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Alexander Peysakhovich

Publications and source records attributed to Alexander Peysakhovich.

24 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Maintaining cooperation in complex social dilemmas using deep reinforcement learning

Social dilemmas are situations where individuals face a temptation to increase their payoffs at a cost to total welfare. Building artificially intelligent agents that achieve good outcomes in these situations is important because many real world interactions include a tension between selfish interests and the welfare of others. We show how to modify modern reinforcement learning methods to construct agents that act in ways that are simple to understand, nice (begin by cooperating), provokable (try to avoid being exploited), and forgiving (try to return to mutual cooperation). We show both theoretically and experimentally that such agents can maintain cooperation in Markov social dilemmas. Our construction does not require training methods beyond a modification of self-play, thus if an environment is such that good strategies can be constructed in the zero-sum case (eg. Atari) then we can construct agents that solve social dilemmas in this environment.

cs.AI↗

Consequentialist conditional cooperation in social dilemmas with imperfect information

Social dilemmas, where mutual cooperation can lead to high payoffs but participants face incentives to cheat, are ubiquitous in multi-agent interaction. We wish to construct agents that cooperate with pure cooperators, avoid exploitation by pure defectors, and incentivize cooperation from the rest. However, often the actions taken by a partner are (partially) unobserved or the consequences of individual actions are hard to predict. We show that in a large class of games good strategies can be constructed by conditioning one's behavior solely on outcomes (ie. one's past rewards). We call this consequentialist conditional cooperation. We show how to construct such strategies using deep reinforcement learning techniques and demonstrate, both analytically and experimentally, that they are effective in social dilemmas beyond simple matrix games. We also show the limitations of relying purely on consequences and discuss the need for understanding both the consequences of and the intentions behind an action.

cs.AI↗

Prosocial learning agents solve generalized Stag Hunts better than selfish ones

Deep reinforcement learning has become an important paradigm for constructing agents that can enter complex multi-agent situations and improve their policies through experience. One commonly used technique is reactive training - applying standard RL methods while treating other agents as a part of the learner's environment. It is known that in general-sum games reactive training can lead groups of agents to converge to inefficient outcomes. We focus on one such class of environments: Stag Hunt games. Here agents either choose a risky cooperative policy (which leads to high payoffs if both choose it but low payoffs to an agent who attempts it alone) or a safe one (which leads to a safe payoff no matter what). We ask how we can change the learning rule of a single agent to improve its outcomes in Stag Hunts that include other reactive learners. We extend existing work on reward-shaping in multi-agent reinforcement learning and show that that making a single agent prosocial, that is, making them care about the rewards of their partners can increase the probability that groups converge to good outcomes. Thus, even if we control a single agent in a group making that agent prosocial can increase our agent's long-run payoff. We show experimentally that this result carries over to a variety of more complex environments with Stag Hunt-like dynamics including ones where agents must learn from raw input pixels.

cs.AI↗

Learning causal effects from many randomized experiments using regularized instrumental variables

Scientific and business practices are increasingly resulting in large collections of randomized experiments. Analyzed together, these collections can tell us things that individual experiments in the collection cannot. We study how to learn causal relationships between variables from the kinds of collections faced by modern data scientists: the number of experiments is large, many experiments have very small effects, and the analyst lacks metadata (e.g., descriptions of the interventions). Here we use experimental groups as instrumental variables (IV) and show that a standard method (two-stage least squares) is biased even when the number of experiments is infinite. We show how a sparsity-inducing l0 regularization can --- in a reversal of the standard bias--variance tradeoff in regularization --- reduce bias (and thus error) of interventional predictions. Because we are interested in interventional loss minimization we also propose a modified cross-validation procedure (IVCV) to feasibly select the regularization parameter. We show, using a trick from Monte Carlo sampling, that IVCV can be done using summary statistics instead of raw data. This makes our full procedure simple to use in many real-world applications.

stat.ML↗

Multi-Agent Cooperation and the Emergence of (Natural) Language

The current mainstream approach to train natural language systems is to expose them to large amounts of text. This passive learning is problematic if we are interested in developing interactive machines, such as conversational agents. We propose a framework for language learning that relies on multi-agent communication. We study this learning in the context of referential games. In these games, a sender and a receiver see a pair of images. The sender is told one of them is the target and is allowed to send a message from a fixed, arbitrary vocabulary to the receiver. The receiver must rely on this message to identify the target. Thus, the agents develop their own language interactively out of the need to communicate. We show that two networks with simple configurations are able to learn to coordinate in the referential game. We further explore how to make changes to the game environment to cause the "word meanings" induced in the game to better reflect intuitive semantic properties of the images. In addition, we present a simple strategy for grounding the agents' code into natural language. Both of these are necessary steps towards developing machines that are able to communicate with humans productively.

cs.CL↗

Combining observational and experimental data to find heterogeneous treatment effects

Every design choice will have different effects on different units. However traditional A/B tests are often underpowered to identify these heterogeneous effects. This is especially true when the set of unit-level attributes is high-dimensional and our priors are weak about which particular covariates are important. However, there are often observational data sets available that are orders of magnitude larger. We propose a method to combine these two data sources to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. First, we use observational time series data to estimate a mapping from covariates to unit-level effects. These estimates are likely biased but under some conditions the bias preserves unit-level relative rank orderings. If these conditions hold, we only need sufficient experimental data to identify a monotonic, one-dimensional transformation from observationally predicted treatment effects to real treatment effects. This reduces power demands greatly and makes the detection of heterogeneous effects much easier. As an application, we show how our method can be used to improve Facebook page recommendations.

cs.AI↗