arXiv subjects

Ali Ghoroghi

Publications and source records attributed to Ali Ghoroghi.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Constitutional governance for societies of AI agents in the built environment: a research agenda

The built environment is on the cusp of populating itself with autonomous artificial agents. AI systems that advise, control and coordinate are being deployed across retrofit, operation and mobility faster than their collective behaviour is studied. The dominant framing treats each agent as a tool operating on a passive building, governance reduced to single-agent safety, which is inadequate. A building, a street, or a city is more accurately modelled as a society of negotiating agents: occupants, owners, operators, regulators, and the artificial agents increasingly acting on their behalf. Their interactions are strategic, their information asymmetric, and the outcomes that matter are properties of the whole. The paper proposes a research agenda for constitutional multi-agent governance of the built environment, organised around three problems: mechanism design for retrofit under deep uncertainty, treating public subsidy as a mechanism component; physics-informed verification of agents in building operations; and antifragile coordination for urban infrastructure under shocks. Drawing on three decades of multi-agent systems research, the paper sets out conceptual foundations, works one governance event through in detail, identifies twelve open problems, and outlines what the agenda requires in data, computation, disciplinary integration and governance.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

Multi-Scale Equilibrium under Variable Indicator Dimensionality: Faithful Reduction of Dynamic Attractors in Urban Mobility Systems

Equilibrium analysis of urban mobility systems is formulated in a high-dimensional indicator space, whilst data availability varies sharply across cities and disruption contexts. This paper gives a formal treatment of that mismatch. It presents a dynamic multi-layer equilibrium attractor for disrupted urban mobility, in which a fast performance layer relaxes towards an indicator-dependent target, a slow strategic layer supplies a joint traffic, modal and learning fixed point, and antifragility is classified through a statistical decision rule on the post-to-baseline performance ratio. It then characterises when a lower-dimensional indicator projection is faithful to this equilibrium structure, establishing four results: conditions for exact and approximate projectability of the attractor with an explicit error bound; preservation of the coupled two-layer fixed point up to a contraction boundary; the retained Fisher information and decision power of any indicator support under a measurement model on observable urban indicators; and a one-sided restoration-time bias, whereby reduced monitoring can only understate recovery duration. A simulation study on three stylised pilot-city configurations verifies each result, and shows that two observable channels suffice for the candidate classification target where the indicator catalogue permits. The framework gives city authorities a principled basis for deciding which indicators must be maintained.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2012

Multi-games and a double game extension of the Prisoner's Dilemma

We propose a new class of games, called Multi-Games (MG), in which a given number of players play a fixed number of basic games simultaneously. In each round of the MG, each player will have a specific set of weights, one for each basic game, which add up to one and represent the fraction of the player's investment in each basic game. The total payoff for each player is then the convex combination, with the corresponding weights, of the payoffs it obtains in the basic games. The basic games in a MG can be regarded as different environments for the players. When the players' weights for the different games in MG are private information or types with given conditional probability distributions, we obtain a particular class of Bayesian games. We show that for the class of so-called completely pure regular Double Game (DG) with finite sets of types, the Nash equilibria (NE) of the basic games can be used to compute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the DG in linear time with respect to the number of types of the players. We study a DG for the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) by extending the PD with a second so-called Social Game (SG), generalising the notion of altruistic extension of a game in which players have different altruistic levels (or social coefficients). We study two different examples of Bayesian games in this context in which the social coefficients have a finite set of values and each player only knows the probability distribution of the opponent's social coefficient. In the first case we have a completely pure regular DG for which we deduce a Bayesian NE. Finally, we use the second example to compare various strategies in a round-robin tournament of the DG for PD, in which the players can change their social coefficients incrementally from one round to the next.

cs.GT↗