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Alexandrine Fortier

Publications and source records attributed to Alexandrine Fortier.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Is Convergence Inevitable? Tracing Output Homogeneity Back to Base Models

The lack of diversity in LM content is widely attributed to the alignment process, but how and where exactly in the pipeline this collapse begins is unknown. We argue that output homogeneity is likely learned during the pretraining phase, and only revealed or magnified during the alignment process. Specifically, we find that semantic convergence is observed from the first alignment stage--the instruction-tuning phase (SFT)--suggesting that homogeneity might already exist in the pre-alignment model. To investigate this, we conduct controlled SFT experiments examining how training data influences output convergence on specific input/output pairs. We find that convergence can be revealed and amplified, but not introduced by the SFT data, supporting its role as a catalyst rather than a cause. To further test whether homogeneity originates before alignment, we measure convergence in base models. We find that instruct-like collapse can be induced through prompting alone, even without alignment. Taken together, our results suggest that semantic convergence may arise naturally from the objectives underlying LM training, making it difficult to mitigate through post-alignment interventions alone.

cs.CL

Where Do Backdoors Live? A Component-Level Analysis of Backdoor Propagation in Speech Language Models

Speech language models (SLMs) are systems of systems: independent components that unite to achieve a common goal. Despite their heterogeneous nature, SLMs are often studied end-to-end; how information flows through the pipeline remains obscure. We investigate this question through the lens of backdoor attacks. We first establish that backdoors can propagate through the SLM, leaving all tasks highly vulnerable. From this, we design a component analysis to discover the role each component takes in backdoor learning. We find that backdoor persistence or erasure is highly dependent on the targeted component. Beyond propagation, we examine how backdoors are encoded in shared multitask embeddings, showing that poisoned samples are not directly separable from benign ones, challenging a common separability assumption used in filtering defenses. Our findings emphasize the need to treat multimodal pipelines as intricate systems with unique vulnerabilities, not solely extensions of unimodal ones.

cs.CL

Multi-Target Backdoor Attacks Against Speaker Recognition

In this work, we propose a multi-target backdoor attack against speaker identification using position-independent clicking sounds as triggers. Unlike previous single-target approaches, our method targets up to 50 speakers simultaneously, achieving success rates of up to 95.04%. To simulate more realistic attack conditions, we vary the signal-to-noise ratio between speech and trigger, demonstrating a trade-off between stealth and effectiveness. We further extend the attack to the speaker verification task by selecting the most similar training speaker - based on cosine similarity - as a proxy target. The attack is most effective when target and enrolled speaker pairs are highly similar, reaching success rates of up to 90% in such cases.

cs.SD