of a system, and approaches to improving cyber resilience.

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arXiv2018

Towards an Active, Autonomous and Intelligent Cyber Defense of Military Systems: the NATO AICA Reference Architecture

Within the future Global Information Grid, complex massively interconnected systems, isolated defense vehicles, sensors and effectors, and infrastructures and systems demanding extremely low failure rates, to which human security operators cannot have an easy access and cannot deliver fast enough reactions to cyber-attacks, need an active, autonomous and intelligent cyber defense. Multi Agent Systems for Cyber Defense may provide an answer to this requirement. This paper presents the concept and architecture of an Autonomous Intelligent Cyber defense Agent (AICA). First, we describe the rationale of the AICA concept. Secondly, we explain the methodology and purpose that drive the definition of the AICA Reference Architecture (AICARA) by NATO's IST-152 Research and Technology Group. Thirdly, we review some of the main features and challenges of Multi Autonomous Intelligent Cyber defense Agent (MAICA). Fourthly, we depict the initially assumed AICA Reference Architecture. Then we present one of our preliminary research issues, assumptions and ideas. Finally, we present the future lines of research that will help develop and test the AICA / MAICA concept.

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arXiv2018

Toward Intelligent Autonomous Agents for Cyber Defense: Report of the 2017 Workshop by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Research Group IST-152-RTG

This report summarizes the discussions and findings of the Workshop on Intelligent Autonomous Agents for Cyber Defence and Resilience organized by the NATO research group IST-152-RTG. The workshop was held in Prague, Czech Republic, on 18-20 October 2017. There is a growing recognition that future cyber defense should involve extensive use of partially autonomous agents that actively patrol the friendly network, and detect and react to hostile activities rapidly (far faster than human reaction time), before the hostile malware is able to inflict major damage, evade friendly agents, or destroy friendly agents. This requires cyber-defense agents with a significant degree of intelligence, autonomy, self-learning, and adaptability. The report focuses on the following questions: In what computing and tactical environments would such an agent operate? What data would be available for the agent to observe or ingest? What actions would the agent be able to take? How would such an agent plan a complex course of actions? Would the agent learn from its experiences, and how? How would the agent collaborate with humans? How can we ensure that the agent will not take undesirable destructive actions? Is it possible to help envision such an agent with a simple example?

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arXiv2018

Approaches to Enhancing Cyber Resilience: Report of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Workshop IST-153

This report summarizes the discussions and findings of the 2017 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Workshop, IST-153, on Cyber Resilience, held in Munich, Germany, on 23-25 October 2017, at the University of Bundeswehr. Despite continual progress in managing risks in the cyber domain, anticipation and prevention of all possible attacks and malfunctions are not feasible for the current or future systems comprising the cyber infrastructure. Therefore, interest in cyber resilience (as opposed to merely risk-based approaches) is increasing rapidly, in literature and in practice. Unlike concepts of risk or robustness - which are often and incorrectly conflated with resilience - resiliency refers to the system's ability to recover or regenerate its performance to a sufficient level after an unexpected impact produces a degradation of its performance. The exact relation among resilience, risk, and robustness has not been well articulated technically. The presentations and discussions at the workshop yielded this report. It focuses on the following topics that the participants of the workshop saw as particularly important: fundamental properties of cyber resilience; approaches to measuring and modeling cyber resilience; mission modeling for cyber resilience; systems engineering for cyber resilience, and dynamic defense as a path toward cyber resilience.

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arXiv2018

Challenges and Characteristics of Intelligent Autonomy for Internet of Battle Things in Highly Adversarial Environments

Numerous, artificially intelligent, networked things will populate the battlefield of the future, operating in close collaboration with human warfighters, and fighting as teams in highly adversarial environments. This paper explores the characteristics, capabilities and intelligence required of such a network of intelligent things and humans - Internet of Battle Things (IOBT). It will experience unique challenges that are not yet well addressed by the current generation of AI and machine learning.

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arXiv2017

How do you Command an Army of Intelligent Things?

Within a decade, probably less, we will need to find ways to work effectively with ever growing numbers of intelligent things, including robots and intelligent agents. The networked workforce of the near future will thus consist of not only interconnected and interdependent humans but also of intelligent things. This raises a number of challenging issues, none more compelling and urgent than finding an answer to the question "How to manage this new organizational form?" We consider these issues in a particularly challenging domain of human endeavor -- warfare. Command and Control (C2) is the term applied to management or governance of military organizations and endeavors. We consider how human and other intelligent entities can best contribute to ensuring that the decision makers, whether human or machine, have the information they require and make good use of this information to accomplish C2 functions. Commanders or managers of mixed human-thing organizations will face several challenges that the discussion above has highlighted. Things are challenged in a number of areas and will need humans to provide these capabilities. These include their ability to explain, build trust, bond, understand personal agendas, emotions, politics, and negotiate. Things and people both to some extent have difficulty anticipating and coping with the unusual and unexpected and to think of out-of-the-box solutions.

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arXiv2017

The Internet of Battle Things

The battlefield of the future will be densely populated by a variety of entities ("things") -- some intelligent and some only marginally so -- performing a broad range of tasks: sensing, communicating, acting, and collaborating with each other and human warfighters. We call this the Internet of Battle Things, IoBT. In some ways, IoBT is already becoming a reality, but 20-30 years from now it is likely to become a dominant presence in warfare. To become a reality, however, this bold vision will have to overcome a number of major challenges. As one example of such a challenge, the communications among things will have to be flexible and adaptive to rapidly changing situations and military missions. In this paper, we explore this and several other major challenges of IoBT, and outline key research directions and approaches towards solving these challenges.

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arXiv2017

Approaches to Modeling the Impact of Cyber Attacks on a Mission

The success of a business mission is highly dependent on the Communications and Information Systems (CIS) that support the mission. Mission Impact Assessment (MIA) seeks to assist the integration of business or military operations with cyber defense, particularly in bridging the cognitive gap between operational decision-makers and cyber defenders. Recent years have seen a growing interest in model-driven approaches to MIA. Such approaches involve construction and simulation of models of the mission, systems, and attack scenarios in order to understand an attack's impact, including its nature, dependencies involved, and the extent of consequences. This paper discusses representative examples of recent research on model-driven approach to MIA, highlights its potential value and cautions about serious remaining challenges.

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arXiv2017

Burstiness of Intrusion Detection Process: Empirical Evidence and a Modeling Approach

We analyze sets of intrusion detection records observed on the networks of several large, nonresidential organizations protected by a form of intrusion detection and prevention service. Our analyses reveal that the process of intrusion detection in these networks exhibits a significant degree of burstiness as well as strong memory, with burstiness and memory properties that are comparable to those of natural processes driven by threshold effects, but different from bursty human activities. We explore time-series models of these observable network security incidents based on partially observed data using a hidden Markov model with restricted hidden states, which we fit using Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques. We examine the output of the fitted model with respect to its statistical properties and demonstrate that the model adequately accounts for intrinsic "bursting" within observed network incidents as a result of alternation between two or more stochastic processes. While our analysis does not lead directly to new detection capabilities, the practical implications of gaining better understanding of the observed burstiness are significant, and include opportunities for quantifying a network's risks and defensive efforts.

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arXiv2017

Recommendations for Model-Driven Paradigms for Integrated Approaches to Cyber Defense

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Exploratory Team meeting, "Model-Driven Paradigms for Integrated Approaches to Cyber Defense," was organized by the NATO Science and Technology Organization's (STO) Information Systems and Technology (IST) panel and conducted its meetings and electronic exchanges during 2016. This report describes the proceedings and outcomes of the team's efforts. Many of the defensive activities in the fields of cyber warfare and information assurance rely on essentially ad hoc techniques. The cyber community recognizes that comprehensive, systematic, principle-based modeling and simulation are more likely to produce long-term, lasting, reusable approaches to defensive cyber operations. A model-driven paradigm is predicated on creation and validation of mechanisms of modeling the organization whose mission is subject to assessment, the mission (or missions) itself, and the cyber-vulnerable systems that support the mission. This by any definition is a complex socio-technical system (of systems), and the level of detail of this class of problems ranges from the level of host and network events to the systems' functions up to the function of the enterprise. Solving this class of problems is of medium to high difficulty and can draw in part on advances in Systems Engineering (SE). Such model-based approaches and analysis could be used to explore multiple alternative mitigation and work-around strategies and to select the optimal course of mitigating actions. Furthermore, the model-driven paradigm applied to cyber operations is likely to benefit traditional disciplines of cyber defense such as security, vulnerability analysis, intrusion prevention, intrusion detection, analysis, forensics, attribution, and recovery.

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arXiv2017

Overview of Cyber Science and Technology Programs at the U.S. Army Research Laboratory

This paper provides an overview of research programs in cyber security performed by the U.S Army Research Laboratory. Although ARL is the U.S. Army's corporate laboratory that focuses on fundamental and early applied research, the fundamental science endeavors are closely integrated with extensive operationally-oriented programs. One example is the Cyber Collaborative Research Alliance (CRA) that brings together ARL scientists with academic researchers from dozens of U.S. universities. ARL cyber scientists are largely driven by challenges unique to the ground operations of the Army; this paper outlines a few of these challenges and the ways in which they are addressed by ARL research efforts. The long-term campaign of cyber research is guided by the vision of the future Army battlefield. In the year 2040, it will be a highly converged virtual-physical space, where cyber operations will be an integral part of the battle.

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arXiv2016

The Future Internet of Things and Security of its Control Systems

We consider the future cyber security of industrial control systems. As best as we can see, much of this future unfolds in the context of the Internet of Things (IoT). In fact, we envision that all industrial and infrastructure environments, and cyber-physical systems in general, will take the form reminiscent of what today is referred to as the IoT. IoT is envisioned as multitude of heterogeneous devices densely interconnected and communicating with the objective of accomplishing a diverse range of objectives, often collaboratively. One can argue that in the relatively near future, the IoT construct will subsume industrial plants, infrastructures, housing and other systems that today are controlled by ICS and SCADA systems. In the IoT environments, cybersecurity will derive largely from system agility, moving-target defenses, cybermaneuvering, and other autonomous or semi-autonomous behaviors. Cyber security of IoT may also benefit from new design methods for mixed-trusted systems; and from big data analytics -- predictive and autonomous.

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arXiv2016

Inducing and Mitigating a Self-Reinforcing Degradation in Decision-making Teams

The models in this paper demonstrate how self-reinforcing error due to positive feedback can lead to overload and saturation of decision-making elements, and ultimately the cascading collapse of an organization due to the propagation of overload and erroneous decisions throughout the organization. We begin the paper with an analysis of the stability of the decision-making aspects of command organizations from a system-theoretic perspective. A simple dynamic model shows how an organization can enter into a self-reinforcing cycle of increasing decision workload until the demand for decisions exceeds the decision-making capacity of the organization. We then extend the model to more complex networked organizations and show that they also experience a form of self-reinforcing degradation. In particular, we find that the degradation in decision quality has a tendency to propagate through the hierarchical structure, i.e. overload at one location affects other locations by overloading the higher-level components which then in turn overload their subordinates. Our computational experiments suggest several strategies for mitigating this type of malfunction: dumping excessive load, empowering lower echelons, minimizing the need for coordination, using command-by-negation, insulating weak performers, and applying on-line diagnostics. We describe a method to allocate decision responsibility and arrange information flow dynamically within a team of decision-makers for command and control.

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