arXiv subjects

Alexandros Hollender

Publications and source records attributed to Alexandros Hollender.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Equilibria of Round-Robin: Computational Hardness and Fairness for Few Subadditive Agents

The round-robin procedure is a simple and well-studied fair division mechanism where agents pick goods in turns. Motivated by draft mechanisms in sports leagues, we investigate strategic behaviour in online round-robin for subadditive agents. This gives rise to an extensive-form game, and we study the computational problem of computing a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). We show that for just two submodular agents, computing an SPNE is $\mathsf{PSPACE}$-hard. Even for the class of $\mathit{OXS}$ utilities, which are a special case of submodular utilities, computing an SPNE remains $\mathsf{NP}$-hard for a small number of agents. We complement our computational results with normative results. We show that for just three additive agents, there exist instances where every equilibrium violates EF1. This separates the online and the direct revelation games. On the positive side, we show that for additive agents every equilibrium allocation is proportional up to one good (PROP1) and for two additive agents it is also EF1. Finally, by showing that round-robin is bossy at equilibrium, we prove that the number of equilibrium allocations can be exponential even if agents have lexicographic preferences.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Efficient Equilibrium Computation in Symmetric First-Price Auctions

We study the complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in single-item first-price auctions. We present the first efficient algorithms for the problem, when the bidders' values for the item are independently drawn from the same continuous distribution. More precisely, we design polynomial-time algorithms for the white-box model, where the distribution is provided directly as part of the input, and query-efficient algorithms for the black-box model, where the distribution is accessed via oracle calls. Our results settle the computational complexity of the problem for bidders with i.i.d. values.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Fisher Markets with Approximately Optimal Bundles and the Need for a PCP Theorem for PPAD

We study the problem of computing a competitive equilibrium with approximately optimal bundles in Fisher markets with separable piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utility functions, meaning that every buyer receives a $(1-δ)$-optimal bundle, instead of a perfectly optimal one. We establish the first intractability result for the problem by showing that it is PPAD-hard for some constant $δ> 0$, assuming the PCP-for-PPAD conjecture. This hardness result holds even if all buyers have identical budgets (competitive equilibrium with equal incomes), linear capped utilities, and even if we also allow $\varepsilon$-approximate clearing instead of perfect clearing, for any constant $\varepsilon < 1/9$. Importantly, we show that the PCP-for-PPAD conjecture is in fact required to show hardness for constant $δ$: showing PPAD-hardness for finding such approximate market equilibria in a broad class of markets encompassing those generated by our hardness result would prove the conjecture. This is the first natural problem where the conjecture is provably required to establish hardness for it.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

The Complexity of Min-Max Optimization for Quadratic Polynomials

We prove that computing approximate stationary points of min-max optimization over the hypercube is PPAD-hard for quadratic polynomials. This holds even when the polynomials are multilinear, each variable appears in at most three monomials, and the approximation factor is inverse polynomial. As a direct consequence, we obtain the first PPAD-hardness results for two-team zero-sum polymatrix games.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2026

On Cutting Cakes and Crossing Curves

We consider the classic envy-free cake-cutting problem where the goal is to cut and allocate a divisible resource among a set of agents in a way that avoids any envy between them. When the agents' valuation functions are continuous and nonnegative, an envy-free solution is guaranteed to exist where each agent is allocated a contiguous piece of the resource. Such a solution can be efficiently computed using the standard cut-and-choose algorithm for two agents, but the problem is known to be hard when there are at least four agents. The setting with three agents has remained open. We show that the problem remains intractable for three agents. We obtain this result by uncovering a novel connection between cake-cutting and a computational problem corresponding to the Jordan curve theorem, introduced by Adler, Daskalakis, and Demaine (2016). As our main technical contribution, we provide the first lower bounds for the Jordan curve problem in the form of a query lower bound as well as hardness for the class UEOPL, a subclass of PPAD containing notoriously challenging problems such as Simple Stochastic Games and the P-matrix Linear Complementarity Problem.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Min-Max Optimization Requires Exponentially Many Queries

We study the query complexity of min-max optimization of a nonconvex-nonconcave function $f$ over $[0,1]^d \times [0,1]^d$. We show that, given oracle access to $f$ and to its gradient $\nabla f$, any algorithm that finds an $\varepsilon$-approximate stationary point must make a number of queries that is exponential in $1/\varepsilon$ or $d$.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2026

Constant Inapproximability for Fisher Markets

We study the problem of computing approximate market equilibria in Fisher markets with separable piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utility functions. In this setting, the problem was only known to be PPAD-complete for inverse-polynomial approximations. We strengthen this result by showing PPAD-hardness for constant approximations. This means that the problem does not admit a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) unless PPAD$=$P. In fact, we prove that computing any approximation better than $1/11$ is PPAD-complete. As a direct byproduct of our main result, we get the same inapproximability bound for Arrow-Debreu exchange markets with SPLC utility functions.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

The Complexity of Two-Team Polymatrix Games with Independent Adversaries

Adversarial multiplayer games are an important object of study in multiagent learning. In particular, polymatrix zero-sum games are a multiplayer setting where Nash equilibria are known to be efficiently computable. Towards understanding the limits of tractability in polymatrix games, we study the computation of Nash equilibria in such games where each pair of players plays either a zero-sum or a coordination game. We are particularly interested in the setting where players can be grouped into a small number of teams of identical interest. While the three-team version of the problem is known to be PPAD-complete, the complexity for two teams has remained open. Our main contribution is to prove that the two-team version remains hard, namely it is CLS-hard. Furthermore, we show that this lower bound is tight (i.e., CLS-membership) for the setting where one of the teams consists of multiple independent adversaries. By leveraging this result we also obtain a simple algorithm that finds an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium and only has a $1/\varepsilon^2$ dependence in $\varepsilon$ in its running time. On the way to obtaining our main result, we prove hardness of finding any stationary point in the simplest type of non-convex-concave min-max constrained optimization problem, namely for a class of bilinear polynomial objective functions.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Computing Equilibrium Points of Electrostatic Potentials

We study the computation of equilibrium points of electrostatic potentials: locations in space where the electrostatic force arising from a collection of charged particles vanishes. This is a novel scenario of optimization in which solutions are guaranteed to exist due to a nonconstructive argument, but gradient descent is unreliable due to the presence of singularities. We present an algorithm based on piecewise approximation of the potential function by Taylor series. The main insight is to divide the domain into a grid with variable coarseness, where grid cells are exponentially smaller in regions where the function changes rapidly compared to regions where it changes slowly. Our algorithm finds approximate equilibrium points in time poly-logarithmic in the approximation parameter, but these points are not guaranteed to be close to exact solutions. Nevertheless, we show that such points can be computed efficiently under a mild assumption that we call "strong non-degeneracy". We complement these algorithmic results by studying a generalization of this problem and showing that it is CLS-hard and in PPAD, leaving its precise classification as an intriguing open problem.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2025

Discrepancy Beyond Additive Functions with Applications to Fair Division

We consider a setting where we have a ground set $M$ together with real-valued set functions $f_1, \dots, f_n$, and the goal is to partition $M$ into two sets $S_1,S_2$ such that $|f_i(S_1) - f_i(S_2)|$ is small for every $i$. Many results in discrepancy theory can be stated in this form with the functions $f_i$ being additive. In this work, we initiate the study of the unstructured case where $f_i$ is not assumed to be additive. We show that even without the additivity assumption, the upper bound remains at most $O(\sqrt{n \log n})$. Our result has implications on the fair allocation of indivisible goods. In particular, we show that a consensus halving up to $O(\sqrt{n \log n})$ goods always exists for $n$ agents with monotone utilities. Previously, only an $O(n)$ bound was known for this setting.

math.CO↗

arXiv2025

Envy-Free Cake-Cutting for Four Agents

In the envy-free cake-cutting problem we are given a resource, usually called a cake and represented as the $[0,1]$ interval, and a set of $n$ agents with heterogeneous preferences over pieces of the cake. The goal is to divide the cake among the $n$ agents such that no agent is envious of any other agent. Even under a very general preferences model, this fundamental fair division problem is known to always admit an exact solution where each agent obtains a connected piece of the cake; we study the complexity of finding an approximate solution, i.e., a connected $\varepsilon$-envy-free allocation. For monotone valuations of cake pieces, Deng, Qi, and Saberi (2012) gave an efficient ($\textsf{poly}(\log(1/\varepsilon))$ queries) algorithm for three agents and posed the open problem of four (or more) monotone agents. Even for the special case of additive valuations, Brânzei and Nisan (2022) conjectured an $Ω(1/\varepsilon)$ lower bound on the number of queries for four agents. We provide the first efficient algorithm for finding a connected $\varepsilon$-envy-free allocation with four monotone agents. We also prove that as soon as valuations are allowed to be non-monotone, the problem becomes hard: it becomes PPAD-hard, requires $\textsf{poly}(1/\varepsilon)$ queries in the black-box model, and even $\textsf{poly}(1/\varepsilon)$ communication complexity. This constitutes, to the best of our knowledge, the first intractability result for any version of the cake-cutting problem in the communication complexity model.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

The Complexity of Computing KKT Solutions of Quadratic Programs

It is well known that solving a (non-convex) quadratic program is NP-hard. We show that the problem remains hard even if we are only looking for a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) point, instead of a global optimum. Namely, we prove that computing a KKT point of a quadratic polynomial over the domain $[0,1]^n$ is complete for the class CLS = PPAD$\cap$PLS.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2025

The Complexity of Symmetric Bimatrix Games with Common Payoffs

We study symmetric bimatrix games that also have the common-payoff property, i.e., the two players receive the same payoff at any outcome of the game. Due to the symmetry property, these games are guaranteed to have symmetric Nash equilibria, where the two players play the same (mixed) strategy. While the problem of computing such symmetric equilibria in general symmetric bimatrix games is known to be intractable, namely PPAD-complete, this result does not extend to our setting. Indeed, due to the common-payoff property, the problem lies in the lower class CLS, ruling out PPAD-hardness. In this paper, we show that the problem remains intractable, namely it is CLS-complete. On the way to proving this result, as our main technical contribution, we show that computing a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) point of a quadratic program remains CLS-hard, even when the feasible domain is a simplex.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors

We consider the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions, where the bidders' values for the item are drawn from a general (possibly correlated) joint distribution. We show that when the values and the bidding space are discrete, determining the existence of a pure Bayes-Nash equilibrium is NP-hard. This is the first hardness result in the literature of the problem that does not rely on assumptions of subjectivity of the priors, or convoluted tie-breaking rules. We then present two main approaches for achieving positive results, via bid sparsification and via bid densification. The former is more combinatorial and is based on enumeration techniques, whereas the latter makes use of the continuous theory of the problem developed in the economics literature. Using these approaches, we develop polynomial-time approximation algorithms for computing equilibria in symmetric settings or settings with a fixed number of bidders, for different (discrete or continuous) variants of the auction.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Constant Inapproximability for PPA

In the $\varepsilon$-Consensus-Halving problem, we are given $n$ probability measures $v_1, \dots, v_n$ on the interval $R = [0,1]$, and the goal is to partition $R$ into two parts $R^+$ and $R^-$ using at most $n$ cuts, so that $|v_i(R^+) - v_i(R^-)| \leq \varepsilon$ for all $i$. This fundamental fair division problem was the first natural problem shown to be complete for the class PPA, and all subsequent PPA-completeness results for other natural problems have been obtained by reducing from it. We show that $\varepsilon$-Consensus-Halving is PPA-complete even when the parameter $\varepsilon$ is a constant. In fact, we prove that this holds for any constant $\varepsilon < 1/5$. As a result, we obtain constant inapproximability results for all known natural PPA-complete problems, including Necklace-Splitting, the Discrete-Ham-Sandwich problem, two variants of the pizza sharing problem, and for finding fair independent sets in cycles and paths.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2024

On the Computation of Equilibria in Discrete First-Price Auctions

We study the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions with discrete value distributions and discrete bidding space, under general subjective beliefs. It is known that such auctions do not always have pure equilibria. In this paper, we prove that the problem of deciding their existence is NP-complete, even for approximate equilibria. On the other hand, it can be shown that mixed equilibria are guaranteed to exist; however, their computational complexity has not been studied before. We establish the PPAD-completeness of computing a mixed equilibrium and we complement this by an efficient algorithm for finding symmetric approximate equilibria in the special case of iid priors. En route to these results, we develop a computational equivalence framework between continuous and discrete first-price auctions, which can be of independent interest, and which allows us to transfer existing positive and negative results from one setting to the other. Finally, we show that correlated equilibria of the auction can be computed in polynomial time.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Pure-Circuit: Tight Inapproximability for PPAD

The current state-of-the-art methods for showing inapproximability in PPAD arise from the $\varepsilon$-Generalized-Circuit ($\varepsilon$-GCircuit) problem. Rubinstein (2018) showed that there exists a small unknown constant $\varepsilon$ for which $\varepsilon$-GCircuit is PPAD-hard, and subsequent work has shown hardness results for other problems in PPAD by using $\varepsilon$-GCircuit as an intermediate problem. We introduce Pure-Circuit, a new intermediate problem for PPAD, which can be thought of as $\varepsilon$-GCircuit pushed to the limit as $\varepsilon \rightarrow 1$, and we show that the problem is PPAD-complete. We then prove that $\varepsilon$-GCircuit is PPAD-hard for all $\varepsilon < 0.1$ by a reduction from Pure-Circuit, and thus strengthen all prior work that has used GCircuit as an intermediate problem from the existential-constant regime to the large-constant regime. We show that stronger inapproximability results can be derived by reducing directly from Pure-Circuit. In particular, we prove tight inapproximability results for computing approximate Nash equilibria and approximate well-supported Nash equilibria in graphical games, for finding approximate well-supported Nash equilibria in polymatrix games, and for finding approximate equilibria in threshold games.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2024

The Computational Complexity of Finding Stationary Points in Non-Convex Optimization

Finding approximate stationary points, i.e., points where the gradient is approximately zero, of non-convex but smooth objective functions $f$ over unrestricted $d$-dimensional domains is one of the most fundamental problems in classical non-convex optimization. Nevertheless, the computational and query complexity of this problem are still not well understood when the dimension $d$ of the problem is independent of the approximation error. In this paper, we show the following computational and query complexity results: 1. The problem of finding approximate stationary points over unrestricted domains is PLS-complete. 2. For $d = 2$, we provide a zero-order algorithm for finding $\varepsilon$-approximate stationary points that requires at most $O(1/\varepsilon)$ value queries to the objective function. 3. We show that any algorithm needs at least $Ω(1/\varepsilon)$ queries to the objective function and/or its gradient to find $\varepsilon$-approximate stationary points when $d=2$. Combined with the above, this characterizes the query complexity of this problem to be $Θ(1/\varepsilon)$. 4. For $d = 2$, we provide a zero-order algorithm for finding $\varepsilon$-KKT points in constrained optimization problems that requires at most $O(1/\sqrt{\varepsilon})$ value queries to the objective function. This closes the gap between the works of Bubeck and Mikulincer [2020] and Vavasis [1993] and characterizes the query complexity of this problem to be $Θ(1/\sqrt{\varepsilon})$. 5. Combining our results with the recent result of Fearnley et al. [2022], we show that finding approximate KKT points in constrained optimization is reducible to finding approximate stationary points in unconstrained optimization but the converse is impossible.

math.OC↗