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Alfredo Madrid-García

Publications and source records attributed to Alfredo Madrid-García.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Jev in Medicine: A Benchmark Evaluation

Jev is a non-generative System One model that assigns probabilities to predefined answer options and cannot answer outside them. Its accuracy and calibration on medical question-answering and case-based diagnostic-reasoning tasks are unknown. We evaluated Jev 1.13 on four medical benchmarks: MetaMedQA, PubMedQA, DiagnosisArena-MCQ and the NEJM Case Challenges. GPT-6 Sol, with (medium) and without reasoning, was the reference. The primary outcome was top-1 accuracy; key secondary outcomes were calibration, selective prediction and recognition of unanswerable questions. All 8,469 requests returned a valid answer. Jev's accuracy was similar to that of GPT-6 Sol with medium reasoning on PubMedQA (78.4% vs 78.2%;), lower on MetaMedQA (74.8% vs 82.7%) and much lower on DiagnosisArena-MCQ (59.8% vs 82.4%;) and the NEJM cases (61.8% vs 82.4%). On MetaMedQA, Jev's probabilities were the best calibrated (expected calibration error 0.063 vs 0.146), and its answers with a probability of at least 0.9 (52.9% of questions) were 93.4% accurate, but GPT-6 Sol was as accurate when it accepted a similar proportion of questions. On DiagnosisArena-MCQ, Jev's probabilities discriminated poorly (AUROC 0.645 vs 0.768). Of the 162 questions whose correct answer was "I don't know or cannot answer", Jev chose that option for 10.5% (GPT-6 Sol, 8.6%). Median latency was 0.27-0.31 s; all 2,823 items cost USD 0.08. Jev was fast and inexpensive, and its accuracy was similar to that of a frontier LLM on research abstracts but lower on examination questions and much lower on complex diagnostic cases. Task-specific validation is required before clinical use.

cs.AI↗

When RAG Chatbots Expose Their Backend: An Anonymized Case Study of Privacy and Security Risks in Patient-Facing Medical AI

Background: Patient-facing medical chatbots based on retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) are increasingly promoted to deliver accessible, grounded health information. AI-assisted development lowers the barrier to building them, but they still demand rigorous security, privacy, and governance controls. Objective: To report an anonymized, non-destructive security assessment of a publicly accessible patient-facing medical RAG chatbot and identify governance lessons for safe deployment of generative AI in health. Methods: We used a two-stage strategy. First, Claude Opus 4.6 supported exploratory prompt-based testing and structured vulnerability hypotheses. Second, candidate findings were manually verified using Chrome Developer Tools, inspecting browser-visible network traffic, payloads, API schemas, configuration objects, and stored interaction data. Results: The LLM-assisted phase identified a critical vulnerability: sensitive system and RAG configuration appeared exposed through client-server communication rather than restricted server-side. Manual verification confirmed that ordinary browser inspection allowed collection of the system prompt, model and embedding configuration, retrieval parameters, backend endpoints, API schema, document and chunk metadata, knowledge-base content, and the 1,000 most recent patient-chatbot conversations. The deployment also contradicted its privacy assurances: full conversation records, including health-related queries, were retrievable without authentication. Conclusions: Serious privacy and security failures in patient-facing RAG chatbots can be identified with standard browser tools, without specialist skills or authentication; independent review should be a prerequisite for deployment. Commercial LLMs accelerated this assessment, including under a false developer persona; assistance available to auditors is equally available to adversaries.

cs.CR↗