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Alif Aqsha

Publications and source records attributed to Alif Aqsha.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Solving Linear-Quadratic Stochastic Control Problems with Signatures

We study a signature-driven numerical scheme to solve multi-dimensional linear-quadratic (LQ) stochastic control problems. Using that linear signature functionals are dense in the natural class of admissible controls, we show that our approach turns the original LQ problem into a deterministic convex quadratic polynomial optimisation. To underpin a numerical approach based on truncated signatures, we prove that the problem's value function can be approximated by finite-dimensional polynomial approximations when the truncation levels are chosen sufficiently high. Remarkably, our numerical experiments show very decent accuracy already for small truncation levels. Key tools for our analysis are (i) the algebraic representation of controlled stochastic differential equations and the associated cost function as linear functionals of the path signatures of the driving noise, (ii) the convergence of the truncated linear functionals, and (iii) the density of signature controls.

math.OC

Equilibrium Reward for Liquidity Providers in Automated Market Makers

We find the equilibrium contract that an automated market maker (AMM) offers to their strategic liquidity providers (LPs) in order to maximize the order flow that gets processed by the venue. Our model is formulated as a leader-follower stochastic game, where the venue is the leader and a representative LP is the follower. We derive approximate closed-form equilibrium solutions to the stochastic game and analyze the reward structure. Our findings suggest that under the equilibrium contract, LPs have incentives to add liquidity to the pool only when higher liquidity on average attracts more noise trading. The equilibrium contract depends on the external price, the pool reference price, and the pool reserves. Our framework offers insights into AMM design for maximizing order flow while ensuring LP profitability.

q-fin.TR

Strategic Learning and Trading in Broker-Mediated Markets

We study strategic interactions in a broker-mediated market in which agents learn and exploit each other's private information. A broker provides liquidity to an informed trader and to noise traders while managing inventory in a lit market. The informed trader infers the broker's trading activity in the lit market, while the broker estimates the trader's private signal. Information leakage in the client's trading flow generates economic value for the broker that is comparable in magnitude to transaction costs: the broker can speculate profitably and manage risk more effectively, which in turn adversely affects the informed trader's performance. Brokers therefore hold a strategic advantage over traders who rely solely on prices to filter information. When the broker only relies on prices rather than client trading flow to infer information, their trading performance becomes indistinguishable from the performance of a naive strategy that internalises noise flow, externalises informed flow, and offloads inventory at a constant rate.

q-fin.TR