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Alireza Kavousi

Publications and source records attributed to Alireza Kavousi.

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Proof of Source of Funds: Efficient On-chain Provenance of Cryptoassets

Regulatory compliance is increasingly mandatory for decentralized finance and privacy-enhancing technologies. Current approaches rely on binary inclusion/exclusion lists or retroactive graph analysis by centralized blockchain intelligence firms. This approach strips honest users of their financial privacy, leads to false positives and negatives, and forces decentralized platforms to bear the burden of on-chain transaction monitoring. In this work, we propose a paradigm shift: moving from platform-side surveillance to user-side provenance. We introduce Proof of Source of Funds (PoSoF), a novel cryptographic framework that shifts the burden to the user. Rather than the platform tracing funds, the user locally generates a zero-knowledge proof demonstrating that their deposit originates exclusively from a set of compliant sources. The platform is thus relieved of chain-analysis duties, requiring a constant-time, O(1) verification to enforce admission control. We formulate a unified temporal Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) abstraction that formalizes both UTXO and account-based ledger histories within a generalized value-flow model. Users extract a compliant sub-DAG of their transaction history and utilize Incrementally Verifiable Computation (IVC) to prove rigorous state-transition predicates that protect against various attack vectors. Crucially, PoSoF provides verifiable cryptographic provenance; it guarantees the legitimacy of the funds without leaking the intermediate transaction topology, intermediary addresses, or the specific origins utilized. We formally define the security properties of PoSoF and evaluate an Ethereum-compatible prototype. Our benchmarks demonstrate that fully private, proactive compliance is highly practical, requiring only ~1.8 s to incrementally update a user's PoSoF per new transaction, and a constant-time ~1.5 ms (~800k gas) for final on-chain EVM verification.

cs.CR

Improved Secure Efficient Delegated Private Set Intersection

Private Set Intersection (PSI) is a vital cryptographic technique used for securely computing common data of different sets. In PSI protocols, often two parties hope to find their common set elements without needing to disclose their uncommon ones. In recent years, the cloud has been playing an influential role in PSI protocols which often need huge computational tasks. In 2017, Abadi et al. introduced a scheme named EO-PSI which uses a cloud to pass on the main computations to it and does not include any public-key operations. In EO-PSI, parties need to set up secure channels beforehand; otherwise, an attacker can easily eavesdrop on communications between honest parties and find private information. This paper presents an improved EO-PSI scheme which has the edge on the previous scheme in terms of privacy and complexity. By providing possible attacks on the prior scheme, we show the necessity of using secure channels between parties. Also, our proposed protocol is secure against passive attacks without having to have any secure channels. We measure the protocol's overhead and show that computational complexity is considerably reduced and also is fairer compared to the previous scheme.

cs.CR