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Alexis Ghersengorin

Publications and source records attributed to Alexis Ghersengorin.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Grabbing the Forbidden Fruit: Restriction-Sensitive Choice

Restricting individuals' access to some opportunities may steer their desire toward their substitutes, a phenomenon known as the forbidden fruit effect. We axiomatize a choice model named restriction-sensitive choice (RSC), which rationalizes the forbidden fruit effect and is compatible with the prominent psychological explanations: reactance theory and commodity theory. The model is identifiable from choice data, specifically from the observation of choice reversals caused by the removal of options. We conduct a normative analysis both in terms of the agent's freedom and welfare. We apply our model to shed light on two phenomena: the backfire effect of beliefs and the backlash of integration policies targeted towards minorities.

econ.TH

AI Testing Should Account for Sophisticated Strategic Behaviour

This position paper argues for two claims regarding AI testing and evaluation. First, to remain informative about deployment behaviour, evaluations need account for the possibility that AI systems understand their circumstances and reason strategically. Second, game-theoretic analysis can inform evaluation design by formalising and scrutinising the reasoning in evaluation-based safety cases. Drawing on examples from existing AI systems, a review of relevant research, and formal strategic analysis of a stylised evaluation scenario, we present evidence for these claims and motivate several research directions.

cs.GT

Robust Regulation of Labour Contracts

We study the robust regulation of contracts in moral hazard problems. A firm offers a contract to incentivise a worker protected by limited liability. A regulator restricts the set of permissible contracts to (i) improve efficiency and (ii) protect the worker. The regulator faces uncertainty about both the worker's actions and the firm's production cost, and evaluates regulations based on their worst-case regret. The regret-minimising regulation mandates a minimum piece rate compensation for the worker. This rule simultaneously guarantees a fair share for the worker and preserves enough contractual flexibility to provide incentives.

econ.TH

Redistribution Through Market Segmentation

We study how to optimally segment monopolistic markets with a redistributive objective. We characterize optimal redistributive segmentations and show that they (i) induce the seller to price progressively, i.e., charge richer consumers higher prices than poorer ones, and (ii) may not maximize consumer surplus, instead granting extra profits to the monopolist. We further show that optimal redistributive segmentations are implementable via price-based regulation.

econ.TH